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CliÀxTER I
The I r lm a  F a c ie  Asymmetry betw een D e s i r e s  a s  Reasons f o r  
B e l i e f  ancl D e s i r e s  as  Reasons f o r  A c t io n
The p o i n t  ar.cl p u rp o se  o f  draw ing a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  
asymmetry be tw een  d e s i r e s  as  re a so n s  f o r  a c t i o n  and d e s i r e s  
a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  i f  i t  t u r n s  o u t  to  be  a 
g en u ine  one i t  w i l l  have im p o r ta n t  co n seq u en ces  f o r  th e  
q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r  th e  w i l l  can be  b ro u g h t  to  b e a r  on 
b e l i e f s ,  which w i l l  in  t u r n  have im p o r ta n t  co nsequences  
f o r  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  b e l i e f s .  S in c e  
most o f  o u r  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n s  a re  e x p la in e d  p a r t l y  by o u r  
b e l i e f s ,  i t  rrsay p e rh a p s  a l s o  have an Im p o r ta n t  b e a r in g  on 
th e  n o t io n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i o n .  An example o f  
th e  s o r t  o f  problem  i t  m igh t h e lp  to  so lv e  i s  th e  fo l lo w in g :  
a man g iv e s  a k n i f e  to  a madman, who th e n  k i l l s  somebody 
w ith  i t .  We would b e  i n c l i n e d  to  say  t h a t  th e  sane man 
was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  m urder s in c e  he was th e  i n d i r e c t  
c au se  o f  i t ,  and we do n o t  h o ld  Aadmen r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s .  But i f  th e  sane  man j u s t i f i e s  h i s  a c t i o n  by 
s a y in g  t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t r e a t i n g  t h i s  madman l i k e  a 
sane man would en co u rag e  him to  behave l i k e  one , m ight t h i s  
a l t e r  our view o f  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  murder? The 
answer to  t h i s  w i l l  depend on such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as  w h e th e r  
b e l i e f  i s  to  any e x te n t  v o l u n ta r y ,  and i f  s o ,  to  what e x t e n t ,  
and w h e th e r  th e  man g e n u in e ly  b e l i e v e d  what he  s a id  he 
b e l i e v e d ,  o r  w he ther  t h i s  ^/as an i n s i n c e r e  a s s e r t i o n  o f  
b e l i e f  g iv en  m ere ly  in  an a t t e m p t  t o  j u s t i f y  an i r r a t i o n a l  
o r  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  a c t i o n .
Reasons can be g iv en  f o r  a lm o s t  e v e r y th in g  t h a t  happens 
in  th e  w orld  and in  t h i s  lo o s e  se n se  o f  th e  word i t  j u s t  
means 'w h a t  e x p la in s * .  ho l i m i t  i s  h e re  p la c e d  on th e
2s o r t  o f  t h in g s  r e a s o n s  can be g iven  f o r :  p h y s i c a l  e v e n t s
and s t a t e s ,  human a c t i o n s ,  m en ta l  s t a t e s  and p ro ce sse s*
But when we t a l k  o f  th e  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  own 
a c t i o n s  o r  m en ta l  s t a t e s ,  t h e  word t a k e s  on a more 
s p e c i a l i z e d  meaning* I t  does n o t  j u s t  mean "what e x p l a i n s ' ,  
s in c e  what e x p la in s  an a c t i o n  or m en ta l s t a t e ,  althouglii i t  
may be what o t h e r s  c i t e  a s  th e  re a so n s  f o r  a m an 's  a c t i o n  
o r  m en ta l  s t a t e ,  o f t e n  c a n n o t  be c i t e d  by th e  man h im s e l f  
a s  a r e a s o n  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n  o r  m en ta l s t a t e *  T h is  i s  
b e ca u se  when a  man g iv e s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i e  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  
o r  m en ta l  s t a t e  th e  re a s o n s  he g iv e s  must r a t i o n a l i z e  and 
j u s t i f y  h i s  a c t i o n  o r  s t a t e .  That th e y  f u l f i l  t h i s  
f u n c t i o n  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  b e in g  h i s  rea(8ona. 
Reasons a lw ays have some e x p la n a to r y  f u n c t i o n ,  b u t  they  
do n o t  a lw ays e x p la in  i n  th e  se n se  o f  g iv in g  n e c e s s a r y  
o r  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  an e v e n t .  So, th e  v ag u en ess  
o f  th e  word ’ r e a s o n ’ g iv e s  r i s e  to  an asymmetry o f  f u n c t i o n  
in  th e  re a s o n s  t h a t  c a r  be g iv en  by somebody f o r  an e v e n t  
o r  s t a t e  which i s  n o t  a t t a c h e d  to  him and th e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  
a r e  g iv e n  by somebody f o r  h i s  own a c t i o n s  o r  s t a t e s *
But w i th in  th e  rea lm  o f  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  
own a c t i o n s  and m en ta l  s t a t e s  t h e r e  i s  a f u r t h e r  asymmetry 
betw een th e  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  t o  j u s t i f y  and r a t i o n a l i z e  
h i s  own a c t i o n s  and th e  r e a s o n s  he g iv e s  to  j u s t i f y  and 
r a t i o n a l i z e  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  and th e r e  i s  a c o n s t r a i n t  on 
b o th  ty p e s  o f  reasons*  T h is  asymmetry can  be seen  by 
c o n s id e r in g  th e  s o r t  o f  f a c t o r s  which a man may c i t e  a s  
h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n  and th e  s o r t  o f  f a c t o r s  he may c i t e  
a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f s .  A man may g iv e  a s  h i s  r e a so n  f o r  
d o in g  som eth ing  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he j u s t  w anted to  do i t ,  ( th oug h  
w h e th e r  t h i s  would r e a l l y  j u s t i f y  th e  te rm  ' r e a s o n '  i s
d e b a ta b le  s in c e  i t  h a r d ly  r a t i o n a l i z e s  o r  j u s t i f i e s  o r  
even e x p la in s  and i t  m ight be s a i d  t h a t  i f  a  man p e r fo rm s  
an a c t i o n  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  he must i n  a t r i v i a l  s e n se  have 
w anted to  do i t *  I t  C8ui, how ever, have a u s e f u l  r o l e  
i n  t h a t  i t  can t e l l  u s  t h a t  i t  was ar i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t i o n  
where t h e r e  may have b e e n  some doub t ab ou t t h i s ) .  A man 
may g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n  by c i t i n g  h i s  i n t e n t i o n s ,  
h i s  p u rp o s e s ,  h i s  m o t iv e s ,  h i s  f e e l i n g s  o r  e m o tio n s ,  h i s  
d e s i r e s ,  o r  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  and i f  h i s  r e a s o n s  i n  te rm s o f  
th e s e  f a c t o r s  r a t i o n a l i z e  o r  j u s t i f y  th e  a c t i o n ,  th e n  th e y  
a re  l e g i t i m a t e  r e a s o n s .
B u t th e  o n ly  f a c t o r  i n  th e  above l i s t  which a man 
c o u ld  l e g i t i m a t e l y  g iv e  a s  a  re a so n  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  would 
be  a n o th e r  b e l i e f .  To suppose  t h a t  a man c o u ld  g iv e  a s  
h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h o ld in g  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f  t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  
X o u t  o f  j e a lo u s y  o r  in  o r d e r  to  avenge h im s e l f  on A, o r  
b e ca u se  he f e l t  a n g ry ,  o r  b e c a u se  he w anted  y and b e l i e v i n g  
X was a good way t o  g e t  y makes n o n sen se  o f  o u r  o r d in a r y  
c o n ce p t  o f  b e l i e f .  A man may on ly  g iv e  a s  h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  
b e l i e v i n g  x m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t .  These m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t  w i l l  
som etim es be t h in g s  o f  w hich i t  makes no se n se  to  a sk  th e  
q u e s t io n  'How do you know?' a s  i n ,  f o r  exam ple , ' I  b e l i e v e  
th e  sky i s  b lu e  b e c a u se  i t  i s  b l u e '  and th ey  w i l l  som etim es 
be h i s  b e l i e f s  ab ou t m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t ,  where th e  b e l i e f  i s  
l e s s  s u r e l y  o r  more i n d i r e c t l y  g a in e d  from th e  w o rld  a s  i t  
i s .  F o r  e x M p le ;  ' I  b e l i e v e  i t  w i l l  be  f i n e  tomorrow 
b e ca u se  I  b e l i e v e  th e  s a y in g  "Red sky a t  n i g h t ,  s h e p h e r d 's  
d e l i g h t "  i s  u s u a l l y  r i g h t * .
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c o n s t r a i n t  on th e  ty p e  o f  
f a c t o r s  a  man may l e g i t i m a t e l y  c i t e  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f  i s  n o t  j u s t  a c o n t in g e n t  f a c t  abou t r e a s o n s  f o r
hb e l i e f ;  i t  i s  a  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  w hich stem s from th e  
n a tu r e  o f  b e l i e f  i t s e l f .  D e s i re s  c an n o t  l o g i c a l l y  be g iv e n  
by a b e l i e v e r  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  and i f  th ey  a r e ,  
t h i s  w i l l  d i s c o u n t  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind as  b e in g  one o f  b e l i e f .  
Suppose someone answ ers  th e  q u e s t io n  'Why do you b e l i e v e  Tom 
i s  h o n e s t ? '  w i th  'B e c a u se  I  w a i t  to  employ him and i f  he  was 
d i s h o n e s t  I  would n o t  be  a b le  to* we c o u ld  n o t  say  t h a t  he 
g e n u in e ly  b e l i e v e d  Tom was h o n e s t  and n o r  c o u ld  h e .  We 
m i ^ t  say  t h a t  by a p ro c e s s  o f  s e l f - a n a l y s i s  he had come 
to  se e  what th e  r e a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  w e re ,  b u t  i f  
th e s e  a r e  in  term s o f  h i s  d e s i r e s  h i s  s t a t e  c an n o t  l o g i c a l l y  
be  one o f  b e l i e f  b e ca u se  i t  i s  a l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  f e a t u r e  
o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  aim s a t  t r u t h :  when a man b e l i e v e s  a
p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s  i t  to  be t r u e  (and when he b e l i e v e s  
a p r o p o s i t i o n  to  be  f a l s e  he  b e l i e v e s  i t  to  be t r u e  t h a t  
t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  f a l s e . )  'When a  man g iv e s  r e a s o n s  
f o r  a b e l i e f  he must a l s o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  he i s  g iv in g  r e a s o n s  
f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s ,  and d e s i r e s  
do n o t ,  and c o u ld  n o t  l o g i c a l l y ,  have any i n f lu e n c e  on th e  
t r u t h  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s .
T here  a re  two c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  co u ld  be  made o f  th e  
p e rso n  who g iv e s  d e s i r e s  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f :  we
c o u ld  c r i t i c i z e  i t  a s  a r e a s o n , w i th o u t  d i s c o u n t i n g  h i s  
s t a t e  o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f ,  and a sk  him to  p ro v id e  
a n o th e r  r e a s o n ,  o r  we c o u ld  a c c e p t  h i s  r e a s o n  a s  a r e a so n  
f o r  som eth ing  b u t  n o t  a s  a re a so n  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f .  We 
would have to  d i s c o u n t  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f  
and a c c e p t  h i s  r e a so n  as  a re a so n  f o r ,  f o r  exam ple , 
p r e te n d in g  to  b e l i e v e .
Til e r e  i s  a l s o  a l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on what can count
as  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n ,  though p e rh a p s  n o t  such an o b v ious  
one and th e  l o g i c a l  ' c o n s t r a i n t  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  r e a s o n s  fo r^  
v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n ,  w h e th e r  g iv en  by th e  p e rso n  who p e rfo rm s  
th e  a c t i o n ,  o r  by  someone e l s e .  The c o n s t r a i n t  on 
r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f ,  how ever, does n o t  app ly  e q u a l ly  no 
m a t t e r  who g iv e s  th e  r e a s o n s .  A man can n o t g iv e  h i s  
d e s i r e s  as  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  own b e l i e f ,  b u t  someone e l s e  
may q u i t e  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c i t e  t h e  f i r s t  m an 's  d e s i r e s  as  
th e  r e a l  re a so n  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f .  The o b s e rv e r  i s  g i v in g  
re a s o n s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  m an 's  b e l i e f  in  th e  se n se  t h a t  he i s  
e x p l a i n i n g  i t ,  b u t  he i s  h a r d ly  j u s t i f y i n g  h i e  s t a t e  o f  
mind e x c e p t  i n  a v e ry  l i m i t e d  s e n s e ,  s i n c e  whet j u s t i f i e s  
someone’ e s t a t e  o f  mind a s  b e in g  o n e^o f  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  he 
b e l i e v e s  h i s  r e a s o n s  p o i n t  t o  th e  t r u t h  o f  h i s  b e l i e f #
I t  seems t h a t  i f  som eth ing  i s  to  coun t a s  a r e a s o n  
f o r  a v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n ,  w h e th er  th e  re a s o n  i s  g iv en  by  
th e  p e rso n  who pe rfo rm ed  th e  a c t io n  o r  by someone e l s e  
i t  must s t a i d  i n  some r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a c t o r ' s  d e s i r e s  
and i f  i t  does n o t  i t  c e a s e s  to  be a r e a s o n .  In  g iv in g  
a r e a s o n  f o r  a v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  we a lw ays im ply a  d e s i r e  
and i f  we do n o t  we c e a s e  to  g iv e  a r e a s o n  f o r  o u r  a c t i o n .
F o r  exam ple, i t  i s  no good g iv in g  as  a re a so n  f o r  d o in g  
so m eth in g  ' I  b e l i e v e  i t  w i l l  be  con d u c iv e  to  x '  u n l e s s  
we c a r  ta k e  t h i s  a s  im p ly in g  t h a t  I  want x . And by no 
means a l l  b e l i e f s  qpp imply d e s i r e s ,  a t  l e a s t  n o t  in  th e  
c o n te x t  o f  a re a so n  f o r  a s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n .  I  c a n n o t ,  i n  
answer to  th e  q u e s t io n  '# h y  have you made a cup o f  t e a ? '  
say 'B ecau se  X b e l i e v e  th e  L abour P a r t y  w i l l  win th e  n e x t  
e l e c t i o n '  thougl: t h i s  m ight be a ve ry  good rea so n  f o r  a n o th e r  
a c t i o n .  The same a p p l i e s  to  a l l  th e  ty p e s  o f  f a c t o r s  which 
can be g iv en  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n .  An i n t e n t i o n  o r
6purpose  w hich I  g ive  as a rea so n  f o r  a c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  c o u n t  
a s  a re a s o n  u n l e s s  i t  can be  tak e n  to  im ply t h a t  I  d e s i r e  
t h a t  which I i n t e n d  to  b r i n g  a b o u t ,  p r  som eth ing  to  which 
i t  i s  c o n d u c iv e .  The c la im  t h a t  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  m u st ,  
to  co u n t a s  r e a s o n s ,  s ta n d  in  some r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a c t o r ' s  
d e s i r e s  w i l l  be examined more th o ro u g h ly  i n  th e  second  
c h a p te r .
Only one k in d  o f  c r i t i c i s m  can be made o f  someone who 
t r i e s  t o  g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n  which a re  q u i t e  
u n r e l a t e d  to  any d e s i r e s  o f  h i s ,  and t h i s  i s  t h a t  he h a s  
g iv en  no re a so n  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n .  T here  i s  no room f o r  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he may have g iv en  a r e a so n  f o r  so m eth in g  
e l s e  t h a t  he  d i d ,  as  t h e r e  i s  i n  b e l i e f .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  b e l i e f  i s  t i : a t  i f  one i s  g iv in g  a 
r e a so n  f o r  so m eth in g  e l s e  ( l i k e  p r e t e n d in g  to  b e l i e v e )  
th e n ,  i n  v i r t u e  o f  t h i s ,  one i s  n o t  g iv in g  a re a so n  f o r  
b e l i e f .
As th e  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  s tem s 
from th e  n e c e s s a r y  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  aims a t  t r u t h ,
60 th e  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n  stem s from  
th e  c o n c e p t  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  b e c a u se  
th e  e s s e n c e  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  i s  d o in g  so m eth in g  b e c a u se  
one w an ts  to  t h a t  r e a s o n s  f o r  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  must a lw ays 
s ta n d  i n  some r e l a t i o n  to  d e s i r e s .  T hat th e  c o n n e c t io n  
betw een  th e  co n ce p t  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  and th e  c o n s t r a i n t  
on r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n  i n  te rm s o f  b e in g  r e l a t e d  to  a d e s i r e  
i s  a n e c e s s a r y  one cari be seen  by th e  a b s u r d i ty  o f  g iv in g  
d e s i r e s  as  r e a s o n s  f o r  o n e 's  i n v o lu n t a r y  a c t i o n s ,  (some 
p h i lo s o p h e r s  would say t h a t  r e a s o n s  canno t be g iv e n  f o r  
i n v o lu n t a r y  a c t i o n s  a t  a l l  s in c e  one can  on ly  g iv e  a 
r e a s o n  f o r  what i s  v o lu n ta r y  -  a t  l e a s t  i n  th e  rea lm  o f
7human a c t i o n .  Rut t h i s  on ly  l i m i t s  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  
w o r d ’rea so n * a n d  does n o t  a l t e r  th e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t ) .
T here  i s  n o t  on ly  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  ty p e s  o f  f a c t o r s  
which can co u n t  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  and th o s e  which can 
coun t a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  steaiming from th e  n a tu r e  o f  
th e  c o n c e p ts  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n  and b e l i e f  th e m s e lv e s ,  
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a co n n ec te d  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  way i n  
which re a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n  a t t a i n  t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  r e a s o n s  
end th e  way in  which r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  a t t a i n  t h e i r  
s t a t u s  a s  r e a s o n s ,  ( t h a t  i s ,  th e  way in  which th e s e  r e a s o n s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  f u l f i l  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n  o f  j u s t i f y i n g  and 
r a t i o n a l i z i n g ) .  T h is  d i f f e r e n c e  a l s o  stem s from  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  betw een th e  concep ts  o f  b e l i e f  and a c t i o n  
th e m se lv e s .  An i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t i o n  can no t be  i d e n t i f i e d  
as  a c a s e  o f  d o in g  such and such in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  th e  
p e rso n  who d id  i t  and h i s  i n t e n t i o n s ,  d e s i r e s  and b e l i e f s  
and f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h e r e  c a n n o t  o b j e c t i v e l y  be £  r e a s o n  
f o r  ^  a c t i o n  making no r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  p e rso n  who 
p e rfo rm ed  th e  a c t i o n  a s  t h e r e  cai. be ja re a so n  f o r  th e  t r u t h  
o f  a p r o p o s i t i o n .  Reasons f o r  v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n  a r e  r e a s o n s  
in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n  i n  which th e y  s t a n d  to  a p e r s o n ,  
h i s  a c t i o n s ,  i n t e n t i o n s  and so on. T h is  does n o t  mean 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on what can co u n t 
as  a r e a so n  f o r  a c t i o n  b u t  t h a t  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  which impose 
l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  an a c t i o n ,  th em se lv e s  s tem  
from th e  p e rso n  who p e rfo rm s  th e  a c t i o n :  once we have
i d e n t i f i e d  an a c t i o n  a s  a c a s e  o f  d o in g  som eth ing  t h e r e  
i s  o n ly  a l i m i t e d  ra n g e  o f  r e a s o n s  which can be  g iv en  f o r  
th e  a c t io n  in  q u e s t io n ,  b u t  ou r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  
a c t io n  a s  a case  o f  d o in g  som eth ing  i s  dependen t on c e r t a i n  
f a c t s  ab o u t th e  p e rso n  whose a c t io n  i t  i s .
8An a c t i o n  l e  t i e d  down to  a p la c e  and a t im e  and to  
th e  p e rso n  who p e rfo rm s  i t  becau se  th e s e  f a c t o r s  a r e  a l l  
n e c e s s a ry  to  i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n .
Someone may lo o k  a s  though he i s  making a cup o f  t e a ,
b u t  th e  a c t i o n  i s  n o t  c o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  th e  making o f
a cup o f  t e a  i f  he i s  in  f a c t  p r e p a r i n g - t o  p o iso n  someone.
A b e l i e f ,  how ever, i s  n o t  t i e d  down to  any o f  th e s e  f a c t o r s :  
we do n o t  have t o ,  and In deed  cm n o t ,  t a k e  a  p e r s o n ' s
i n t e n t i o n s  and s i t u a t i o n  i n t o  acco u n t  when we i d e n t i f y
h i s  b e l i e f  a s  a b e l i e f  t h a t  such and such i s  th e  c a s e .
T h is  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  a n o th e r  a p p a re n t  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  
b e l i e f  and a c t i o n :  we can t a l k  o f  two p e o p le  h o ld in g
l i t e r a l l y  th e  same b e l i e f  even i f  th ey  do so i n  d i f f e r e n t  
p l a c e s  and a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s .  The o b je c t  o f  each  p e r s o n 's  
b e l i e f ,  a p r o p o s i t i o n ,  i s  i d e n t i c a l .  But i t  seems t h a t  we
car n e v e r  t a l k  i n  t h i s  se n se  o f  tw,> p e o p le  d o in g  l i t e r a l l y
th e  same t h i n g ,  even i f  th e y  a r e  d o in g  i t  i n  th e  same p la c e  
and a t  th e  san e  t im e . Even i f  th e  same d e s c r i p t i o n  can 
be c o r r e c t l y  a p p l i e d  to  what th ey  a r e  each  d o in g  we c o u ld  n o t  
say  t h a t  th ey  were d o in g  th e  sarra t h i n g  ( i n  th e  sen se  i n  which 
we c an  say t h a t  two p eo p le  h o ld  th e  same b e l i e f ) .  T h is  i s  
j u s t  b e ca u se  t h e r e  i s  more th an  one p e rs o n  in v o lv e d  and t h i s  
e n t a i l s  t h a t  each  p e rs o n  c o u ld  be p e r fo rm in g  th e  a c t i o n  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s  which i n  t u r n  e n t a i l s  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  be 
d e s c r ib e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways. I f  two p e o p le  a r e  p u sh in g  
th e  same s to n e  up th e  same h i l l  a t  th e  same tim e  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  A i s  p u sh in g  th e  s to n e  up th e  h i l l  and Y i s  p u sh in g  
th e  s to n e  up th e  h i l l ,  i n v o lv e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  A m ight 
be  t r y i n g  to  g e t  th e  s to n e  to  th e  to p  o f  th e  h i l l  w h i le  Y 
m ight be  t r y i n g  to  g e t  some p h y s i c a l  e x e r c i s e .  But two 
p e o p le  h o ld in g  th e  same b e l i e f  does n o t  in  g e n e r a l  a l lo w
9f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such  a v a r i a t i o n  i n  th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  
th e  b e l i e f ,  and even i f  i t  d o e s ,  even i f  two men h o ld  th e  
same b e l i e f  f o r  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s ,  t h i s  i s  n e v e r  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  j u s t i f y  u s  i n  a s c r i b i n g  d i f f e r e n t  b e l i e f s  t o  
them. I n  o t h e r  words th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a b e l i e f  a s  a 
b e l i e f  t h a t  such and such  i s  th e  c a s e  i s  n o t  dependen t on 
th e  re a s o n s  a man h a s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  w hereas  i n  th e  c a s e  
o f  a c t i o n ,  r e a s o n s  and a c t i o n s  a re  m u tu a l ly  d ep end en t f o r  
th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  e a c h ,  e i t h e r  a s  a re a s o n  o r  a s  a  
s p e c i f i c ; a c t i o n .
Reasons f o r  b e l i e f  a t t a i n  t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  r e a s o n s  by 
a S tran g s  and p ro b lem ia tlc  m ix tu re  o f  s u b j e c t i v e  and o b j e c t i v e  
f a c t o r s .  %hat i s  b e l i e v e d  i s  th e  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
and a p r o p o s i t i o n ,  i n  v i r t u e  o f  i t s  c o n te n t  a lo n e ,  in d e p e n d e n t  
o f  w h e th e r  anyone a c t u a l l y  b e l i e v e s  i t  o r  n o t ,  d i c t a t e s  re a so n s  
f o r  i t s  own t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y .  ’ Som ebody's a c t u a l l y  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  X i s  n o t  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  ou r  b e in g  a b le  to  
say  t h a t  a ,  b ,  and c a r e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  t r u t h  o f  x  w hereas  
som ebody 's  a c t u a l l y  d o in g  2 i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  ou r  
b e in g  a b le  to  say t h a t  p ,  q and  r  a r e  r e a s o n s  f o r  i t .  B ut 
when somebody a c t u a l l y  does b e l i e v e  x th e  r e a s o n s  he g iv e s  
f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  a r e  d ep en den t t o  some e x t e n t  f o r  t h e i r  s t a t u s  
a s  r e a s o n s  on th e  s t a t e  o f  mind o f  th e  p e rso n  whose b e l i e f  
i t  i s .  F o r  i n s t a n c e  i f  a ,  b and c a r e  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  
t r u t h  o f  X ,  somebody who b e l i e v e s  x  m ight be unaware o f  
a and b ,  and g iv e  o n ly  c a s  h i s  re a s o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g .  a 
and b c o u ld  n o t ,  c e r t a i n  p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c a l  c a s e s  a p a r t ,  
be h i s  re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  x i f  he was unaware o f  them.
In  t h i s  way th e  r e a s o n s  a  man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  e r e  
dependen t on , and c i r c u m s c r ib e d  b y ,  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind, s
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a man may g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r
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h i s  b e l i e f  which have a p e r f e c t l y  l e g i t i m a t e  s t a t u s  a s  
r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  b u t  n o t  be  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  
o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s .  T h is  p o s s i b i l i t y  seems 
to  deny th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  a r e  to  some 
e x te n t  c o n s t r a in e d  by o b j e c t i v e  f a c t o r s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  a  p r o p o s i t i o n  d i c t a t e s  r e a s o n s  f o r  i t s e l f ,  in d e p e n d e n t ly  
o f  a n y o n e 's  a c t u a l l y  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n .  B ut th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  j u s t  m en tioned  sh o u ld  n o t  be co n fu sed  w i th  
a n o th e r  p e r f e c t l y  v a l i d  p o s s i b i l i t y  which i s  t h a t  o t h e r s  
sh o u ld  be  a b le  to  g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  som eone 's  b e l i e f  which 
a re  n o t  re a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  b e l i e v e d .
 ^ T here  i s  a  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on th e  f i r s t  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
which i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  f o r m u la te ,  which t h e r e  i s  n o t  
on th e  second  p o s s i b i l i t y .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  one may g iv e  
a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  someone e l e e ' s  b e l i e f s  h i s  su b c o n sc io u s  
d e s i r e s ,  o r  th e  ends he  w ish e s  to  a t t a i n ,  o r  th e  i n t e n t i o n s  
he h a s .  But t h e  re a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  own b e l i e f s  
a r e  c o n s t r a i n e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  must s t a n d  i n  some
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  what i s
b e l i e v e d  i s  b e l i e v e d  to  be  t r u e .  T h is  l e a v e s  room f o r  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f
a re  n o t  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he  b e l i e v e s ,
( t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  a l lo w  f o r  f a l s e  b e l i e f s ) ,  
b u t  n o t  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he  sh o u ld  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h q t  
th e  r e a s o n s  he g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  a re  n o t  r e a l l y  r e a s o n s  
f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s ,  and th e  
s t a t u s  o f  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  own b e l i e f  a s  r e a s o n s  
( i . e .  a s  j u s t i f y i n g  and r a t i o n a l i z i n g )  depends on t h i s  f a c t .  
More w i l l  be s a i d  ab o u t  t h i s  i n  C h a p te r  IV.
O th e r  f a c t s  p o ^ n t  to  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  way in  which 
r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  a t t a i n  t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  r e a s o n s  ar.d th e  
way i n  wnich re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  a t t a i n  t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s
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r e a s o n s .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f s  car. be  c h a l le n g e d  i n  a way in  which th e  r e a s o n s  a  
man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n s  can n o t  be  -  u n t i l  we know h i s  
i n t e n t i o n s  o r  d e s i r e s  ( u n t i l  we can i d e n t i f y  th e  a c t i o n  
a s  a  c a s e  o f  d o in g  such  a r d  such) and r e l a t e d  to  t h i s  i s  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  b e l i e f  t h e r e  i s  no s h a r p  d i v i s i o n  ( a l th o u g h  
t h e r e  may on o c c a s io n  be a d i v i s i o n )  be tw een b e l i e v e r  and  
o b s e r v e r  where a c c e s s  to  r e a s o n s  i s  c o n ce rn e d  b e c a u se  th e  
r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  a re  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  b e l ie v e d #  
The u l t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a b e l i e f  i s  when i t  t u r n s  
o u t  to  be  t r u e  ( th o u g h  t h i s  does n o t  e n t a i l  t h a t  i f  a  man 
h o ld s  a t r u e  b e l i e f  he i s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  h o ld in g  i t ) .  Ho 
such u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
a c t i o n .  I f  an a c t i o n  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  i t  can o n ly  be  j u s t i f i e d  
i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  p e rs o n  who p e rfo rm ed  i t .
A lth o u g h , a s  i t  has  b e en  shown, t h e r e  a r e  o b j e c t i v e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  a  man can  g iv e  f o r  h i s  own 
b e l i e f s ,  stemming from  th e  n e c e s s a r y  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  
i t  aim s a t  t h e  t r u t h ,  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  have 
p ro v ed  d i f f i c u l t  to  f o rm u la te  i n  a  way which shows t h a t  
th e y  a r e  o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  im posed  by th e  w orld  a s  i t  
i s ,  on what can  l e g i t i m a t e l y  co u n t  a s  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e  o f  mind. 
The most t h a t  i t  h a s  been  p o s s i b l e  to  say  a b o u t  t h e s e  
o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  so f a r  i s  t h a t  i f  a  man car. p r o p e r ly  
be  s a i d  to  b e  g i v in g  re a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  (an d  can t h e r e f o r e  
p r o p e r ly  be  s a i d  t o  b e l i e v e )  h e  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  he i s  r e a l l y  
g iv in g  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s .  
But t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  a r e  Imposed by a  
f u r t h e r  s t a t e  o f  mind o f  th e  p e rs o n  who b e l i e v e s  seems to
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make no n sen se  o f  th e  c la im  t h a t  th e y  a r e  o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
imposed by th e  w o r ld  a s  i t  i s .  What i t  does mean, f o r  
r e a s o n s  a l r e a d y  g iv e n ,  i s  t h a t  a  man can n o t g iv e  h i s  d e s i r e s  
a s  h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  and s t i l l  co u n t a s  b e l l e v i n # .
But i f  a  man c a r  g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  which he o n ly  
b e l i e v e 6 a r e  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  he 
m ight g iv e  r e a s o n s  which r e a l l y  a r e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  
( h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind o r  a t t i t u d e  to w ard s  a p r o p o s i t i o n ) ,  b u t  
a r e  n o t  re a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s  
(which i n  t h i s  c a s e  m ight o r  m ight n o t  be t r u e ) .  The f a c t  
t h a t  th e y  a re  n o t  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
w i l l  n o t  co u n t e i t h e r  a g a i n s t  th e  r e a s o n s  he g iv e s  a s  
r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  b e in g  
r e a s o n s ,  o r  a g a i n s t  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f .
T h i s ,  and  th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  an o b s e r v e r  may g iv e  
d e s i r e s  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  someone e l s e ’ s b e l i e f ,  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
we have n o t  y e t  a l t o g e t h e r  su cceed ed  i n  o u s t i n g  d e s i r e s  
from b e in g  c a n d id a t e s  f o r  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f .
I t  seems t h a t  th e r e  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t io n  be tw een  
th e  n o t io n  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  r e a s o n s  f o r  
v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  must s t a n d  i n  some r e l a t i o n  t o  d e s i r e s ,  
b e c a u se  t h i s  f a c t  i s  what makes an a c t io n  v o l u n t a r y .  So 
a n o th e r  d i r e c t i o n  from w hich we c o u ld  app roach  th e  q u e s t io n  
o f  w h e th e r  d e s i r e s  can be  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  i s  by a s k in g  
w h e th e r  b e l i e f s  a r e  o r  can b e ,  must o r  can* t  b e ,  v o l u n ta r y .
Any c o n c lu s io n s  we come to  abou t t h i s  q u e s t io n  w i l l  have 
n e c e s s a r y  c o n seq u en ces  f o r  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r  d e s i r e s  
can be  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f s .  V o lu n ta ry  a c t i o n  i s  th e  
parad igm  o f  th e  v o lu n ta r y  so  any e n q u iry  i n t o  th e  
v o l u n t a r i n e s s  o f  b e l i e f  sh o u ld  make a  com parison  o f  b e l i e v i n g  
w ith  a c t i n g .
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The a b s u r d i ty  o f  t a l k i n g  i n  e x a c t ly  th e  same way ab ou t 
b e l i e f s  a s  we do a b o u t  a c t i o n s  was n o te d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  
o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  when th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een r e a s o n s  f o r  
b e l i e f  and r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t i o n  was c o n s id e re d #  Not o n ly  
would t h e r e  be  th e  a b s u r d i ty  o f  c i t i n g  th e  same s o r t s  o f  
r e a s o n s  f o r  b o th  b e l i e f  and a c t i o n ,  b u t  t h e r e  would a l s o  
b e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  b e l i e v i n g  som eth ing  f o r  no re a so n  
a t  a l l ,  ( o t h e r  th an  t h a t  one w anted t o ) ,  o f  b e l i e v i n g  
so m e th in g  a t  w i l l ,  o f  b e l i e v i n g  a p r o p o s i t i o n  w i th  ve ry  
l i t t l e  e v id e n c e  i n  su p p o r t  o f  i t  r a t h e r  th an  one w ith  much 
e v id e n c e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  i t ,  ( t h e  p a r a l l e l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
a c t i o n  a l lo w s  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n c o n t i n e n t  a c t i o n s ) ,  
and knowing t h a t  one d id  s o ,  w i th o u t  any c o n t r a d i c t i o n *  
R e la te d  to  t h i s ,  one c o u ld  h o ld  i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e l i e f s  and 
know t h a t  one did^ a s  one can  p e rfo rm  a c t io n s  which a r e  n o t  
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  each o th e r*
I f  b e l i e f  j ja  v o lu n ta r y  i t  does n o t  l i v e  up to  th e  
parad igm  o f  th e  v o lu n ta r y  e x e m p l i f i e d  i n  some v o lu n ta r y  
a c t io n s *  Be c an n o t  b e l i e v e  a t  w i l l  a s  we can do some tn in g s  
( l i k e  r a i s i n g  ou r  arm s) a t  w i l l*  I f  one c o u ld  b e l i e v e  a t  
w i l l  one c o u ld  a c q u i r e  a b e l i e f  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  i t s  t r u t h  
and t h i s  s o r t  o f  a c t i v i t y  c o u ld  n o t  be c a l l e d  b e l i e v in g #
One c o u ld  n o t  b o th  know t h a t  one was b e l i e v i n g  som eth ing  
a t  w i l l  and co u n t a s  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h i n g ,  b u t  i f  one c o u ld  
b e l i e v e  som eth in g  a t  w i l l  one would have to  know t h a t  one 
was a b l e  to  a c q u i r e  b e l i e f s  in  t h i s  way, and one n e c e s s a r i l y  
ca^ n o t  know t h a t  one h a s  a c q u i r e d  a p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f  i n  
t h i s  way# *"1 '
A lthough t h i s  i s  one a r e a  o f  th e  v o lu n ta r y  which a p p l i e s  
t o  some a c t i o n s  and ca i.no t app ly  to  b e l i e f s  i t  does n o t  
show t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  n o t  v o lu n ta r y .  T here  a r e  v e ry  few 
a c t i o n s  which we can p e rfo rm  a t  w i l l  and th e s e  a r e  f o r  t h e
I k
most p a r t  l i m i t e d  to  b o d i ly  movements* T hat b e l i e f  c a n n o t  
be l i k e  th e s e  a c t i o n s  does n o t  show t h a t  i t  c an n o t  be l i k e  
some a c t io n s *  M oreover, we can b e l i e v e  som eth ing  f o r  which 
we have no e v id e n c e ,  (we have no e v id e n c e  f o r  many o f  our  
p e r c e p t u a l  b e l i e f s ) ,  though we c o u ld  n o t  b e l i e v e  i t  j u s t  
b e c a u se  we w anted  t o  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  a c o n t r a d i c t o r y  b e l i e f  
f o r  which t h e r e  was no ev idence*  P e o p le  ve ry  o f t e n  h o ld  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e l i e f s  w i th o u t  o u r  d i s c o u n t i n g  t h e i r  s t a t e  
o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  though th ey  c o u ld  
n o t  h o ld  i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e l i e f s  j u s t  b e ca u se  th ey  w anted  t o .
In  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  we c a n n o t  t a l k  ab o u t b e l i e f s  
i n  e x a c t l y  th e  same way a s  we t a l k  ab o u t a c t i o n s ,  we do 
t a l k  a b o u t  b e l i e f s  i n  some o f  th e  same ways a s  we t a l k  
abou t a c t i o n s ;  we t a l k  a b o u t  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  x  r a t h e r  
th an  y a s  we t a l k  o f  d e c id in g  to  do one t h in g  r a t h e r  th a n  
ano th e r*  We u se  su ch  e x p r e s s io n s  a s  *I j u s t  c o u ld n ’ t  
b r i n g  m y se lf  to  b e l i e v e  h im , ’ ’ In  th e  end I  was w i l l i n g  
to  b e l i e v e  him though a t  f i r s t  I  found  i t  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t , ’
’ I t  was easy  to  b e l i e v e  e v e r y th in g  he sa id*  and ’ I  e x p e c te d  
to  b e l i e v e  Tom’ s s t o r y ,  b u t  I  ended up  b e l i e v i n g  D ick ’ s ’ 
a l l  o f  which have p a r a l l e l s  i n  th e  lan g u ag e  o f  a c t i o n .
A l l  t h a t  t h i s  shows i s  t h a t  we can n o t  a p p e a l  to  th e  common 
id iom  by i t s e l f  t o  so lv e  th e  problem  o f  w h e th e r  b e l i e f s  a r e ,  
o r  can b e ,  v o lu n ta ry *
What h a s  been  e s t a b l i s h e d  i s  t h a t  i f  b e l i e f s  a re  
v o lu n ta r y  th ey  a r e  v o lu n ta r y  i n  a n a r ro w e r  se n se  th&n th e  
se n se  i n  which a c t i o n s  a re  v o l u n ta r y ,  which does n o t  l i v e  
up  to  th e  pa rad igm  o f  t h e  v o lu n ta r y  s e t  by v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n *
A man who g iv e s  d e s i r e s  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  b e c a u se  
he does s o ,  c o n f e r s  on h i s  so c a l l e d  b e l i e f  a l l  th e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  and i n  v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  
what can be a s c r ib e d  to  th e  man c e a s e s  t o  be a b e l i e f  and
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becomes an a c t io n *  W hether t h e r e  i s  some l i m i t e d  sense  
i n  which d e s i r e s  can be r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  which would 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b e l i e f s  were i n  some se n se  v o lu n ta r y  w i l l  
depend on what s i g n i f i c a n c e  can be a t t a c h e d  to  ou r  common 
l o c u t i o n s  which i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  in  some r e s p e c t s  
l i k e  a c t i o n .
D e s i r e s  c a n n o t  be  g iv en  by a man as  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  
own b e l i e f s .  On th e  o t h e r  hand , any r e a s o n s  f o r  v o lu n ta r y  
a c t i o n ,  w h e th e r  g iv en  by th e  a c t o r  h im s e l f  o r  by someone 
e l s e ,  m u st ,  i t  seem s, s t a n d . i n  some r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a c t o r ’ s 
d e s i r e s ,  and  i t  i s  i n  v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  t h a t  th e  a c t i o n  can 
be  c a l l e d  a v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n .  W hether t h i s  i s  a l e g i t i m a t e  
c la im  w i l l  be  exam ined i n  th e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .
■",^1
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CHAi TER I I
The Sense in  which D e s i r e s  a re  Reasons f o r  A c tio n
I  su g g e s te d  i n  th e  p re c e d in g  c i ia p te r  t h a t  p a r t  o f  th e  
p rim a f a c i e  asymmetry betw een b e l i e f  and a c t io n  r e s t e d  on 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  w hereas a man canno t g iv e  h i s  d e s i r e s  as  
r e a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  and s t i l l  coun t a s  b e l i e v i n g ,  i f  
a man i s  to ^ c o u n t^ a s  g iv in g  re a s o n s  f o r  h i s  i n t e n t i o n a l  
a c t io n  th e  f a c t o r s  he c i t e s  a s  r e a s o n s  must n e c e s s a r i l y  
s ta n d  i n  some r e l a t i o n  to  h i s  d e s i r e s ,  and t h a t  i t  was in  
v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  n e c e s s a ry  r e l a t i o n  to  h i s  d e s i r e s  t h a t  th ey  
a t t a i n e d  t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  re a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n ,  and i n  t h i s  
c h a p te r  I  p ro pose  to  examine t h i s  s u g g e s t io n .
Any re a so n  g iv en  f o r  a v o lu n ta ry  o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t io n  
must j u s t i f y  o r  r a t i o n a l i z e  t h a t  a c t i o n  and a s  I  s a id  i n  
th e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  v a r io u s  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r s  can be c i t e d  
a s  th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  a  man’ s a c t io n  which f u l f i l  t h i s  c o n d i t io n ,  
such as m o tiv e s ,  d e s i r e s ,  b e l i e f s ,  i n t e n t i o n s  and p u rp o se s .
A re a s o n  must have some e x p la n a to ry  f u n c t io n  b u t  i t  does 
n o t  a lw ays ex] l a i n  in  th e  se n se  o f  g iv in g  th e  n e c e s s a ry  
c o n d i t io n s  o f  th e  a c t i o n .  A man can  have a r e a so n  f o r  an 
a c t i o n ,  b u t  t h a t  r e a s o n  need  n o t  be th e  rea so n  why he 
perfo rm ed  th e  a c t io n :  he m ight s t i l l  have perfo rm ed  t h a t
a c t i o n ,  even i f  he had n o t  had t h a t  re a so n .  But i f  
som eth ing  i s  to  co u n t as  a  re a so n  f o r  an a c t io n  i t  must be 
th e  ca se  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  have been a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  t h a t  
a c t i o n  and, i f  an a c t io n  i s  perform ed i n t e n t i o n a l l y , t h e  man 
who perfo rm s i t  must have a t  l e a s t  one rea so n  which i s  th e  
rea so n  why he perfo rm ed  th e  a c t i o n ,  which g iv e s  th e  re a s o n  
w ith o u t  which he would n o t  have perfo rm ed  th e  a c t i o n .  ( I n  
g e n e ra l  a  man has  a com bina tio n  o f  r e a so n s  f o r  d o ing  what he 
does and pe rh ap s  none o f  th e s e  by i t s e l f  g iv e s  th e  re a so n
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w ith o u t  which th e  a c t io n  would n o t  have been pe rfo rm ed , 
b u t  t o g e t h e r  th ey  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  n e c e ssa ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  
t h a t  a c t io n )*
I t  i s ,  i n  o t h e r  w ords, an e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  a 
re a so n  f o r  a v o lu n ta ry  o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t io n  t h a t  i t  must 
be c a p a b le  o f  m o t iv a t in g  t h a t  a c t i o n ,  and i t  i s  i n  v i r t u e  o f  
t h i s  t h a t  i t  e x p la in s  t h a t  a c t io n .  I f  i t  d id  n o t  have t h i s  
f e a t u r e  a re a so n  would n o t  be c a p a b le  o f e x p la in in g  an 
a c t i o n  any more than  any random c o n s i d e r a t i o n  we c a re  to  
nairic which need s ta n d  in  no r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a c t i o n  in  
q u e s t io n .  How e l s e  cou ld  a rea so n  e x p la in  an a c t io n  i f  
i t  c o u ld  n o t  be th e  means o f  b r in g in g  i t  about? Not j u s t  
in  v i r t u e  o f  j u s t i f y i n g  e r  r a t i o n a l i z i n g  i t .  T h is  i s  n o t  
to  say t h a t  every  rea so n  f o r  an a c t i o n  which r e a l l y  a 
rea so n  f o r  t h a t  a c t i o n  a c t u a l l y  m o t iv a te s  t h a t  a c t io n  o r  i s  
th e  rea so n  why a man p e rfo rm ed  t h a t  a c t i o n .  But i f  a man 
pe rfo rm s an a c t io n  i n t e n t i o n a l l y ,  th e n  he must have a 
re a so n  which a c t u a l l y  m o tiv a te d  t h a t  a c t i o n .
I  do n o t  w ish  to  r e i t e r a t e  th e  argum ents f o r  and a g a i n s t  
th e  view t h a t  th e  rea so n  o r  re a s o n s  which a c t u a l l y  m o tiv a te  
an a c t io n  ( th e  p rim ary  r e a s o n s  i n  Donald D avidson’ s 
te rm in o lo gy  ( 1 ) )  a r e  th e  c au se  o r  c a u se s  o f  t h a t  a c t i o n .
I t  h a s ,  I  t h in k ,  been c o n v in c in g ly  a rg u e d  t h a t  they  a re  ( 2 ) .  
Any re a so n  which i s  th e  re a so n  why, o r  f o r  w hich , somebody 
d id  som eth ing  e x p la in s  t h a t  a c t io n  in  th e  same way as a 
cau se  e x p la in s  an e v e n t .
But in  s p i t e  o f  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  t e n a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  
t h e s i s ,  th e r e  ap p ea r  to  be d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  u sage  
o r  common sense  between ’ r e a s o n ’ and ’ c a u s e ’ which make 
u s e f u l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  and i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  two words a re  n o t  
a lw ays synonymous. In  o rd in a ry  u s a g e ,  the  word ’c a u s e ’ 
a p p l i e d  to  a c t i o n s  does in  g e n e ra l  i n d i c a t e  some deg ree  o f
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i n v o l u n t a r i n e s s ,  o r  some deg ree  o f  com pulsion  which i s  n o t  
i n d i c a t e d  by th e  word ’ r e a s o n ’ : a pe rso n  h a s ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,
d i r e c t ,  n o n - in d u c t iv e  knowledge o f  h i s  rea so n s  b u t  
o b s e rv e r s  on ly  know h i s  r e a s o n s  by in d u c t io n  o r  on th e  
ev id en ce  o f  h i s  te s tim o n y  w hereas th e  c au ses  o f  a p e r s o n ’ s a c t io n  
ten d  to  be  known i n  th e  same way by o b s e rv e r s  o f  t h a t  a c t io n  
as  by th e  p e rfo rm e r  h im s e l f .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  someone’ s 
acco un t o f  h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  need no t n e c e s s a r i l y  be 
tak en  a s  th e  c o r r e c t  one and he may a c c e p t  c o r r e c t i o n  from 
o t h e r s  on t h i s  m a t t e r ,  b u t  u s u a l ly  a p e r s o n ’ s acco u n t o f  h i s  
re a so n s  m ust, b e ca u se  he has d i r e c t  a c c e s s  to  th e  e x p e r ie n c e s ,  
m ental s t a t e s  and so on which in  p a r t  c o n s t i t u t e  h i s  r e a s o n s ,  
o v e r r id e  an o b s e r v e r ' s  a cc o u n t  o f  them.
The words ’ reason*  o r  ’ c a u s e ’ a re  o f te n  u sed  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
to  b r i n g  o u t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between what a man i s  c o n sc io u s  
o f  as  m o t iv a t in g  him to  a c t ,  and what he  i s  u n e oi s clous o f .
We may say ’The r e a s o n  he gave f o r  do in g  x was y , b u t  i n  
f a c t  what caused  him to  do i t  was z ’ where z i s  th e  s o r t  o f  
t h in g  which would i n  g e n e ra l  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e a so n  r a t h e r  than  
a c a u se ;  t h a t  i s ,  i t  would be th e  s o r t  o f  t h in g  which would 
f e a t u r e  in  the  e x p la n a t io n  o f  a v o lu n ta r y  a c t i o n  r a t h e r  th an  
an I n v o lu n ta ry  one. But t h e r e  i s  no h a rd  and f a s t  r u l e  o f
g e n e ra l  u sage  h e r e .  We m ight j u s t  a s  w e ll  say ’ The re a so n
he gave f o r  d o in g  x was y ,  b u t  th e  r e a l  re a so n  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n  
was z ’ i n d i c a t i n g  i n  t h i s  way too t h a t  he was unaware o f  th e  
m o t iv a t in g  in f lu e n c e  o f  z . In  g e n e r a l ,  i n  o rd in a ry  u s a g e ,  
th e  word ’ c a u s e ’ , when som eth ing  i s  c i t e d  as  th e  cause  o f  
an a c t i o n  which co u ld  f e a t u r e  in  th e  e x p la n a t io n  o f  a 
v o lu n ta ry  a c t i o n ,  i s  u sed  on ly  o f  what th e  ag en t was n o t  
c o n sc io u s  o f  a s  m o t iv a t in g  him to  a c t ,  w hereas the  word 
’reason* can be  u se d  bo th  o f  what th e  a g en t  was c o n sc io u s  o f  
a s  m o t iv a t in g  him to  a c t  and o f  what he was n o t  c o n sc io u s
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o f  as  m o t iv a t in g  him to  a c t .
There  i s  a l s o  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  grammar o f  ’ cause* 
and t h a t  o f  ’ reason* wnlch shou ld  he n o te d .  A man may 
g ive  as  h i e  r e a so n  f o r  g o ing  to  a c e r t a i n  p la c e  ’AB l i v e s  
t h e r e ’ h u t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  AB l i v e s  in  t h i s  p la c e  i s  n o t  
th e  cau se  o f  h i s  g o ing  t h e r e .  We can no t say ’ th e  cause  
o f  h i s  go ing  t h e r e  was t h a t  AB l i v e d  t h e r e ’ s in c e  he m ight 
have gone even i f  AB d id  n o t  l i v e  th e r e  and h i s  rea so n  f o r  
go ing  m ight s t i l l  have been *AE- l i v e s  t h e r e ’ . T h o u ^  i f  
h i s  r e a so n  i s  s t a t e d  i n  th e  form ’ I  b e l i e v e  AB l i v e s  t h e r e ’ 
t h i s  g iv e s  n o t  o n ly  tiie re a s o n  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n ,  h u t  a l s o  th e  
c au se :  ’H is b e l i e f  t h a t  AB l i v e s  t h e r e  cau sed  him to  go th e re * .
So a lth o u g h  s ta te m e n t s  o f  m o t iv a t in g  re a so n s  a lw ays im port 
s t a te m e n ts  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  th e  cause  cann o t a lw ays be s t a t e d  
in  th e  same form as  t h a t  i n  which tîie  r e a so n  i s  s t a t e d .  But
t h i s  does n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  an o b je c t io n  to  th e  t h e s i s  t h a t  
m o t iv a t in g  re a so n s  a r e  c a u se s  o f  a c t io n  because  such 
re a so n s  can a lw ays be s t a t e d  i n  a form in  which they  can 
l e g i t i m a t e l y  f u n c t io n  a s  c a u se s  as w e ll  a s  r e a s o n s .
I f  th e  p rim ary  re a so n  f o r  an a c t io n  i s  th e  cause  o f  
t h a t  a c t i o n ,  i t  seems t h a t  an e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  
p rim ary  re a so n  must be t h a t  i t  c o n ta in s  a r e f e r e n c e  to  a 
d e s i r e ,  e i t h e r  I m p l i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t .  I f  i t  d id  n o t ,  
n o th in g  would j u s t i f y  u s  i n  c a l l i n g  i t  the  cau se  o f  a 
v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n .  How co u ld  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  o r  a man’ s 
b e l i e f  in  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  by i t s e l f  b o th  c a u se  somebody 
to  do som ething  and be h i s  r e a s o n  f o r  d o ing  t h a t  th in g ?
A m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  m ight by i t s e l f  c au se  somebody to  do som eth ing , 
b u t  i t  co u ld  n e v e r ,  by i t s e l f ,  be h i s  rea so n  f o r  d o ing  i t  
as w e l l .  T h e ,o n ly  t h in g  t h a t  e n a b le s  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  to  
be a r e a so n  f o r  cmy a c t io n  as  w e l l  a s  i t s  cause  i s  t h a t  i t  
s ta n d s  i n  some r e l a t i o n  to  my d e s i r e s .  And i t  a p p ea rs
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t h a t  th e  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t o r  in  th e  cause  o f  a v o lu n ta ry  
a c t io n ,  in  v i r t u e  o f  which th e  a c t io n  can have a cause  "but 
rem ain v o lu n ta ry ,m u s t  be a d e s i r e  o f  th e  a g e n t ’ s* As I  
s a i d  in  th e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  i t  i s  no good g iv in g  a s  a re a so n  
f o r  d o in g  som eth ing  ’ I  b e l i e v e  i t  w i l l  be conducive  to  x ’ 
f o r  exam ple, u n l e s s  we can t a k e  t h i s  a s  im p ly in g  t h a t  I  
want X.  A b e l i e f  by i t s e l f ,  which does n o t  imply a d e s i r e ,  
can never  be a re a so n  f o r  a c t io n *  T h is  might be  o v e rlo oked  
b e c a u se  when b e l i e f s  a re  g iven  as  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  they  
always do imply a d e s i r e ,  b u t  b e ca u se  we do n o t  q u e s t io n  
t h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  a c t io n  in  q u e s t io n ,  we do 
n o t  lo o k  f o r  the  d e s i r e  th ey  imply*
There  i s  a n o th e r  n e c e s s a ry  e lem ent o f  th e  m o t iv a t in g  
rea so n  f o r  an a c t io n  which stems from th e  f a c t  t h a t  n o t  
j u s t  any d e s i r e  can m o tiv a te  o r  be a rea so n  f o r  j u s t  any 
ac tio n *  An i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t i o n  must be  r e l a t e d  to  th e  
d e s i r e  which i s  a re a so n  f o r  i t  by a b e l i e f  o f  th e  a g e n t ’ s*
I canno t say t h a t  I  i n te n d  to  go to  P ran ce  f o r  a h o l id a y  
b ecause  I  want a cup o f  t e a  u n le s s  I  r .e a l ly  do b e l i e v e  t h a t  
go ing  to  F ran ce  i s  th e  b e s t  (and  p e rh a p s  th e  o n ly )  way o f  
g e t t i n g  a cup o f  tea* I t  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a 
d e s i r e ’ s b e in g  a re a so n  f o r  a c t io n  t h a t  th e  a g e r t  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  
th e  a c t io n  he h a s  perform ed, o r  i s  abou t to  p e r f o r m , r e a l ly  i s  
conducive  to  th e  end which he d e s i r e s ,  o r  i s  i t s e l f  what he 
d e s i r e s .  But in  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a b e l i e f  o f  th e  
a g e n t ’ s must alw ays be im p l ie d ,  even i f  i t  i s  n o t  c i t e d  
e x p l i c i t l y ,  when he g iv e s  a re a so n  f o r  h i e  a c t i o n ,  i t  s t i l l  
seems t h a t  th e  e lem ent in  v i r t u e  o f  which th e  prim ary  re a so n
f o r  a v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  can be  th e  re a so n  f o r  t h a t  a c t io n  a s
i t  a
w e ll  a s  th e  cause  o f  i t  (thus :makimg/ v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n )  i s  th e  
a g e n t ’ s d e s i r e .
The t h e s i s  t h a t  a p r im ary  re a so n  m o tiv a te s  o r  c a u se s  th e
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v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n  which i t  i s  s re a so n  f o r  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  a  d e s i r e  o f  th e  a g en t  muet form p e r t  o f  i t  has  
b e e r  c h a l le n g e d ,  however, by Tom Nagel In  h i s  book ’The 
P o s s i b i l i t y  o f  A lt ru ism * . He m a in ta in s  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a 
n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  som eth ing  b e in g  a rea so n  f o r  a c t io n  
t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  make some r e f e r e n c e  to  a d e s i r e ,  and t h a t  a 
rea so n  can s t i l l  f u l f i l  i t s  f u n c t io n  o f  m o t iv a t in g  an 
a c t io n  even i f  a d e s i r e  does n o t  form p a r t  o f  i t .  S ince  
t h i s  i s  in  d i r e c t  o p p o s i t io n  to  my owr c o n te n t io n  h i e  t h e s i s  
must be examined.
N a g e l’ s t h e s i s  abou t a l t r u i s m  i s  t h a t  one has a d i r e c t  
rea so n  to  prom ote th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r s  and t h i s  re a so n  
does n o t  depend on in te r m e d i a t e  f a c t o r s  such a s  one’ s own 
i n t e r e s t s  o r  f e e l i n g s  o f  sympathy and b e n ev o len c e .  T h is  
t h e s i s  depends on a r  a n a l y s i s  o f  p r u d e n t i a l  re a so n s  in  which 
he hopes to  show * th a t  o u r  own f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t s  p ro v id e  u s ,  
by th e m se lv e s ,  w ith  re a s o n s  f o r  p r e s e n t  a c t io n  to  s e c u re  
them and t l i a t  m o t iv a t io n  o f  t h i s  s o r t  canno t ar.d need  n o t  
be  e x p la in e d  by i n te r m e d ia t e  p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s  o r  any o t h e r  
i n te r m e d ia t e  m o tiv e”.
The view t h a t  a l l  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  have d e s i r e  a t  
t h e i r  so u rce  sterns from th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  r e a so n s  f o r  
a c t i o n  must be c a p a b le  o f  m o t iv a t in g  w ith  th e  a ssu m p tio n , 
wixich Nagel r e g a rd s  a s  m is ta k e n ,  t h a t  d e s i r e s  a r e  a 
n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t i o n  o f  m o tiv a tio n *  T h is  view h as  th e  
consequence t h a t  a c t i o n s  done in  someone e l s e ’ s i n t e r e s t ,  
o r  in  my own f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  c an n o t  b e  m o tiv a te d  merely 
by th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p roposed  a c t  i s  in  someone 
e l s e ’ s i n t e r e s t  o r  i n  my own i n t e r e s t ;  a d e s i r e  to  f u r t h e r  
e i t h e r  o f  th o se  i n t e r e s t s  must a l s o  be p r e s e n t  i n  o rd e r  to  
e x rü a in  th e  a c t i o n .  In  common p a r la n c e  th e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
an a c t io n  i s  i n  mj’ owr f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  a c c e p ta b le
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as  a re a so n  f o r  t h a t  a c t i o n ,  and so ,  t o o ,  o f t e n  i s  th e  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  a c t io n  i s  in  someone e l s e ’ s i n t e r e s t s ,  
though i t  would depend f o r  i t s  fo rc e  a s  a rea so n  on the  
assum ption  t h a t  I  c a re d  a c e r t a i n  amount ab o u t t h i s  p e rs o n ,  
o r  a t  l e a s t  t h a t  I  d id n ’ t  d i s l i k e  him in te n s e ly *  P h i lo s o p h e r s  
in  g e n e ra l  s a y ,  however, t h a t  th e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  som eth ing  _ 
i s  i n  my own f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p ta b le  a s  
a r e a so n  b e ca u se  as  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  most p e o p le  c a re  
abou t t h e i r  f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t s  and want to  f u r t h e r  them so  
a d e s i r e  i s  r e a l l y  a t  th e  r o o t  o f  t h i s  m o tiva tio n*
N a g e l’ s f i r s t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h i s  view I s  t h a t  m o tiv a te d  
and u n m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e s  a r e  n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  c l e a r l y  enough 
from one another*  Some d e s i r e s  j u s t  come to  u s ,  and th e s e  
a re  u n m o tiv a te d ,  b u t  o th e r  d e s i r e s  a re  a r r i v e d  a t  by 
d e c i s io n  and a f t e r  d e l i b e r a t io n *  Some m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e s  
a re  m o tiv a te d  by u n m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e s  -  a s  th e  d e s i r e  to  
shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s  i s  m o t iv a te d  by an u n m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e  
f o r  food* B u t ,  Nagel s a y s ,  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  an 
un m o tiv a ted  d e s i r e  must a lw ays be a t  the  b a s i s  o f  a 
m o tiv a te d  one. I f  t h e  m o t iv a t in g  re a so n  f o r  an a c t io n  i s  
a m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e ,  then  th e  a c t io n  and trie d e s i r e  which 
m o tiv a te s  i t  w i l l  bo th  t e  e x p la in e d  by th e  same th in g ,  and , 
s in c e  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e s  a re  
m o tiv a te d  by u n m o tiv a ted  d e s i r e s ,  i t  i s  e q u a l ly  n o t  c l e a r  
t h a t  a d e s i r e  must come i n t o  t h i s  l a s t  e x p la n a t io n .
But i t  seems t h a t  what m o t iv a te s  d e s i r e s  can alw ays 
be  i n t e r p r e t e d  as o t h e r ,  u l t i m a t e l y  u n m o tiv a te d ,  d e s i r e s .
I f  I  am t r y in g  to  d e c id e  which o f  th e  two th in g s  I  want 
to  do more, t h i s  d e c i s io n  w i l l  s t a n d  i n  some r e l a t i o n  t o ,  
and w i l l  be b a se d  on, th e  d e s i r e s  I a l r e a d y  have. I f  I  
come to  the  c o n c lu s io n  th a t ,  a l l  t h in g s  co n s id e re d ,  I  w a r t  
to  do X r a t h e r  than  y, th e  rea so n  f o r  t h i s  c o n c lu s io n  i s
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t h a t  a l l  th in g s  c o n s id e re d  i t  would he  b e s t  f o r  me to  do x, 
and t h i s  re a so n  stem s from th e  f a c t  t h a t  I  want to  do w hat, 
a l l  t h in g s  c o n s id e r e d ,  would he b e s t  f o r  mo. To ta k e  
N a g e l 's  exam ple, a d e s i r e  to  shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s  i s  m o tiv a te d  
i n  me hy hunger (a d e s i r e  f o r  food) h u t  th e r e  may he p r e s e n t  
in  me a t  th e  same tim e  a d e s i r e  n o t  to  shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s  
m o tiv a te d  hy th e  d e s i r e  n o t  to  e a t  m o tiv a te d  hy th e  d e s i r e  
to  l o s e  w e ig h t.  In  my d e c i s io n  w hè th er  o r  n o t  to  shop 
f o r  g r o c e r i e s  I  am m o tiv a te d  hy th e  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  w he ther  
i t  would he b e t t e r  f o r  m e ,a l l  t h in g s  con s idered , to  s a t i s f y  
my hunger o r  to  rem ain  hungry and l o s e  weight, and my 
d e l i b e r a t i o n  w i l l  he gu ided  hy th e  f a c t  t h a t  I  want what 
i s  b e s t  f o r  me. (The f a c t  t h a t  a l l  t h in g s  c o n s id e re d  I  
want to  do one t h in g  r a t h e r  th a r  a n o th e r  does n o t  mean 
t h a t  i f  I  do a n y th in g  I  w i l l  do t h a t  th in g  r a t h e r  then  
th e  a l t e r n a t i v e ) .
Nagel says  t h a t  i t  i s  a t r i v i a l  t r u t h  t h a t  i f  som eth ing  
m o t iv a te s  me to  act. then  a d e s i r e  to  do t h a t  a c t i o n ,  o r  f o r  
th e  end to  which t h i s  a c t i o n  i s  a means, i s  p r e s e n t  i n  me.
That t h i s  d e s i r e  i s  p r e s e n t  sim ply  fo l lo w s  l o g i c a l l y  from 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  c e r t a i n  C' n s i d e r a t l o n s  m o t iv a te ,  h u t  c o n t r a r y  
to  p o p u la r  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  b e l i e f ,  th e  d e s i r e  i s  n o t  th e  
so u rc e  o f ,  n o r  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  a c e r t a i n  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ' s  m o t iv a t in g  me.
N agel th in k s  t h a t  two p o s s ib l e  e x p la n a t io n s  may he 
g iven  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  d e s i r e s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n s  o f  
m o t iv a t io n  h u t  t h a t  when I  am m o tiv a te d  a d e s i r e  i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  (h u t  t r i v i a l l y )  p r e s e n t .  I f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
m a t te r s  o f  f a c t  ( e .g .  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  in  my f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t )  
co u ld  m o tiv a te  hy them se lv es  " th en  th ey  can e x p la in  and 
re n d e r  i n t e l l i g i b l e  th e  d e s i r e  f o r  f u t u r e  h a p p in e s s  which
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i s  a s c r i b a h l e  to  anyone whom they do m o t iv a te " .  But t h i s  
does n o t  seem to  o f f e r  any e x p la n a t io n  o f  why d e s i r e s  
must n e c e s s a r i l y  be p r e s e n t  when c o n s id e r a t io n s  o f  m a t te r s  
o f  f a c t  m o t iv a te .  I f  th e  c o n s id e r a t i o n  t h a t  som ething  i s  
i n  my f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  ( o r  any o th e r  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  s in c e  
Nagel w an ts  to  say t h a t  d e s i r e s  a r e  n o t  a n e c e ssa ry  
c o n d i t io n  o f  any m o tiv a te d  a c t i o n ,  n o t  on ly  j o t  p r u d e n t i a l  
o r  a l t r u i s t i c  ones) can m o tiv a te  by th em se lv es  and can 
e x p la in  an a c t io n  by th e m se lv e s ,  why in c lu d e  a d e s i r e  a t  
a l l ?  By p a y in g  l i p  s e r v i c e  to  th e  common and i n e r a d i c a b l e  
n o t io n  t h a t  d e s i r e s  a r e  a t  th e  r o o t  o f  a l l  i n t e n t i o n a l  o r  
m o t iv a te d  a c t i o n ,  and s a y in g  t h a t  d e s i r e s  must be p r e s e n t  
when a r e a so n  m o t iv a te s ,  b u t  t h a t  t h i s  n e c e s s i t y  i s  
l o g i c a l ,  n o t  c a u s a l ,  he a p p ea rs  to  s t r e n g th e n  h i s  ca se  
by t a k in g  accoun t o f  t h i s  n o t io n ,  b u t  i n  f a c t  weakens i t .
The second p o s s ib l e  e x p la n a t io n  which he g iv e s  i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  may be  a n o th e r  f a c t o r  which would e x p la in  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  abou t th e  f u t u r e  can m o tiv a te  by  ^
th e m se lv e s ,  and th e  m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e  (m o tiv a te d  by th e  
same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s )  which "em bodies” t h a t  m o t iv a t io n a l  
i n f lu e n c e .  He says  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  o th e r  
f a c t o r  would n e c e s s a r i l y  be a f u r t h e r  u n m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e  -  
pe rh ap s  n o t ,  b u t  in  th e  absen ce  o f  any s u g g e s t io n s  i t  i s  
n o t  c l e a r  what e l s e  i t  c o u ld  b e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  i t  was a 
f a c t o r  whose jo b  was to  e x p la in  two m o t iv a t io n s ,  a m o tiv a te d  
a c t io n  and a m o tiv a te d  d e s i r e .
N agel backs up h i s  view t h a t  d e s i r e s  do n o t  e x p la in  a 
m o t iv a t io n  o r  p ro v id e  a rea so n  f o r  i t ,  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  t r u e  
t r i v i a l l y  t h a t  they  a re  a t  the  r o o t  o f  every  m o t iv a t io n ,  
by an analogy  w ith  b e l i e f .  As a d e s i r e  i s  a lw ays 
n e c e s s a r i l y  b u t  t r i v i a l l y  p r e s e n t  when a re a s o n  m o t iv a te s .
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80 a b e l i e f  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  b u t  a l s o  t r i v i a l l y ,  p r e s e n t  
when a re a so n  c o n v in c e s ,  b u t  th e  b e l i e f  i s  n o t  th e  
e x p la n a t io n  o f  a c o n c lu s io n ,  as a d e s i r e  i s  n o t  th e  
e x p la n a t io n  o f  a m o t iv a t io n .  A ccord ing  to  N ag e l,  i f  
someone draws c o n c lu s io n s  i n  acco rdance  w ith  a c e r t a i n  
p r i n c i p l e  th en  we would be r i g h t  to  a s c r i b e  to  him th e  
b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t r u e .  But th e  b e l i e f  i s  n o t  
a  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  h i s  h a v in g  re a s o n s  to  draw th o se  
c o n c l u s i o n s ; '  i t  does n o t  e x p la in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he h as  
r e a so n s  to  draw th o se  c o n c lu s io n s .  R a th e r ,  th e  b e l i e f  in  
th e  p r i n c i p l e  and th e  c o n c lu s io n s  drawn in  acco rdance  w ith  
i t  a re  e x p la in e d  by th e  p e r c e p t io n  o f  the  re a s o n s  to  draw 1
c o n c lu s io n s  in ^ a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  i t .  T h is  c a se  i s  an a lag o u s  
to  th e  c a se  o f  a c t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  in  th e  way f a g e l  
w ants i t  to  be . I f  somebody does som eth ing  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  
then  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  to  a s c r i b e  to  him the  d e s i r e  
e i t h e r  to  do t h a t  t h in g  o r  f o r  som eth ing  to  which t h a t  
a c t io n  i s  a means. S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  somebody draws 
c o n c lu s io n s  in  a cco rd an ce  w ith  a c e r t a i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  i s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  to  a s c r i b e  t t  him a b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  
i s  t r u e  ( u n le s s  they  a re  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n s ) .  But i i  
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  b e l i e f  i s  n o t  among th e  
c o n d i t io n s  f o r  h a v in g  r e a s o n s  to  draw c o n d lu s io n s  in  
acco rd an ce  w ith  i t ,  b u t  th e  b e l i e f  in  th e  p r i n c i p l e ,  and 
th e  c o n c lu s io n s  drawn a re  b o th  e x p la in e d  by th e  p e rc e p t io n  
o f  th e  r e a s o n s  to  draw c o n c lu s io n s  in  acco rdance  w ith  i t ?
N a g e l 's  aim seems to  be  to  do away w ith  th e  p a r t i a l  
dependence o f  r e a so n s  cn" th e  p e o p le  who have them, to  make 
them p u re ly  o b j e c t i v e l y  v a l i d ,  r a t h e r  than  p a r t l y  s u b j e c t iv e l y  
v a l i d  as  they  have in  g e n e ra l  b e e r  c o n s id e re d  to  be -  can 
t h i s  be done? Tt ' s pe rhap s  e a s i e r  to  do i n  th e  rea lm  o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  than  in  t h a t  o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n in g .
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T;.e o b j e c t s  o f  b e l i e f  a re  p r o p o s i t io n s  and they  do n o t  
depend f o r  t h e i r  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  on any a t t i t u d e  human 
b e in g s  may tak e  tow ards  them. I f  they  a re  b e l i e v e d  o r  
d i s b e l i e v e d  o r  ig n o re d  t h e i r  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  w i l l  n o t  
be a l t e r e d .  They have a c o n te n t  o r  a meaning and t h i s  
l i m i t s  what r e a s o n s  t h e r e  can  b e  f o r  draw ing c o n c lu s io n s  
in  acco rd ance  w ith  them. The c o n te n t  o f  any p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
w h a tev e r  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  a t t i t u d e s  human b e in g s  ta k e  tow ards 
i t ,  d i c t a t e s  th e  s o r t  o f  r e a s o n s  t h a t  can be g iv en  f o r  i t s  
t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y .  In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  c o n c lu s io n s  which a r e  
drawn as  th e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  re a so n in g  a r e  indep en den t 
o f  human b e in g s  and t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s .  But a t  th e  same tim e 
i t  i s  q u e s t io n a b le  w he ther  any meaning can be g iven  to  th e  
n o t io n  o f  rea so n  o r  r e a s o n in g  t o t a l l y  in d ep en d en t  o f  human 
b e in g s  and t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s .  A lthough peop le  can n o t g iv e  
j u s t  any re a so n s  f o r  t h e i r  b e l i e f  in  a c e r t a i n  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
o r  f o r  t h e i r  c o n c lu s io n s  i n  acc o rd a n c e  w ith  a c e r t a i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  b e cau se  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  in v o lv e d  
d i c t a t e s  what s o r t  o f  re a so n s  can be g iv e n ,  what re a so n s  
a c t u a l l y  a re  g iv en  depends to  some e x te n t  on human b e in g s ,  
and so does th e  f a c t  t h a t  what th ey  g iv e  i n  su p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  
c o n c lu s io n s  a c t u a l l y  a re  r e a s o n s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  shows t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
some in d ep en d en t c r i t e r i a  f o r  re a s o n s  d i c t a t e d  by th e  
c o n te n t  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  in v o lv e d :  i f  x i s  th e  c a s e ,
then  i t  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e a so n  f o r  y. But n o n -h y p o th e t ic a l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  shows t h a t  t h e r e  a re  f u r t h e r  l i m i t s  
p u t  on re a so n s  by th e  human b e in g s  in v o lv e d  and the  a t t i t u d e s  
they  have -  x w i l l  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e a so n  (o r  n o t  a re a so n  
he can g iv e )  f o r  som eone 's  coming to  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  y 
i f  he i s  unaware t h a t  x o r b e l i e v e s  n o t  x . S i m i la r ly  i f  
A g iv e s  a p e r f e c t l y  v a l i d  re a so n  f o r  coming to  a c e r t a i n
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c o n c lu s io n ,  i f  he h i t  on i t  hy a c c id e n t  and had no id e a
t h a t  i t  r e a l l y  d id  show t h a t  h i s  c o n c lu s io n  fo l lo w e d ,
th en  i t  co u ld  n o t  cou n t as  a rea so n  f o r  h i s  h a v in g  come
to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  he d id .  H is o th e r  re a so n s  r e a l l y  *
were h i s  r e a s o n s  b u t  t h i s  one was not,. b e c a u se  he d id
no t b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  was t r u e ,  o r  b e ca u se  he d id  n o t
b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  a f f e c t e d  th e  argument i n  any way. B e l i e f
i s  an o p e r a t iv e  f a c t o r  i n  what c o u n ts  as  a p e r s o n 's  re a so n s
f o r  coming to  c e r t a i n  c o n c lu s io n s .
K e g e l 's  example o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  s u f f e r s  from 
h a v in g  been  p u t in  such a p e r s o n a l  form. He say s  t h a t  th e  
b e l i e f  and th e  c o n c lu s io n s  drawn in  acco rdance  w i t h . i t  a re  
e x p la in e d  by th e  p e r c e p t io n  o f  th e  r e a so n s  th e r e  a re  to  
draw c o n c lu s io n s  i n  acc o rd a n c e  w ith  i t .  But th e  a c t i v i t y  
o f  d raw ing  c o n c lu s io n s  (a  human a c t i v i t y )  can n o t  be made 
sense  o f  ( u n le s s  i t  i s  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  draw ing  o f  c o n c lu s io n s )  
u n le s s  one b e l i e v e s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i n  acco rdance  w ith  which 
one i s  draw ing c o n c lu s io n s  -  what o th e r  e x p la n a t io n  i s  t h e r e ,  
o r  c o u ld  t h e r e  b e ,  o f  d raw ing  c o n c lu s io n s  in  a cco rd an ce  w ith  
a p r i n c i p l e ?  Of c o u rse  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  w i l l  
d i c t a t e  th e  s o r t  o f  c o n c lu s io n  which car. be drawn, and to  
t h i s  e x te n t  th e  r e a so n s  f o r  t h a t  c o n c lu s io n  a re  in d ep e n d en t  
o f  th e  p e rso n  draw ing th e  c o n c lu s io n ,  b u t  th e  a c t i v i t y  o f  
draw ing  c o n c lu s io n s  must be e x p la in e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  
b e l i e f ' i n  p r i n c i p l e s  from which th ey  a re  drawn.
Nagel does n o t  seem to  d i s t i n g u i s h  s u f f i c i e n t l y  betw een 
th e  human a c t i v i t y  o f  r e a s o n in g ,  and the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  c o n te n t  
o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  th em se lv e s  d lc ta t e ^ w h a t  s o r t  o f  th in g s  can y 6 
coun t a s  re a so n s  and th e s e  p o t e n t i a l  r e a s o n s  a re  in d ep en d en t 
o f  w h e th er  human b e in g s  may a c t u a l l y  u se  them as  r e a s o n s .
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They a re  on ly  p o t e n t i a l  r e a s o n s  and though a human "being 
must l i m i t  h im s e l f  to  th o se  r e a s o n s ,  and in  t h i s  way what 
can co u n t as r e a s o n s  i s  in d ep en d en t  o f  any human a c t i v i t y ,  what 
w i l l  f i n a l l y  emerge as th e  re a so n  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c lu s io n  
o r  b e l i e f ,  o r  as  somebody’ s r e a so n s  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c o n c lu s io n  o r  b e l i e f  w i l l  be f u r t h e r  l i m i t e d  by what men 
i n  g e n e r a l ,  o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  man, know o r  b e l i e v e ,  and what 
t h e i r  p u rp o se s  a r e .  I f  what can co u n t  a s  r e a so n s  i n  
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  i s  to  some e x te n t  c i r c u m s c r ib e d  by 
human b e in g s  and t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s ,  th e n  i s  i t  n o t  more th an  
l i k e l y  t h a t  re a so n s  f o r  a c t io n  which i s  s u i  g e n e r i s  a 
human a c t i v i t y  w i l l  be c i r c u m s c r ib e d  b y , and d i c t a t e d  b y ,  
human a t t i t u d e s  ( i n  t h i s  case  d e s i r e s )  a s  w e l l  a s  m a t t e r s  
o f  f a c t?
To r e t u r n  to  N a g e l’ s t h e s i s :  he w ants to  say t h a t  a
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  ray f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  can by i t s e l f  m o t iv a te  
my a c t i o n s  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no n e c e s s i t y  t o ’ p o s t u l a t e r ,  
an i n t e r v e n i n g  p r e s e n t  d e s i r e  as th e  m o t iv a t io n a l  in f lu e n c e # ' 
There a r e  two f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  accou n t which he 
o b j e c t s  to  b e c a u s e ,  he  s a y s ,  th ey  l e a d  to  a b su rd  consequences . 
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i t  does n o t  a l lo w  a c o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  
i n t e r e s t  to  p ro v id e  by i t s e l f  a re a so n  f o r  a c t i n g  and th e  
second  i s  t h a t  i t  does a llo w  a p r e s e n t  d e s i r e  f o r  a f u t u r e  
o b je c t  to  p ro v id e  by i t s e l f  a re a so n  f o r  p r e s e n t  a c t io n  i n  
p u r s u i t  o f  t h a t  o b j e c t .  He says  t h a t  th e s e  two f e a t u r e s  
l e a d  to  a b su rd  con seq u en ces .
The f i r s t  o f  th e s e  i s  t h a t  on th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  view I  
may now d e s i r e  f o r  th e  f u t u r e  som eth ing  which I  do n o t  
e x p ec t  to  d e s i r e  then  and which I  b e l i e v e  t h e r e  w i l l  th en  
be no re a so n  to  b r i n g  ab o u t -  so I may have re a so n  now to  
p re p a re  to  do what I  know I  w i l l  have no re a so n  to  do when
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th e  tim e comes. But what i s  i t  l i k e  to  d e s i r e  som eth ing
»
f o r  th e  f u t u r e  which I  know I  w i l l  c e a se  to  d e s i r e  a s  th e  
t im e  draws near?  Suppose I  d e s i r e  to  meet th e  Prim e
M in i s t e r  i n  a w e ek 's  t im e . My d e s i r e  i s  f o r  th e  f u t u r e
sim ply  b e ca u se  I  ioiow I  w i l l  have th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  o f  
m ee tin g  him i n  a w e ek 's  t im e . But I  know t h a t  when th e  
tim e comes I  s h a l l  have c e a se d  to  want to  meet him. Cbii
b o th  th e s e  d e s i r e s  be a b s o lu te ly  e q u a l  i n  t h e i r  m o t iv a t io n a l
fo rc e ?  I n  th e  p r e s e n t  I can on ly  depend on my powers o f  
p r e d i c t i o n  a s  to  th e  s t r e n g t h  o f  my f u t u r e  d e s i r e  arid can  
w e i ^  my d e s i r e s  a g a i n s t  each  o th e r  only  from my p r e s e n t  
p o in t  o f  view. A ccord ing  to  N ag e l ,  I  may have re a so n  
now to  make an appo in tm en t to  see  th e  i^ im e  M in i s t e r  when 
I  know I  w i l l  have no re a s o n  (because  no d e s i r e )  to  see  
him when th e  tim e comes. But th e  s o l u t i o n  in  t h i s  c a se  
seems q u i t e  u n p ro b le m a tic  and depends on how I  know t h a t  
I  w i l l  have no re a so n  ( d e s i r e )  to  se e  th e  Prim e M in i s t e r  
when th e  tim e comes. I f  I w i l l  have no d e s i r e  b ecause  I  
w i l l  be overcome w ith  f e a r  and t r e p i d a t i o n ,  th e n  i t  i s  up 
to  me to  d e c id e  which d e s i r e  i s  th e  s t r o n g e r ,  o r  which 
d e s i r e  I  w ish to  be m o t iv a t i o n a l l y  e f f i c a c i o u s .  I f  I  now 
d e s i r e  to  se e  th e  Prim e M in i s t e r  i n  a w eek 's  t im e ,  b u t  
know t h a t  when th e  tim e comes I  w i l l  have* c ea sed  to  d e s i r e  
to  see  him b e cau se  I  w i l l  have th e  in fo rm a t io n  I r e q u i r e  
from d i f f e r e n t  s o u r c e s ,  my p r e s e n t  d e s i r e ,  i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  
t h i s  knowledge, i s  q u i t e  in c o m p re h e n s ib le .
The second p o s s i b i l i t y ,  a c c o rd in g  to  N a g e l ,  on th e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  v iew , i s  t h a t  i f  I  ex p ec t  to  have a d e s i r e  i n  
th e  f u t u r e  and t h e r e f o r e  to  have i n  th e  I b t u r e  a r e a so n  f o r  
do ing  what th e  d e s i r e  i n d i c a t e s ,  b u t  th e  d e s i r e  i s  n o t
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p r e s e n t  now, and i f  no o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  d e s i r e  i s  p r e s e n t ,
I  have no rea so n  to  p re p a re  now f o r  what I  know I  s h a l l  
have re a so n  to  do in  th e  f u t u r e .  B ut t h i s  f a l l s  to  ta k e  
accoun t o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  to  a g r e a t e r  cr l e s s e r  
d e g re ^  a g e n e ra l  d e s i r e  p r e s e n t  i n  most men to  s a t i s f y  
t h e i r  p r e d i c t a b l e  f u t u r e  d e s i r e s  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e s e  
c o n f l i c t  i n  no way w ith  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s .  An example 
o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  Nagel e n v is a g e s  would be th e  fo l lo w in g ;
I  e x p e c t  t o  be hungry  by t h i s  e v en in g ,  b u t  am n o t  hungry 
now, t h e r e f o r e  now I  have no re a so n  to  shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s ,  
b u t  by t h i s  ev en in g ,  when I  w i l l  have re a s o n  to  shop f o r  
g r o c e r i e s ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be no o p p o r tu n i ty  to  do so . But in  
s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  th e  e x p e c ta t i o n  o f  my f u t u r e  d e s i r e  f o r  
food  p ro v id e s  no rea so n  to  shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s  now. I n  
such a s i t u a t i o n  most p e o p le  would shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s  when 
t h e r e  was an o p p o r tu n i ty  i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  
d id  n o t  f e e l  hungry a t  t h a t  tiirie. N a g e l 's  p u z z le  i s  how 
t h i s  a c t i o n  can be e x p la in e d  i f  a p r e s e n t  r e l e v a n t  d e s i r e  
i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  e x p la in  any a c t i o n ,  and i f  th e  p e r c e p t io n  
t h a t  som eth ing  i s  in  one’ s own f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  c an no t 
m o tiv a te  by i t s e l f .  The answ er to  t h i s  i s  t h a t  a  r e l e v a n t  
d e s i r e  i s  p r e s e n t ,  which does e x p la in  th e  a c t i o n ,  and t h i s  
i s  th e  g e n e ra l  d e s i r e  to  s a t i s f y  o n e ’ s p r e d i c t a b l e  f u t u r e  
d e s i r e s .  T h is  d e s i r e  i s  as  a m a t te r  o f  f a c t  n e a r ly  a lw ays 
p r e s e n t , '  b u t  l i k e  a l l  d e s i r e s ,  can be o v e r r id d e n .  I f  I  have 
a very  p r e s s in g  d e s i r e  to  do som eth ing  e l s e  r a t h e r  th an  shop 
f o r  g r o c e r i e s ,  th en  I  may d e c id e  to  l e t  t h i s  d e s i r e  m o tiv a te  
me and fa c e  th e  problem  o f  a d e s i r e  f o r  food  when i t  comes. 
I f ,  a s  Nagel w ants to  sa y ,  th e  p e rc e p t io n  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  
in  my own f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  can m o tiv a te  me by i t s e l f ,  how 
c o u ld  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  sometimes d o e sn ’ t  m o t iv a te  be
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a d e q u a te ly  e x p la in e d ?
Tom N a g e l’ 6 example o f  what would he p o s s ib l e  on th e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  view p r e s e n t s  a  p i c t u r e  o f  human b e in g s  
c o m p le te ly  a t  th e  mercy o f  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s  swayed 
t h i s  way and t h a t ,  p e rh ap s  b e in g  a b le  to  choose betw een 
two d e s i r e s  p r e s e n t  a t  a s p e c i f i c  t im e ,  b u t  n e v e r  b e in g  
a b le  to  a c t  i n  acco rd a n c e  w ith  an e x p ec te d  f u t u r e  d e s i r e  
r a t h e r  th a n  a p r e s e n t  one , and so only  f o r t u i t o u s l y  
p u jS u in g  a c o n s i s t e n t  c o u rse  o f  a c t i o n .  I f  a t  a l l ,  o f t e n  
a c t i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s ,  whose e x p e c te d  f u t u r e  
d e s i r e s  a re  as rem ote  from them a s  o t h e r  p e o p le ’ s d e s i r e s .
But p e o p le  a r e  n o t  l i k e  t h i s ,  they  do ta k e  accou n t o f  t h e i r  
own f u t u r e  d e s i r e s  a rd  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  a c t i o n .
The f a c t  t h a t  th e y  a r e  n o t  l i k e  t h i s  does n o t  show t h a t  
th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  wrong, b u t  t h a t  N a g e l’ s  acco u n t 
o f  i t  i s .  P e o p le  a re  m o tiv a te d  by ex tre m e ly  g e n e ra l  
d e s i r e s  a s  w e ll  a s  by s p e c i f i c  ones and th e  g e n e ra l  d e s i r e s  
can b e  e x ten d ed  o v e r  t im e ,  b ecause  a human b e in g  i s  c a p a b le  
o f  p r e d i c t i n g  f u t u r e  s i t u a t i o n s  and f u t u r e  d e s i r e s  a r i s i n g  
ou t o f  them, and a l s o  o f  d e c id in g  which o f  two d e s i r e s  he 
w ishes  to  be m o t iv a t i o n a l l y  e f f i c a c i o u s .  T h is  e x p la in s  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  p e o p le  a re  c a p a b le  o f  d i s r e g a r d in g  t h e i r  
p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s  i f  th ey  c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e i r  f u t u r e  d e s i r e s ,  
o r  o f  d i s r e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  i n  fa v o u r  o f  t h e i r  
p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s .  T h is  l a s t  f a c t  c an n o t be e x p la in e d  i f  
th e  mere p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  in  o n e ’ s f u t u r e  
i n t e r e s t  can m o tiv a te  by i t s e l f .  I t  can be  e x p la in e d  by 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  some p e o p le  a re  b e t t e r  a t  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e i r  
p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s ,  p a r t l y  p e rh ap s  b ecause  t h e i r  powers o f  
p r e d i c t i o n  a re  b e t t e r ,  o r  t h e i r  im a g in a t io n  more v i v id .
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There i s  a s e n s e ,  however, i n  which * I t  was i n  h i s  own 
i n t e r e s t *  does always e x p la in  an a c t i o n ,  h u t  n o t  every  a c t io n  
can he  e x p la in e d  hy s a y in g  t h a t  i t  was in  th e  a c t o r ’ s t e s t  
i n t e r e s t s .  T h is  asymmetry e x i s t s  b ecau se  in  g e n e ra l  
p eo p le  have a d e s i r e  to  do what I s  i n  t h e i r  own b e s t  i n t e r e s t  
b u t  n o t  a l l  d e s i r e s  a r e  alw ays m o t iv a t io n a l ly  e f f i c a c i o u s .
I f  th e  p e r c e p t io n  t h a t  som eth ing  was in  somebody’ s own 
i n t e r e s t s  p ro v id e d  by i t s e l f  a rea so n  f o r  h i s  a c t io n  th en  
t h e r e  would n o t  be  t h i s  asymmetry. There i s  a n o th e r  f a c t o r  
which sh o u ld  be tak e n  i n t o  acco u n t;  i t  i s  n o t  always p o s s ib l e  
to  fo rm u la te  a c l e a r  c u t  acco u n t o f  a p e r s o n ’ s b e s t  i n t e r e s t s .
A p e r s o n ’ s b e e t  i n t e r e s t s  a re  o f te n  r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  
c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  such a s  th e  s o r t  o f  p e rso n  he w ants to  b o > 
and th e s e  o th e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  can be fo rm u la te d  i n  term s o f  
d e s i r e s .  I f  John w ants to  be  a good son then  i t  i s  i n  h i s  
b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  to  do x ,  b u t  i f  he w ants to  g e t  on in  th e  
w orld  th e n  i t  i s  in  h i s  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  to  do y. So what 
i s  i n  someone’ s b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  depends i t s e l f  on what h i s  
d e s i r e s  a re  and can no t be fo rm u la te d  w ith o u t  some very  
g e n e ra l  r e f e r e n c e  to  some v e ry  g e n e ra l  d e s i r e s .  D e s i r e s  
canno t be  e sca p ed . A c t io n s ,  i f  they  a r e  v o lu n ta ry  o r  
i n t e n t i o n a l ,  have to  b e  e x p la in e d  at- some p o in t  by some 
r e f e r e n c e  to  a d e s i r e ,  though th e  d e s i r e  may be so g e n e ra l  
a rd  80 u n i v e r s a l  t h a t  i t  may appea r  t h a t  th e  a c t i o n  i s  b e in g  
e x p la in e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  a lo n e .
Nagel seems to  want to  say  t h a t  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  e x i s t  
in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  p e o p le  p e rfo rm in g  th o se  a c t i o n s  and t h a t  any 
p r e d i c a t e  which can be  a p p l i e d  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t io n  c o n s t i t u t e s  
a prim a f a c i e  rea so n  f o r  i t .  But i t  i s  on ly  when an a c t io n  
s ta n d s  in  some r e l a t i o n  to  a p e rso n  ( i s  c o n te m p la te d  by him, 
done by him, r e g r e t t e d  by him) t h a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  re a s o n s  f o r
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a c t io n  h a s  any se n se .  One p e r s o n ’ s r e a so n s  f o r  an a c t io n  
m ight he  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from a n o th e r  p e r s o n ’ s re a s o n s  f o r  
a s i m i l a r  a c t i o n  and they  on ly  become re a s o n s  f o r  him and 
f o r  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n  (h i s  a c t io n )  i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  
h i s  d e s i r e s .
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The I m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  D e s i r e s  b e in g  Reasons f o r  B e l ie v in g
In  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r  I  su g g e s te d  t h a t  t a e  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  so m e th in g ’ s h av ing  th e  s t a t u s  o f  a re a so n  were d i f f e r e n t  
in  th e  c a s e  o f  a rea so n  f o r  a v o lu n ta r y  a c t io n  and in  th e  
case  o f  a re a so n  f o r  a b e l i e f ,  and th e  second c h a p te r  showed 
t h a t  i f  som eth ing  i s  to  coun t a s  a p rim ary  rea so n  f o r  an 
a c t io n  (som eth ing  which can m o tiv a te  o re c a u se  t h a t  a c t io n )  
i t  must in c lu d e  a t  l e a s t  an i m p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  to  a d e s i r e .
On th e  o t h e r  hand , a s  was n o te d  i n  th e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  i f  a 
man g iv e s  e r e a s o n  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  to  coun t as 
a r e a s o n ,  must n o t  make e x p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  to  a d e s i r e .
I f  i t  does i t  w i l l  d i s c o u n t  th e  rea so n  a s  a re a so n  f o r  t h a t  
s t a t e  o f  mind, and c o n se q u e n t ly  th e  s t a t e  o f  mind as  one o f  
b e l i e f .  The asymmetry betw een th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  re a so n s  f o r  
a c t io n  and th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  stem s from 
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een b e l i e f  and a c t i o n .  Reasons j u s t i f y ,  
r a t i o n a l i z e  and e x p la in  som eth ing  and i f  a c t i o n  and b e l i e f  
a re  i n  im p o r ta n t  ways very  d i s s i m i l a r  i t  i s  to  be e x p ec te d  
t h a t  what w i l l  j u s t i f y  r a t i o n a l i z e  o r  e x p la in  one type  o f  
th in g  ( a c t io n )  w i l l  n o t ,  (p e rh a p s  j u s t  i n  v i r t u e  o f  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  i t  j u s t i f i e s ,  r a t i o n a l i z e s  and e x p la in s  t h a t  
type  o f  t h i n g ) ,  f u l :^ i l  th e  same f u n c t io n  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a 
r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  type  o f  t h in g  ( b e l i e f ) .
But i t  i s  by no means obv ious t h a t  th e  asymmetry 
between re a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n s  and re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  which 
e x i s t s  in  one l e v e l  o f  r e a so n s  f o r  b e l i e f  ( th e  re a so n s  a 
man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  own b e l i e f s )  e x i s t s  in  a l l  a r e a s  o f  r e a so n s  
f o r  b e l i e f .  In  th e  a re a  o f  th e  r e a so n s  a man may g iv e  f o r  
someone e l s e ’ s b e l i e f s  t h e r e  i s  no asymmetry, and o th e r
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f a c t o r s ,  m en tioned  i n  th e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
th e r e  m ight b e  room f o r  d e s i r e s  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f ,  
among them, t h a t  i t  seems im p o s s ib le  to  fo rm u la te  th e  
o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  cn th e  re a so n s  f o r  b e l i e f  in  a way 
which does n o t  make them dependent on th e  b e l i e v e r ’ s s t a t e  
o f  mind, and so seems to  d i v e s t  them o f  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v i t y .
I f  d e s i r e s  can to  some e x te n t  be  re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  
th en  b e l i e f s  w i l l  to  t h a t  e x te n t  be  v o lu n ta ry .  Do we have 
any c o n t r o l  ove r o u r  b e l i e f s ?  Can th e  w i l l  be b ro u g h t  to  
b e a r  on them? Some o f  th e  ways in  which we o r d i n a r i l y  
t a l k  abou t b e l i e f s  have p a r a l l e l s  in  th e  language  o f  a c t i o n ,  
d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e ,  f i n d i n g  som eth ing  d i f f i c u l t  o r  easy  to  
b e l i e v e ,  and so p n .  What, i f  any, s i g n i f i c a n c e  can be 
a t t a c h e d  to  th e s e  canmon lo c u t io n s ?
Among h i s t o r i c a l  p h i lo s o p h e r s  who have been  i n t e r e s t e d  
in  t h i s  problem  D e s c a r te s  i s  u s u a l ly  s a id  to  have h e ld  t h a t  
b e l i e f  i s  v o lu n ta ry  w h ile  Sp inoza  and Hume say t h a t  i t  i s  
i n v o lu n ta r y .  D e s c a r te s  h a s  come u n d e r  much c r i t i c i s m ,  
b o th  from con tem porary  p h i lo s o p h e r s  and from S p inoza  h im s e l f ,  
f o r  s a y in g  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  v o lu n ta r y .  But w he ther  what 
D e sc a r te s  sa y s  abou t b e l i e f  does in  f a c t  have th e  consequence 
t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  v o lu n ta ry  i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  d e b a ta b le .  When 
s e t t i n g  o u t  on h i s  programme o f  s y s te m a t ic  doubt he say s :
" I  ought n o t  th e  l e s s  c a r e f u l l y  to  W ithhold  b e l i e f  from 
what i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  c e r t a i n  and i n d u b i t a b l e  th an  from what 
i s  m a n i f e s t ly  f a l s e "  (M e d i ta t io n  I ) .  He i s  w i th o u t  doubt 
s a y in g  t h a t  th e r e  i s  an e lem en t o f  th e  v o lu n ta ry  i n  b e l i e f  
b u t  he i s  n o t  t a k in g  acco u n t  o f  a n y th in g  more uncommon 
than  th e  law t a k e s  acc o u n t  o f  when i t  say s  t h a t  somebody 
sh ou ld  be c o n s id e re d  in n o c e n t  u n t i l  he i s  p roved  g u i l t y .
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He i s  t a k in g  acco u n t  o f  our a b i l i t y  to  a s s e s s  ev idence  and 
to  b e  l e d  by i t #  When D e s c a r te s  d i s c a r d s  a l l  h i s  u s u a l  
b e l i e f s  he does so f o r  th e  ve ry  good rea so n  t h a t  th e  ev id ence  
f o r  them l e a v e s  some room f o r  doubt abou t t h e i r  t r u t h .
Indeed  th e  ve ry  ev id en ce  which he u s u a l ly  t a k e s  to  p o in t  to  
t h e i r  t r u t h ,  c o u ld  p o in t  to  t h e i r  f a l s i t y .  He b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  c e r t a i n  p h y s ic a l  o b j e c t s  su rro u n d  him becau se  he has  
c e r t a i n  s e n s a t i o n s  b u t  wher. he i s  w ondering w h e th er  he i s  
j u s t i f i e d  i n  b e l i e v i n g  t l i l s  he r e a l i z e s  t h a t  th e  same 
ev id en ce  in  d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  (when he i s  a s l e e p  
and dream ing) does n o t  p o in t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  h i s  b e l i e f  
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  p h y s ic a l  o b j e c t s .  What he i s  draw ing our 
a t t e n t i o n  to  i s  t h a t  th e  ev id en ce  which we u s u a l ly  tak e  to  
be e v id e n ce  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t io n  i s  o f t e n  n o t  
th e  on ly  e v id e n ce  th e r e  i s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  i f  we b e l i e v e  
th e  ev id en ce  o f  o u r  s e n se s  a lo n e  we w i l l  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  
sun i s  a sm a ll  round o b j e c t ,  and i f  we b e l i e v e  th e  ev id en ce  
o f  s c ie n c e  we w i l l  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i s  many t im es  l a r g e r  
than  th e  e a r t h .  What he i s  s a y in g  i s  t h a t  we have a du ty  
to  e x p lo re  a l l  th e  e v id e n c e ;  we must n o t  be l e d  to  b e l i e f s  
by in c o n c lu s iv e  o r  in a d e q u a te  e v id e n c e .  H is acco u n t o f  
freedom to  b e l i e v e  i s  n o t  d iv o rc e d  from th e  n o t io n  o f  t r u t h  
and so i s  n o t  an i l l e g i t i m a t e  sen se  o f  freedom. He says  
"To th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  freedom , i t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a ry  t h a t  I  
be a l i k e  i n d i f f e r e n t  tow ards each o f  two c o n t r a r i e s .  The 
more I  am i n c l i n e d  tow ards th e  one, w he ther  b e ca u se  I  
c l e a r l y  know t h a t  in  i t  t h e r e  i s  th e  rea so n  o f  t r u t h  and 
goodness , o r  b e ca u se  God th u s  i n t e r n a l l y  d i s p o s e s  ray 
th o u g h t ,  th e  meore f r e e l y  do I  choose and embrace i t . ” 
(M e d ita t io n  IV ). D e s c a r te s  a t t a c h e s  a s p e c i a l  sen se  to  
freedom  h e re  in  which my freedom  i s  dependent on my a b i l i t y
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to  b e l i e v e  what i s  t r u e .  And my a b i l i t y  to  b e l i e v e  what 
i s  t r u e  i s  dependent on my du ty  to  c o n s id e r  th e  e v id e n ce .
In  t h i s  way I  can make su re  t h a t  I  do n o t  b e l i e v e  som ething 
f o r  which th e  ev id e n ce  i s  in a d e q u a te .  A dm itted ly  D e sc a r te s  
say s  t h in g s  which imply t h a t  we a re  f r e e  to  b e l i e v e  what we 
l i k e  " I f  I  a b s t a i n  from ju d g in g  a t h in g  when I  do n o t  p e rc e iv e  
i t  w ith  s u f f i c i e n t  c l e a r n e s s  and d i s t i c t n e s s  I  a c t  r i g h t l y  
and am n o t  d e c e iv e d ;  b u t  i f  I  r e s o lv e  to  deny o r  a f f i r m ,
I  th en  do n o t  make a r i g h t  u se  o f  my f r e e  w i l l . "  (M e d i ta t io n  IV). 
But i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  sense  which he g iv e s  to  "freedom " i n  
th e  rem ark  quo ted  above, I  t h in k  t h i s  im p l i c a t io n  can be 
r e j e c t e d .  I t  i s  more l i k e l y  t h a t  what he means i s  t h a t  i f  
I  r e s o l v e  to  b e l i e v e  so m eth in g , a l th o u g h  I  know I  have 
in a d e q u a te  ev id en ce  f o r  i t ,  then  I  am u s in g  my freedom  
w rongly . That we do have t h i s  freedom can be seen from 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  we o f t e n  do h o ld  b e l i e f s  b a se d  on in a d e q u a te  
ev id en ce  when we know t h a t  th e  ev id en ce  i s  in a d e q u a te .
In d eed , i f  we co u ld  n o t  do t h i s ,  s c i e n t i f i c  d i s c o v e r i e s  
might n e v e r  be made s in c e  i t  i s  o f t e n  b ecau se  a b e l i e f  i s  
h e ld  ve ry  s t r o n g ly  on in a d e q u a te  e v id e n c e ,  t h a t  a s c i e n t i s t  
i s  prom pted to  d i s c o v e r  e v id e n c e  t h a t  w i l l  be ad eq u a te  f o r  i t .
D e s c a r te s  can and sh o u ld  be  c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  g iv in g  too 
g r e a t  a scope to  ou r a b i l i t y  to  d o u b t .  T here  a re  some 
b e l i e f s  wnich a r e  n o t  b a sed  on e v id e n ce  and which i t  does 
n o t  make se n se  to  say we can d o u b t ,  namely many o f  Our 
p e r c e p tu a l  b e l i e f s .
S p in o z a ’ s main c r i t i c i s m  o f  D e s c a r te s  seems to  be  
t h a t  he  makes a s s e n t  to  a p r o p o s i t io n  a d i f f e r e n t  t h in g  
from th e  p e rc e p t io n  t h a t  i t  i s  t r u e  o r  f a l s e  th u s  im p ly in g  
t h a t  p e r c e iv in g  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  t r u e  o r  f a l s e  i s  n o t  a 
n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  a s s e n t in g  to  i t  o r  d i s s e n t i n g  from
J:
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i t .  I n  a way Sp inoza  i s  q u i t e  r i g ï i t  to  say t h a t  p e rc e iv in g  
som eth ing  to  be t r u e  and a s s e n t in g  a re  one and th e  same 
a c t i v i t y ;  I f  i t  i s  p l a i n  to  u s  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  t r u e  
th en  t h e r e  i s  no room f o r  n o t  b e l i e v i n g  i t ,  and s e e in g  t h a t  
i t  i s  t r u e  and b e l i e v i n g  i t  a r e  one and th e  same th in g .
But t h e r e  does seem to  be a  p o in t  to  D escar tes*  d i s t i n c t i o n  : 
betw een p e r c e p t io n  and a s s e n t ,  which i s  t h a t  we can a s s e n t  
to  ( b e l i e v e )  a p r o p o s i t i o n  w ith o u t  h av in g  p e rc e iv e d  t h a t  
i t  i s  t r u e  (w i th o u t  h a v in g  a d eq u a te  ev idence  f o r  i t s  t r u t h )  
a l th o u g h  we must t h in k  t h a t  we have p e rc e iv e d  t h a t  i t  i s  t r u e .  
S p in o za , by e q u a t in g  b e l i e f  witbi th e  p e rc e p t io n  t h a t  som ething  
i s  t r u e ,  does n o t  a llo w  f o r  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  a l th o u g h  h i s  
accoun t does a llo w  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  su sp en d in g  our 
judgement when we do n o t  p e rc e iv e  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  t r u e .
He sa y s  "When we say  t h a t  anyone suspends h i s  judgement we 
m ere ly  mean t h a t  • • •  he does n o t  p e rc e iv e  th e  m a t t e r  i n  
q u e s t io n  a d e q u a te ly "  ( E th i c s .  P a r t  I I  P r o p o s i t i o n  XLIX).
There  i s  a n o th e r  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  i s  a l s o  l e v e l l e d  a t  
D e sc a r te s  and o th e r s  who say  t h a t  one ought to  b e l i e v e  
what i s  t r u e  (o r  what th e  ev id en ce  p o i n t s  to  as  b e in g  t r u e ) .  
The u se  o f  ’o u g h t ’ h e r e ,  i t  i s  s a i d ,  im p l ie s  t h a t  one can 
b e l i e v e  what one l i k e s .  B e rn ard  Mayo, i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  
" B e l i e f  and C o n s t r a in t "  (3) sa y s  " I f  ought im p l i e s  b o th  
"can" and i t s  s u b c o n t r a ry  "can o m it" ,  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  
b e l i e v i n g  i s  som eth ing  we can do o r  a v o id ,  an a c t  we can 
perfo rm  o r  a  s t a t e  we c a r  e n t e r  i n t o ,  o r  d e p a r t  from, a t  
w i l l " .  W hether Mayo i s  r i g h t  ab o u t t h i s  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  
l a t e r  on , b u t  one th in g  which h a s  been  e s t a b l i s h e d  ( i n  
C h a p te r  I )  i s  t h a t  we canno t b e l i e v e  a t  w i l l .
Can we d e c id e  to  b e l i e v e ?  I t  seems t h a t  in  many c a s e s
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t h e r e  i s  a s i m i l a r i t y  betw een d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  and
To
d e c id in g  to  a c t .  We decide^ 'x  r a t h e r  th a n  y b e cau se  a, b ,  
and c p o in t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  x v.wheh n o th in g  p o i n t s  to  t h e  
t r u t h  o f  y ,  o r  what does p o in t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  y i s  much 
weaker ev id e n ce  f o r  i t  than  th e  ev id ence  we have f o r  th e  
t r u t h  o f  X a s  we o f t e n  d e c id e  to  do a r a t h e r  th an  b ,  
becau se  t h e r e  i s  more to  be  s a i d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a .
But i n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  s i m i l a r i t y  betw een th e  two c a s e s  
" o f  d e c id in g  i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  
se n se  o f  " d e c id in g "  i n  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  which th e r e  a re  
n o t  o rT d e c id in g  to  a c t  which stem from th e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between b e l i e v i n g  and a c t in g :  i n  a c t io n  one can d e c id e  to
do one t h in g  r a t h e r  than a n o th e r ,  w hich, a l l  t h in g s  c o n s id e re d  
h as  l e s s  to  be  s a i d  in  f a v o u r  o f  i t ,  and know t h i s ,  ( t h i s  
a cc o u n ts  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n c o n t in e n t  a c t i o n s )  b u t  one 
c o u ld  n e v e r  d e c id e  to  b e l i e v e  som eth ing  f o r  which t h e r e  was 
l i t t l e  o r  no ev id en ce  r a t h e r  th an  somet in g  f o r  which th e r e  
was a g r e a t  dea l o f  e v id e n c e ,  and know t h a t  one d id .  At 
l e a s t ,  i f  one d id ,  i t  would have to  be b ecau se  one s u s p e c te d  
t h a t ,  i f  o n ly  i t  c o u ld  be d i s c o v e r e d ,  t h e r e  would in  f a c t  
be s t r o n g  e v id en ce  to  s u p p o r t  o n e ’ s b e l i e f .  T h is  e x p la in s  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th in g s  l i k e  hun ches , where we have  a very  
s t r o n g  b e l i e f  u n su p p o r te d  by any e v id e n c e ,  b u t  a l th o u g h  no 
ev id en ce  may ev e r  be d is c o v e re d  which j u s t i f i e s  a hunch, 
h a v in g  a hunch o r  b e l i e f  which c o n t r a d i c t s  a n o th e r  p r o p o s i t io n  
f o r  which th e r e  i s  much ev id ence  can n e v e r  be  c a l l e d  j u s t  
d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  one t h in g  r a t h e r  than  a n o th e r ,  as we can 
j u s t  d e c id e  to  pe rfo rm  an a c t i o n  which has l i t t l e  to  be s a id  
in  fav o u r  o f  i t  r a t h e r  thar; one which h a s  much to  be s a id  
in  fa v o u r  o f  i t ,  b ecau se  th e  u l t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a 
hunch f o r  which t h e r e  i s  no e v id e n c e ,  i s  t h a t  i t  t u r n s  o u t
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t o  be  t r u e ,  and a s  h a s  been s a i d  a l r e a d y ,  we cemnot d e c id e  
what s h a l l  be t r u e .  F o r  an in c o n t i n e n t  a c t io n  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
i s  p o s s i b l e ,  b u t  t h i s  does n o t  p re v e n t  one from d e c id in g  to  
do i t .  But i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  i f  one d e c id e s  to  b e l i e v e  
som eth in g , one must b e  a b le  to  j u s t i f y  o n e ’ s b e l i e f .
There  a r e  o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  
and d e c id in g  to  a c t  wi ic h  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  d e c id in g  i n  th e  f i r s t  
c o n te x t  h a s  a n a rro w er  sen se  th a n  d e c id in g  in  th e  second; 
th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  a d e c i s io n  to  a c t  i s  t y p i c a l l y  th e  e x p re s s io n  
o f  th e  i n t e n t i o n  to  a c t .  The a c t i o n  i s  som ething  o v e r  and 
above th e  d e c i s io n .  We n e v e r  a c t  m ere ly  by d e c id in g  to  a c t  
(a l th o u g h  th e  d e c i s io n  i t s e l f  can be c a l l e d  an a c t io n )  and 
so a l th o u g h  we may have d e c id e d  to  a c t  in  a c e r t a i n  way, 
we may n e v e r  in  f a c t  p e rfo rm  t h a t  a c t i o n .  But th e  e x p re s s io n  
o f  a d e c i s io n  to  b e l i e v e  i s  t y p i c a l l y  th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  th e  
b e l i e f  i t s e l f .  When we say  " I  have d ec id ed  to  b e l i e v e  y" 
we mean in  g e n e ra l  " I  now b e l i e v e  y" n o t  " I  have now formed 
th e  I n t e n t i o n  o f  b e l i e v i n g  y a t  a l l  c o s t s " .  But i f  th e  w i l l  
can be b ro u g h t  to  b e a r  on b e l i e f s  i t  must be p o s s ib l e  to  speak  
o f  a d e c i s io n  to  b e l i e v e  o r  an i n t e n t i o n  to  b e l i e v e  which 
does n o t  im ply t h a t  one a l r e a d y  h o ld s  t h a t  b e l i e f .  I t  must 
be p o s s ib l e  to  s e t  o n e s e l f  a p r o j e c t  o f  b e l i e v i n g  a c e r t a i n  
t h in g  as  one can s e t  o n e s e l f  a p r o j e c t  o f  d o ing  som eth ing  
and i t  must be p o s s ib l e  to  f a i l  o r  su cceed  in  t h i s .
As has been  se e n ,  th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  a man’ s a c t io n s  stem  
p a r t l y  from , and a re  c i r c u m s c r ib e d  b y ,  h ie  d e s i r e s  as  w e l l  
as  stemming from h i s  b e l i e f s  abo u t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  and m a t t e r s  
o f  f a c t .  I f  i t  can be shown t h a t  a man’ s d e s i r e s  a re  to  
some e x te n t  u n d e r  h i s  v o lu n ta r y  c o n t r o l ,  th en  he w i l l ,  to  
some e x t e n t ,  be a b le  to  choose h i s  own re a so n s  f o r  a c t io n  
(se e  C h a p te r  V, p a r t  2 ) .  But a man cou ld  n o t  l o g i c a l l y
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Choose h i e  own re a so n s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  and s t i l l  p r o p e r ly  
be s a i d  to  b e l i e v e ,  becau se  a p r o p o s i t io n  which i s  th e  o b je c t  
o f  b e l i e f  h a s  a c o n te n t  which d i c t a t e s  i t s  re a so n s  becau se  
they  a re  r e a s o n s  f o r  i t s  t ru th *  And th e  t r u t h  o f  a 
p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  n o t  a r e l a t i v e  n o t io n  -  a p r o p o s i t io n  does 
n o t  become t r u e  when i t  i s  b e l i e v e d  by one p e rso n  and f a l s e  
when i t  i s  b e l i e v e d  by a n o th e r  -  a s  a (n o n -m o ra l ly )  
commendable a c t i o n  i s  commendable i h  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  p e rso n  
who p e rfo rm s  i t .  Even i f  th e  re a so n s  a p e rso n  g iv e s  f o r  
h i s  b e l i e f  a r e  n o t  d i c t a t e d  by th e  p r o p o s i t io n  be  b e l i e v e s ,  
he must b e l i e v e  t h a t  th ey  a r e ,  and t h i s  p re c lu d e s  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h i s  c o n s c io u s ly  ch o o sin g  h i s  own re a s o n s  f o r  
h i s  b e l i e f s .
B ut a l th o u g h  a man canno t say ’ I  b e l i e v e  x  because  y ’ 
where y e x p re s s e s  a d e s i r e  o f  some k in d ,  someone e l s e  can 
aay  'He b e l i e v e s  x b e ca u se  y ’ , where y i s  a d e s i r e ,  w i th o u t  
d i s c o u n t in g  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f .  And a lth o u g h  
b e l i e f  h a s  a  n e c e s s a ry  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  brwti m a n i fe s te d  i n  
f i r s t  p e rso n  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  b e l i e f  so t h a t  we can n o t say *I 
b e l i e v e  p , b u t  p i s  f a l s e ’ t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  does n o t  have to  
be m a n i fe s te d  in  t h i r d  p e rso n  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  b e l i e f  so t h a t  
we car say  *He b e l i e v e s  t h a t  p ,  b u t  p i s  f a l s e * .  So we 
can h o ld  b e l i e f s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  d e s i r e s ,  and we can 
(o b v io u s ly )  h o ld  f a l s e  b e l i e f s .  T h is i s  im p o r ta n t  s in c e  
i f  some o f  our b e l i e f s  a re  h e ld  on th e  b a s is  o f  ou r  d e s i r e s ,  
i t  i s  t o  be e x p e c te d  t h a t  they  w i l l  on ly  have a f o r t u i t o u s  
co n n e c t io n  w ith  t r u t h .  A lthough t h i s  i s  so ,  i t  does n o t  
imply t h a t  anybody e v e r  d e c id e s  to  b e l i e v e  somet i n g  in  
th e  w ide r  sen se  o f  "decide* which i s  a p p l i c a b le  to  a c t i o n .  
Peophe may b e l i e v e  som eth ing  b e cau se  they  want t o ,  o r  because  
o f  some o th e r  d e s i r e  th e y  h a v e ,  w i th o u t  ever  h a v in g  d e c id ed  
to  b e l i e v e  i t .
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Can b e l i e f  be  v o lu n ta r y  to  any e x te n t?  I s  a c o n sc io u s  
p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  p o s s ib le ?  Could one e v e r  
have a m oral o b l i g a t i o n  to  b e l i e v e  som ething?
I n  Hume’ s acco u n t  o f  b e l i e f  t h e r e  i s  no room f o r  any 
v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  o v e r  ou r  b e l i e f s  a t  a l l .  He a sk s  "«Vherein 
c o n s i s t s  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een  i n c r e d u l i t y  and b e l i e f ?  s in c e  
i n  b o th  c a s e s  th e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  i d e a  i s  e q u a l ly  p o s s ib l e  
and r e q u i s i t e "  and comes to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  " b e l i e f  must 
l i e  in  th e  manner o f  c o n c e iv in g  id e a s "  "a  b e l i e f  i s  n o th in g  
b u t  an id e a  t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from a f i c t i o n ,  n o t  in  th e  
n a tu r e  o r  o rd e r  o f  i t s  p a r t s ,  b u t  in  th e  manner o f  i t s  
b e in g  c o n c e iv e d ."  ( T r e a t i s e ,  Book I ,  S e c t io n  V I I ) .  Nor 
does h i e  accou n t o f  th e  way in  which we come to  have b e l i e f s  
a llow  f o r  any v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  o ve r them* He says  "a  
p r e s e n t  im p re s s io n  r e l a t e d  to  an id e a  e i t h e r  by re sem b lan ce , 
c o n t i g u i t y  o r  c a u s a t io n ,  c a u s e s  b e l i e f  in  t h a t  id e a "  and 
"A p r e s e n t  im p re s s io n  i s  a b s o l u t e ly  r e q u i s i t e  to  b e l i e v i n g .  
Thus a l l  p ro b a b le  r e a s o n in g  i s  n o th in g  b u t  a s p e c ie s  o f  
s e n s a t io n "  ( T r e a t i s e ,  Book I  S e c t io n  V I I I ) .  A n e c e s sa ry  
consequence  o f  t h i s  acco u n t  o f  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  no more 
v o lu n ta ry  than  s e n s a t io n .  In  th e  Appendix to  th e  T r e a t i s e  
Hume sa y s  " b e l i e f  c o n s i s t s  m erely  i n  a c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g  o r  
s e n t im e n t ; i n  som eth ing  t h a t  depends n o t  on th e  w i l l ,  b u t  
must a r i s e  from c e r t a i n  d e te r m in a te  c a u se s  and p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  which we a r e  n o t  m a s te r s " .
But Hume’ s acco u n t o f  b e l i e f  has  th e  i n v o lu n t a r i n e s s  
o f  b e l i e f  a s  i t s  consequence  b e cau se  i t  i s  much too  l im i t e d  
and ta k e s  i n to  c o n s id e r a t io n  on ly  one way in  which we a r r i v e  
a t  b e l i e f s .  Some b e l i e f s  a re  a r r i v e d  a t  im m edia te ly  o r  
a u to m a t i c a l ly  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a p r e s e n t  im p re ss io n  end i t  
would make no se n se  to  say we c o u ld  have any v o lu n ta ry  
c o n t r o l  over t h e s e :  i f  I  h o ld  some wax over a f i r e ,  I
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canno t h e lp  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  I t  w i l l  m e l t .  When we b e l i e v e  
som eth ing  im m edia te ly  o r  a u to m a t i c a l ly  l i k e  t h i s ,  i t  i s  
s i m i l a r  to  th e  c a s e s  o f  b e l i e f  in  which we come to  b e l i e v e  
som eth ing  b ecau se  i t  i s  so . T h is  i s  a c e n t r a l  n o t io n  in  
b e l i e f ,  b u t  Hume*s acco u n t s u f f e r s  from f a i l i n g  to  ta k e  i n t o  
c o n s id e r a t io n  b e l i e f s  which a r e  n o t  a r r i v e d  a t  a u to m a t i c a l ly  
o r  d i r e c t l y ,  and a r e  n o t  r e l a t e d  to  a p r e s e n t  im p re s s io n ,  
(a l th o u g h  i n  th e  c h a p te r  on M ira c le s  in  the  I n q u i r y  he does 
say "A w ise  man . . .  p r o p o r t io n s  h i s  b e l i e f  to  th e  e v id e n c e " ) .  
Very many o f  ou r  b e l i e f s  a r e  a r r i v e d  a t  a f t e r  a lo n g  p ro c e s s  
o f  w eig iiing  up th e  e v id e n c e ,  and i t  i s  in  t h i s  a r e a  o f  b e l i e f  
t h a t  b e l i e v i n g  becomes a u s e f u l  t h in g  to  be a b le  to  do, s in c e  
i f  we can have b e l i e f s  o f  t h i s  k ind  very  rany  more a c t io n s  
a re  open to  u s  a s  s e n s i b l e  ones to  p e rfo rm , than  i f  we had 
to  r e l y  o n ly  on o u r  a u to m a tic  o r  im m ediate  b e l i e f s  when we 
a r e  d e l i b e r a t i n g  ab ou t what to  do. Because Hume on ly  ta k e s  
accoun t o f  such a l i m i t e d  ran g e  o f  b e l i e f s ,  no s i g n i f i c a n c e  
can b e  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  n e c e s s a ry  consequence  o f  h i s  accoun t 
t h a t  b e l i e f s  a r e  i n v o lu n ta r y  thougli h i s  accou n t does se rv e  
to  p o in t  o u t  one a r e a  o f  b e l i e f s  in  which they  a re  in v o lu n ta r y .
H.H. P r i c e ,  i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  ’B e l i e f  and W i l l ’ (U) 
c o n s id e r s  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  w he ther  we can have any v o lu n ta r y  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  o u r  b e l i e f s  and l o c a t e s  an a r e a  o f  th eI
v o lu n ta r y  in  th e  e v id en ce  f o r  ou r  b e l i e f s .  A lthough one 
- ^  can n o t  make o n e s e l f  b e l i e v e  som eth ing  j u s t  by an e f f o r t  o f  
w i l l  " d i r e c t l y  h e re  a rd  now) he  s a y s , " i n d i r e c t l y  and o v e r  
a p e r io d  o f  t im e ,  one can up  t o  a p o in t  v o l u n t a r i l y  c o n t r o l  
o ne’ s b e l i e f s .  B e l i e f s  can be g r a d u a l ly  c u l t i v a t e d  and 
they  can a l s o  be p re s e rv e d  when one i s  in  dan ger  o f  l o s i n g  
them. We have i t  in  ou r  power to  weaken o u r  dou b ts  l i t t l e  
by l i t t l e " .  There  a r e  two methods by which one may s e t
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about b e l i e v i n g  o r  d i s b e l i e v i n g  something* As th e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  to  some e x te n t  in  ou r  own power, 
we c a r  g e t  to  th e  s t a g e ,  by a j u d i c i a l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a t t e n t i o n ,  
where th e  on ly  ev id en ce  o f  which we a r e  aware p o in t s  to  th e  
t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  we w ish to  b e liev e *  The o th e r  
method i s  j u s t  to  f i x  o n e ’ s a t t e n t i o n  on th e  p r o p o s i t io n  
one w ish es  to  b e l i e v e  a rd  on what th in g s  would be  l i k e  i f  
i t  were t r u e  and we may even a c t  a s  i f  i t  were t r u e ,  th o u ^ i  
b e l i e f s  a r r i v e d  a t  by t h i s  method would n o t  be  re a s o n a b le  
b e l i e f s  b ecau se  th ey  would be q u i t e  lnde^,endent o f  any 
ev idence  t h e r e  i . lg h t  be f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  them. But n e i t h e r  
• o f  th e s e  methods c o u ld  coun t as  a c a se  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  
u n le s s  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a t t e n t i o n  e i t h e r  to  th e  ev iden ce  which 
fa v o u re d  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  o r  to  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  i t s e l f  was a 
c o n sc io u s  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a t t e n t i o n ;  b u t  i f  i t  was a com p le te ly  
c o n sc io u s  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a t t e n t i o n  i t  would seem t h a t  a man 
would have to  be  a b le  to  s a y ,  i n  th e s e  c a s e s ,  t h a t  he 
b e l i e v e d  som eth ing  b e cau se  he  wanted to  and as we have 
seen  a man c an n o t  say t h a t  he b e l i e v e s  som eth ing  sim ply 
becau se  he w ants t o ,  o r  because  o f  some o th e r  d e s i r e  he h a s ,  
w i th o u t  d i s c o u n t in g  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind a s  one o f  b e l i e f .
As an a cc o u n t  i n  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  te rm s about th e  way in  w hich , 
as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  w e^acqu ire  many o f  our b e l i e f s .  P r i c e ’ s 
acco un t seems to  be  a c o r r e c t  one. But a lth o u g h  a man may 
know I su b c o n s c io u s ly  t h a t  he has  a c q u ire d  a b e l i e f  in  t h i s  way, 
t h i s  knowledge can n o t be c o n sc io u s  to  th e  e x te n t  t h a t  he g iv e s  
re a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  t e r r a  o f  h i s  d e s i r e s .
In  g e n e ra l  we cai. g iv e  reasor s f o r  our b e l i e f s  w he ther  
they  a re  a c q u i re d  by th e  methods o u t l i n e d  above o r  by more 
r e p u ta b le  methods* I t  i s  n o t  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  
b e l i e v i n g  som eth ing  t h a t  we can g iv e  re a so n s  f o r  i t  a s  we
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may have hunches f o r  which we have no re a so n s ^ b u t  even i n  y )
t h i s  ty p e  o f  b e l i e f ,  we a re  n o t  only  conv in ced  o f  th e  t r u t h  
o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  we b e l i e v e ,  b u t  we a re  a l s o  conv in ced  
t h a t  t h e r e  must be v e ry  good re a so n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  o u r  
b e l i e f ,  i f  on ly  we c o u ld  d i s c o v e r  them# A man who 
e x e r c i s e s  v o lu n ta r y  c o n t r o l  over  h i s  b e l i e f s  by d i r e c t i n g  
h i s  a t t e n t i o n ,  o r  by c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on a p ro ix s s i t io n  must 
in  g e n e r a l  be a b le  to  g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  and 
th e s e  re a so n s  must be r e a s o n s  which he r e a l l y  b e l i e v e s  p o in t  
to  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  and a re  n o t  grounded i n  h i s  
p e rs o n a l  d e s i r e s #  A man who knew t h a t  he had a c q u ire d  a 
b e l i e f  b e c a u se  he wanted to  wou d n o t ,  i f  t h i s  knowledge 
was c o n s c io u s ,  be a b le  to  g iv e  a s  r e a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f , ^  
on ly  t h in g s  which he g e n u in e ly  b e l i e v e d  were re a so n s  f o r  th e  
t r u t h  o f  th e  p ro p o s i t io n #
The p r o j e c t  o f  t r y i n g  to  b e l i e v e  what I s  f a l s e  shou ld  
be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from a n o th e r  p r o j e c t ,  which i s  a n e c e s sa ry  
p r e r e q u i s i t e  o f  th e  f i r s t ,  and t h i s  i s  th e  p r o j e c t  o f  
t r y i n g  to  f o r g e t  what i s  t r u e .  The l a t t e r  i s  b o th  e a s i e r  
and l e s s  i r r a t i o n a l  th a n  th e  fo rm er .  I t  i s  e a s i e r  b e c a u se  
f o r g e t t i n g ,  u n l ik e  b e l i e v i n g ,  i s  n o t  a p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  o f  
mind dependen t on c e r t a i n  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t i o n s  such as  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  what we b e l i e v e  i s  t r u e .  The on ly  n e c e s s a ry  
c o n d i t io n  f o r  f o r g e t t i n g  som eth ing  i s  t h a t  we sh o u ld  n o t  
remember i t  ( o r  n o t  a t  th e  p o in t  a t  which we a r e  s a id  to  
have f o r g o t t e n  i t ) ,  *?e do n o t  need to  have e v id e n ce  f o r  
th e  f a l s i t y  o f  som eth ing  i n  o rd e r  to  f o r g e t  t h a t  i t  i s  t r u e ,  
and we do n o t  need  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i s  f a l s e  i n  o rd e r  to  
f o r g e t  t h a t  i t  i s  true#  T ry in g  to  f o r g e t  what i s  t r u e  i s  
l e s s  i r r a t i o n a l  th an  t r y i n g  to  b e l i e v e  what i s  f a l s e  becau se  
i t  i s  n o t  th e  c a se  t h a t  every  t r u t h  ougiit to  be som eth ing  I  
b e l i e v e  whereas i t  i s  the  c a se  t h a t  e v e r y th in g  I  b e l i e v e
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ought to  be  t r u e .
A no ther  o b j e c t i o n  to  a c o n sc io u s  p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  
to  b e l i e v e  i s  t h a t  a rren who had d e c id ed  to  b e l i e v e  som eth ing  
t h a t  tu r n e d  out to  be f a l s e  would be c o n s t a n t ly  c o n fro n te d  
w ith  e v id e n c e  which c o n f l i c t e d  w ith  h i s  b e l i e f  ar-.d which 
he would somehow have to  d i s c o u n t ,  and i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  
where t h i s  p ro c e s s  would come to  an end . I r i c e  s u g g e s ts  
t h a t  t h i s  p rob lem ^cou ld  be overcome by d i r e c t i n g  one’ s 
a t t e n t i o n  on ly  to  f a v o u r a b le  e v id e n c e ,  b u t  i t  i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  i f  one d id  t h i s  C o n s c ie n t io u s ly  one would have to  
d i s c a r d  v e ry  many o f  o n e ’ s  o r d i n a r i l y  h e ld  b e l i e f s .
A nother problem  a t t a c h e d  to  d i r e c t i n g  o n e ’ s a t t e n t i o n  
on ly  to  e v id e n c e  f a v o u ra b le  to  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  one w ishes 
to  b e l i e v e ,  i s  t h a t  i f  a man a v o id s  u n fa v o u ra b le  e v id e n c e ,  
he must r e a l l y  know what i s  t r u e  o r  he would n o t  know what 
to  d i r e c t  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  away from , and i f  he r e a l l y  >oiow8 
what i s  t r u e ,  does he a l s o  b e l i e v e  what he r e a l l y  knows to  
be t ru e ?  What i s  c e r t a i n  i n  t h i s  c a se  i s  t h a t  i f  th e  man 
can r e a l l y  be  s a i d  to  b e l i e v e  what he s e t s  o u t  to  b e l i e v e ,  
h i s  knowledge o f  what i s  t r u e  must be su b c o n sc io u s  and 
w hether one n e c e s s a r i l y  b e l i e v e s  what one knows only  
s u b c o n s c io u s ly ,  o r  n o t ,  i f  one does then  one must n e c e s s a r i l y  
b e l i e v e  i t  s u b c o n s c io u s ly .
I t  seems t h a t  many b e l i e f s  a re  h e ld  on th e  b a s i s  o f  
d e s i r e s  and t h i s  f a c t  does n o t  d is c o u n t  them a s  b e in g  
c a s e s  o f  b e l i e f ,  b u t  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  w he ther  a c o n sc io u s  
p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  i s  l o g i c a l l y  in c o m p a t ib le  t ; 
w ith  a s t a t e ’ s b e in g  one o f  b e l i e f  h a s  n o t  y e t  been  answ ered.
What h a s  been e s t a b l i s h e d  i s  t h a t  some d e g re e  o f  s e l f - d e c e p t io n  
i s  v i t a l  when one b e l i e v e s  som eth ing  b a s i c a l l y  b e e ause  one 
w a r ts  t o ;  th e  deg ree  o f  s e l f - d e c e p t i o p  which e n a b le s  one to
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g ive  th e  r i g h t  s o r t  o f  r e a s o n s  f o r  one’ s b e l i e f ,  and to  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  th ey  r e a l l y  a re  one’ s reasonas# Some degree  
o f  s e l f - d e c e p t i o n  i s  v i t a l  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l  to  
what e x te n t  à c o n sc io u s  p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  i s  
c o m p a tib le  w ith  th e  deg ree  o f  s e l f - d e c e p t i o n  n e c e s s a ry .
But i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  i f  one needs  to  be d e ce iv e d  about th e  
re a so n s  f o r  o n e ’ s b e l i e f  t h i s  i s  n o t  co m p a tib le  w ith  a 
c o n sc io u s  p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  becau se  " d e c id in g "  
in  t h i s  se n se  ( t h e  sen se  i n  which i t  i s  u s u a l ly  used  o f  
d e c id in g  to  a c t )  means t h a t  one car. d e c id e  to  do som ething  
becau se  one w ants t o ,  and know t h a t  t h i s  i s  th e  b a s i s  o f  
o ne’ s d e c i s io n .
I  conclude  t h a t  b e l i e v i n g  can no t be v o lu n ta r y ,  and 
t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  d e s i r e s  c an n o t  be  rea so n s  f o r  them.
B u t ,  i t  w i l l  be o b je c te d ,  I  have s e v e r a l  t im es  s a i d  t h a t  
d e s i r e s  can be r e a s o n s  f o r  a c t io n  in  th e  se n se  t h a t  we can 
say "He b e l i e v e s  x b ecau se  he wants y " .  But h e re  i t  i s  
u s e f u l , t o  appea l to  th e  c o m m o n 'd is t in c t io n  be tw een  re a s o n s  
and c a u sé s  m en tioned  i n  c h a p t e r  I I  i n  w hich , i n  g e n e r a l ,  
th e  c au se  o f  someone’ s a c t io n  o r  s t a t e  i s  som eth ing  o f  which 
he i s  n o t  c o n sc io u s  and o v er  which he t h e r e f o r e  has no c o n t r o l .  
D e s i r e s  may be c a u se s  o f  b e l i e f s ,  th ey  may e x p la in  why 
someone h o ld s  th e  b e l i e f  he d o e s ,  b u t  they  a re  n o t  r e a so n s  
in  th e  sense  t h a t  a man who b e l i e v e s  x becau se  he w ants y 
canno t be aware o f  y a s  th e  cau se  o f  h i s  b e l i e f  and must 
t h in k  t h a t  o t h e r ,  l e g i t i m a t e ,  f a c t o r s  a re  th e  cause  o f  h i s  
b e l i e f  o r  a r e  re a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f .
T here  i s ,  however, an a re a  o f  th e  v o lu n ta r y  which i s  
conn ec ted  w ith  b e l i e f  and in  which one can d e c id e  in  th e  
w ide r  se n se  o f  " d e c id e ” and t h i s  i s  th e  e x p re s s io n  o r  
a s s e r t i o n  o f  a b e l i e f .  The d e c i s io n  to  a s s e r t  on e ’ s 
b e l i e f  o r  to  c o n ce a l  i t ,  o r  to  a s s e r t  i t  s i n c e r e l y  o r
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i n s i n c e r e l y  i s  in  every  r e s p e c t  l i k e  th e  d e c i s io n  to  a c t ,  
h u t  t h i s  i s  b e ca u se  a s s e r t i o n  i s  i t s e l f  an a c t io n *
I have a l r e a d y  touched  (page 37) on a c r i t i c i s m  made 
hy B e rn a rd  Mayo o f  D e s c a r te s  and o t h e r s  who say t h a t  we 
ought ^to b e l i e v e  what i s  t ru e*  He o b j e c t s  to  t h i s  on th e  
g rounds t h a t  i t  e n t a i l s  t h a t  we can b e l i e v e  what i s  t r u e  or 
what i s  f a l s e  as we l i k e .  I t  shou ld  be bo rne  in  mind t h a t  
”VVe ought to  b e l i e v e  what i s  t r u e ” i s  m erely a lo o s e  way 
o f  s a y in g  t h a t  e v e r y th in g  we b e l i e v e  ought to  be  t r u e  and 
does n o t  mean t h a t  we ought to  b e l i e v e  e v e r y tn in g  t h a t  i s  
t r u e  which i s  o b v io u s ly  an u n re a so n a b le  demand* Does 
sa y in g  t h a t  e v e r y th in g  we b e l i e v e  ought to  b e  t r u e  e n t a i l  
t h a t  we can b e l i e v e  som eth ing  t h a t  i s  t r u e  o r  som eth ing  t h a t  
i s  f a l s e  a s  we l i k e ?  That we can no t b e l i e v e  a n y th in g  we 
l i k e ,  and t h a t  when we b e l i e v e  som eth ing  we b e l i e v e  i t  to  
be  t r u e ,  has  a l r e a d y  been shown* So s a y in g  t h a t  what we 
b e l i e v e  ought to  be t r u e  i s  e i t h e r  i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  o r  i t  does 
n o t e n t a i l  t h a t  we can b e l i e v e  what we l i k e  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
i t s  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y .  T here  i s  a sense  in  which th e  u se  
o f  ”o u # i t ” h e re  does imply "can ” and t h a t  i t  does i s  v i t a l  
to  th e  con cep t o f  b e l i e f ,  b u t  i t  does n o t  imply "ca n ” i n  
th e  way in  which Mayo say s  i t  does* I t  does n o t  imply 
" ca n ” i n  th e  sense  t h a t  we can b e l i e v e  w hatever we l i k e ;  
b u t  i t  does imply "can" in  th e  sen se  t h a t  what we b e l i e v e  
(and t h e r e f o r e  b e l i e v e  to  be  t r u e )  can  be  f a l s e .  T h is  i s  
th e  nub o f  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between b e l i e f  and knowledge.
That o u r  b e l i e f s  can be f a l s e  i s  what makes them b e l i e f s  
r a t h e r  th an  knowledge* But t h i s  does n o t  e n t a i l  t h a t  th e  
a c t i v i t y  o r  s t a t e  o f  b e l i e v i n g  i s  in  any deg ree  v o lu n ta r y .  
"Ought" may always imply " c a n " ,  b u t  i t  does n o t  (and canno t 
when a p p l i e d  to  in a n im a te  o b j e c t s  and such th in g s  as  t r u t h )
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always im ply v o l u n t a r i n e s s .  !.
The f a c t  t h a t  d e s i r e s  canno t be re a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f  
and t h a t  we have a ve ry  s t r o n g  o b je c t i o n  to  th e  c o n sc io u s  
p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  stem from the  f e a t u r e  o f 
b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  alms a t  t r u t h ,  and i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  f e a t u r e  
i s  in  some se n se  c r i t e r i a l  to  th e  con cep t o f  b e l i e f .  To 
b e l i e v e  p i s  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  p i s  t r u e  and th e  re a so n s  f o r  
one’ s b e l i e f  a re  d i c t a t e d  by t h i s .  But t h i s  o b v io u s ly  
does n o t  mean t h a t  when one g iv e s  r e a so n s  f o r  a b e l i e f  one 
must be g iv in g  re a so n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  one 
b e l i e v e s ,  b e ca u se  i t  i s  n o t  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  b e l i e f  
t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  be t r u e ,  u n l ik e  knowledge. But th e  
e s s e n t i a l  n o t io n  o f  a im ing  a t  the  t r u t h  does e n t a i l  th e  
fo l lo w in g :  when one i s  g iv in g  r e a s o n s  f o r  a b e l i e f  one i s
do ing  two th in g s  w ith  one s e t  o f  re a so is*  One i s  ( a )  g iv in g  
re a s o n s  f o r  o n e ’ s s t a t e  o f  : . ind  ( b e l i e f )  and (b )  g iv in g  
re a so n s  which th e  b e l i e v e r  su duose s  o r  b e l i e v e s  a re  re a so n s  
p o i n t i n g  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  b e l ie v e d *  These 
two f u n c t io n s  a r e  i n te r d e p e n d e n t .  The f i r s t  f u n c t io n  i s  
dependen t on th e  second f u n c t io n  and th e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  th e  
second f u n c t io n  i s  b o th  a n e c e s s a ry  and a s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t io n  f o r  th e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  th e  f i r s t  f u n c t io n .  # h a t  
makes b e l i e f  such a d i f f i c u l t  con cep t to  p in  down i s  th e  
s t r a n g e  way in  which even th e  second f u n c t io n  i s  c ir c u m s c r ib e d  
by a  s t a t e  o f  mind w hereas th e  n e c e s sa ry  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  
t h a t  i t  aims a t  t r u t h ,  demands some o b je c t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t  on 
th e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  be  g iven  f o r  a b e l i e f .
There i s  a l s o  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  g iv in g  an o b j e c t i v e  se n se  
to  th e  n o t io n  o f  a im ing a t  t r u t h  which a t  th e  same tim e does 
n o t  make i t  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  o f  b e l i e f s  t h a t  they  sho u ld  
be  t r u e .  These d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i l l  be examined i n  th e  n e x t  
c h a p te r .
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CHAjlTSR IV 
C r i t e r i a l  Q u es tion s  abou t B e l i e f
I
When we ask  f o r  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  a concep t we a re  
a sk in g  what j u s t i f i e s  us in  u s in g  o r  a p p ly in g  t h i s  c o n c e p t ,  
what a re  th e  c o n d i t io n s  o r  r u l e s  a c c o rd in g  to which we 
app ly  t h i s  c o n c e p t ,  o r  what th e  n e c e s sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t io n s  a r e  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n ce p t.
In  th e  rea lm  o f  what might be  c a l l e d  o b s e r v a t io n a l  
c o n c e p ts  th e  r e q u e s t  f o r  c r i t e r i a  which j u s t i f y  us in  
a p p ly in g  them i s  u n p ro b le m a t ic .  I f  we want to  know th e  
c r i t e r i a  a c c o rd in g  to  which we c a l l  som eth ing  a t r e e ,  o r  a 
house f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  we want to  know the  n e c e ssa ry  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  so m eth in g ’ s b e in g  a t r e e  o r  a 
ho u se , and we depend f o r  our  knowledge o f  th e s e  n e c e s sa ry  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  on ou r  powers o f  o b s e r v a t io n .
They a r e  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a c o n c e p t ,  b u t  th ey  can only be e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  one way, nam ely , by o b s e r v a t io n .
But a r e q u e s t  f o r  tiie  c r i t e r i a  o f  a con cep t l i k e  b e l i e f  
which i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b le  to  ’ t h in g s  i n  th e  w o r ld ’ (as  we , i r k  
no rm ally  th in k  o f  them) b u t  to  som eth ing  r a t h e r  a b s t r a c t ,  
l i k e  ’ s t a t e s  o f  m ind’ g iv e s  r i s e  to  a d iv e rg e n ce  i n  the  
s o r t  o f  th in g s  which a r e  s a id  to  c o n s t i t u t e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  the  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  c o n ce p t.  T h is  d iv e rg e n c e  sterns from a 
d i f f e r e n c e  in  em phasis on e i t h e r  l o g i c a l  o r  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  C r i t e r i a  which em phasize  one o r  o th e r  o f  
th e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  b o th  answer t h e  q u e s t io n  ’What j u s t i f i e s  
us i n  sa y in g  t h a t  such and such i s  a c a se  o f  b e l i e f ? ’ b u t  
they  do so by a p p e a l in g  to  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  o f  f a c t o r s .
The r e q u e s t  f o r  c r i t e r i a  which em phasize l o g i c a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s
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t y p i c a l l y  a sk s  what i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  a c e r t a i n  concep t we 
have w i th o u t  which i t  would c e a se  to  be t h a t  c o rc e p t .  That 
i s ,  i t  I s  in  v i r t u e  o f  c e r t a i n  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  we 
say  t h a t  such and such i s  a ca se  o f ,  f o r  example, b e l i e f .
The r e q u e s t  f o r  c r i t e r i a  which em phasize  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a l s o  a sks  what f e a t u r e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  to  a 
c o n c e p t ,  b u t  th e s e  f e a t u r e s  a re  e s s e n t i a l  in  t h a t  w i th o u t  
them we c o u ld  n o t  have o r  u se  th e  concep t i n  q u e s t io n .
W ithout th e s e  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e s  som eth ing  would c e a se  to  
be a c a se  o f  b e l i e f  b e cau se  we c o u ld  n o t  know t h a t  i t  was a 
case  o f  b e l i e f .
M ental c o n c e p ts  g iv e  r i s e  to  t h i s  s o r t  o f  d iv e rg e n c e  in  
th e  c r i t e r i a  g iven  f o r  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  b ecau se  o f  the  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e x p la in in g  how we come to  have th e s e  c o n c e p ts ,  
and th e  r e l a t e d  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a p p ly in g  them once we have 
them. I f  ’b e l i e f * ,  f o r  exam ple, i s  th e  name o f  a  s t a t e  o f  
mind to  which th e  p e rso n  who i s  in  t h a t  s t a t e  o f  mind has 
p r i v i l e g e d  a c c e s s ,  and o f  which he h a s  i n c o r r i g i b l e  
knowledge, then  on ly  he can say w he ther  he b e l i e v e s  o r  n o t ,  
and t h i s  g iv e s  r i s e  to  th e  problem  o f  how ’b e l i e f *  can be a 
concep t in  the  p u b l ic  lan g u ag e  i f  th e r e  a re  no p u b l ic  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n .
Some p h i lo s o p h e r s  have hoped to  so lv e  th e  problem  by 
g iv in g  c r i t e r i a  f o r  a ’ s t a t e  o f  mind’ con cep t in  term s o f  
e x t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  o b se rv a b le  by everybody a l i k e .  The ways 
in  which we can t e l l  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a case  o f ,  f o r  exam ple, 
b e l i e f  then  become th e  n e c e s sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  
o f  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  co n cep t b ecau se  they  a r e  a ls o  th e  
n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  ou r  h a v in g  t h a t  
concep t a t  a l l .
Two main tyi>es o f  answer have been g iven  to  th e  q u e s t io n  
'What i s  a b e l i e f ? '  o r  'What i s  i t  to  have a b e l i e f ? '  and th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  betw een  th e s e  two answ ers stems from th e  two
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d i f f e r e n t  ways in  which th e  f u n c t io n  o f  c r i t e r i a  have been 
i n t e r p r e t e d ,  i n  w hich , as  I  have s a i d ,  one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
l a y s  em phasis on l o g i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  th e  e s s e n t i a l  
f e a t u r e s  o f  a co n cep t  w i th o u t  which i t  would n o t  be  th e  
co n cep t i t  i s ,  and th e  o t h e r  la y s  em phasis on th e  q u e s t io n  
o f  how i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  f o r  u s  to  have and u se  t h i s  c o n ce p t,  
and what th e  n e c e s sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  t h i s  
are*
The f i r s t  main ty p e  o f  answ er, which i s  i r  g e n e ra l  
c a l l e d  th e  ’ occu rrence*  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f ,  a n a ly s e s  b e l i e f  
as  a m en ta l e v e n t  o r  o c c u r re n c e  which can be d e s c r ib e d  as  
a s s e n t in g  to  a p r o p o s i t i o n  in  o n e ’ s mind. Hume a n a ly s e s  
b e l i e f  a s  a m en ta l o c c u r r e n c e ,  though a t o t a l l y  in v o lu n ta ry  
one, and f o r  t h i s  rea so n  does n o t  c a l l  i t  ’ a s s e n t ’ to  a 
p r o p o s i t i o n ,  s in c e  a s s e n t  i s  i n  g e n e ra l  v o lu n ta r y .  B e l i e f ,  
he s a y s ,  i s  "som eth ing  f e l t  by th e  l i n d  which d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
th e  id e a s  o f  th e  judgement from  th e  f i c t i o n s  o f  th e  im a g in a t io n "  
( T r e a t i s e  Book I  S e c t io n  V II)  a rd  a g a in ,  i n  th e  Appendix to  
th e  T r e a t i s e  " B e l i e f  c o n s i s t s  m erely  i n  a c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g  o r  
s e n t im e n t"  Hume g iv e s  th e  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  th e  m en ta l o ccu rren ce  
which i s  b e l i e f ,  by g iv in g  th e  c a u se s  o f  i t ,  b u t  by 
r e s t r i c t i n g  the  cause  o f  b e l i e f  in  an id e a  to  "a  p r e s e n t  
im p re s s io n  r e l a t e d  to  an id e a  e i t h e r  by re sem b lan c e ,  
c o n t i g u i t y  o r  c a u s a t io n "  ( T r e a t i s e  Book I  S e c t io n  V I I I )  
makes th e  concep t o f  b e l i e f  much too narrow , and a llo w s no 
room f o r  b e l i e f s  which a r e  n o t  r e l a t e d  to  a p r e s e n t  im p re s s io n ,  
and b e l i e f s  which a r e  a r r i v e d  a t  a f t e r  w e igh ing  up  e v id e n c e ,  
a s  I s a id  in  the  t h i r d  c h a p te r .
Locke, to o ,  a n a ly s e s  b e l i e f  as a m en ta l o c c u r re n c e ,  
b u t  he d i f f e r s  from Hume in  t h a t  he c a l l s  t h i s  m ental 
o c c u r re n c e  a s s e r t  to  a p r o p o s i t i o n .  In  th e  ’Essay
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c o n c e rn in g  Human U n d e rs ta n d in g ’ he recommends a p o l ic y  f o r  
r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  (Book IV, S e c t io n  2 , C h a p te r  15) "The mind, 
i f  i t  w i l l  p ro ceed  r a t i o n a l l y ,  ought to  examine a l l  th e
grounds o f  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and see  how th ey  make more o r  l e s s
\
f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  any p r o p o s i t i o n ,  b e fo r e  i t  a s s e n t s  to  o r  
d i s s e n t s  from i t ;  and upon a due b a la n c in g  o f  th e  whole 
r e j e c t  o r  r e c e iv e  i t  w i th  a more o r  l e s s  f i rm  a s s e n t ,  
p ropoftionab ly  to  th e  p reponderancy  o f  th e  g r e a t e r  grounds 
o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  on one s id e  o r  th e  o th e r " .  Locke’ s acco u n t 
has  th e  ad v an tag e  o v e r  Hume’ s t h a t  i t  a l lo w s  f o r  b e l i e f s  
which a r e  b a sed  on e v id e n c e ,  and g iv e s  an a c c u ra te  acco u n t 
o f  th e  p ro c e s s e s  we go th ro u g h  when we weigh up th e  ev id en ce  
f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  the  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t io n .  But i t  i s  
ambiguous a s  to  w he th er  he th in k s  th e  m enta l a s s e n t  g iven  to  
a p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  v o lu n ta r y  o r  n o t .  Does he t ï i in k  t h a t  a l th o u g h  
our a s s e n t  ought to  be  d e te rm in e d  by th e  e v id e n c e ,  i t  need  
no t  be? That he does i s  i n d i c a t e d  p a r t l y  by h i s  u se  o f  th e  
word ’ a s s e n t ’ and p a r t l y  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  he th in k s  t h e r e  
i s  an ’E th i c s  o f  B e l i e f ’ . H is  u se  o f  ’ o u g h t’ h e re  seems 
to  be a  m oral o u g h t ,  and so th e r e  i s  room f o r  u s  to  b e l i e v e  
o r  a s s e n t  i n  a m o ra l ly  r e p r e h e n s ib l e  way, t h a t  i s ,  by n o t  
p r o p o r t io n in g  th e  d e g re e  o f  o u r  a s s e n t  to  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  
e v id e n c e .  T h is  In c lu d e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a s s e n t in g  to  a 
p r o p o s i t i o n  w ith o u t  t a k in g  any n o t i c e  o f  th e  e v id e n c e ,  e i t h e r  
f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  i t .  Locke c h a r a c t e r i z e s  b e l i e f  a s  a s s e n t  to  
a p r o p o s i t i o n ,  and a l th o u g h  he g iv e s  th e  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  
j u s t i f i e d  a s s e n t ,  he does n o t  g iv e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a s s e n t  a s  
such and so im p l ie s  (a s  th e  word i t s e l f  does) t h a t  a s s e n t  i s  
v o lu n ta ry  and t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no c o n d i t io n s  n e c e s sa ry  f o r  i t .
But b e l i e f ,  a s  we have s e e n ,  canno t be  v o lu n ta r y .
The a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  a m ental o c cu rren c e  which i s
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an a c t  o f  a s s e n t  i n  g e n e r a l ,  h a s  v a r io u s  f a u l t s :  b e f o r e  we
can a s s e n t  to  a p r o p o s i t io n  we must e n t e r t a i n  i t ,  w i th o u t  
e i t h e r  b e l i e v i n g  i t  o r  d i s b e l i e v i n g  i t .  But t h e r e  a re  
some p r o p o s i t i o n s  which we canno t e n t e r t a i n  w i th o u t  a s s e n t in g  
to  them o r  d i s s e n t i n g  from them, b ecause  t h e i r  t r u t h  o r  
f a l s i t y  i s  so m a n i f e s t .  How co u ld  we, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
e n t e r t a i n  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  " I  am h e re "  w it  o u t  a t  th e  same 
tim e  b e l i e v i n g  i t ?  Hume makes th e  m is ta k e  o f  sa y in g  t h a t  
th e s e  a r e  th e  o n ly  s o r t  o f  b e l i e f s  we c a r  h a v e ,  b u t  the 
a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  m en ta l  a s s e n t  makes th e  m is take  o f  n o t  
a l lo w in g  f o r  th e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s .
N e i th e r  Hume’ s a n a l y s i s ,  n o t  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  
m en ta l a s s e n t ,  a l lo w s  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u n c o n sc io u s ly  
h e ld  b e l i e f s .  Both th e s e  a n a ly s e s  make i t  a n e c e s sa ry  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  b e l i e v i n g  som eth ing , t h a t  one knows one b e l i e v e s  
i t .  T h is  c r i t i c i s m  i s  r e l a t e d  to  a n o th e r ,  which i s  t h a t  
one can  have b e l i e f s  i n  a n o n - o c c u r r e n t  se n se .  We may 
h o ld  b e l i e f s  o ve r  a p e r io d  o f  t im e , and a t  any p o in t  in  t h i s  
p e r io d  o f  tim e i t  would be t r u e  to  say o f  u s  t h a t  we h o ld  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f .  We canno t on ly  be s a id  to  have 
t h i s  b e l i e f  when we have a c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g ,  o r  when we 
a s s e n t  in  o u r  minds to  a p r o p o s i t i o n .  We may h o ld  th e  
b e l i e f  w i th o u t  e i t h e r  o f  th e s e  m ental e v e n ts  e v e r  h av in g  
tak e n  p l a c e .  T h is  does n o t  mean t h a t  th e  b e l i e f  i s  an 
u n c o n sc io u s  one; i f  a sked  w h e th er  we b e l i e v e d  so and so ,  we 
would say  t h a t  we d id ,  and th en  p o s s ib ly  th e  m enta l even t  
would ta k e  p la c e .  But th e  f a c t  rem ains  t h a t  p eo p le  can 
p ro p e r ly  be  s a i d  to  h o ld  b e l i e f s  a l t h o u ^  th e  a p p ro p r i a te  
m en ta l e v en t  may n e v e r  have o c c u r re d ,  and a l th o u g h  i t  may 
have o c c u r re d  i t  does n o t  have to  o c cu r  every  tim e we say 
o f  someone ’He b e l i e v e s  x* i n  o r d e r  to  j u s t i f y  us i n  
a t t r i b u t i n g  t h i s  b e l i e f  to  someone. I t  i s  p o s s i b l e .
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how ever, t h a t  we canno t say ’ I  b e l i e v e  x ’ w i th o u t  th e  
o c c u r re n c e  o f  a m en ta l e v e n t  when we say i t ,  which j u s t i f i e s  
u s  i n  s a y in g  i t .  But i t  seems t h a t  even t h i s  i s  no t the  
c a s e .  When I  say  ’ I  b e l i e v e  x ’ I  may say i t  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  a c e r t a i n  m enta l o c c u rre n c e  o f  a s s e n t ,  a f e e l i n g  tow ards 
a p r o p o s i t i o n ,  a s  when somebody h as  f l n e d l y  conv inced  me o f  
th e  t r u t h  o f  som eth ing , o r  I  may j u s t  be t e l l i n g  someone 
some f a c t s  ab ou t m y s e lf ,  com parable to  t e l l i n g  them I have 
b lu e  e y e s .  In  th e  l a t t e r  case  o f  s a y in g  ’ I  b e l i e v e  x ’ i t  
i s  by no means c l e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  must b e  a m en ta l o c cu rren c e  
o f  b e l i e v i n g  every  tim e I  sa^ t a i s .
The t h i r d  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  o c c u r re n c e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
b e l i e f  i s  made by p h i lo s o p h e r s  (n o ta b ly  R yle  ( 5) )  who th in k  
t h a t  no c o n ce p t  can p lay  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  i n  a language  
u n le s s  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  can be  g iven  i n  
p u b l i c ly  o b s e rv a b le  te rm s. The o c c u rre n c e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
b e l i e f  h a s  th e  consequence t h a t ,  i f  b e l i e f  i s  a s s e n t  to  a 
p r o p o s i t io n  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g ,  my knowledge 
o f  my b e l i e f s ,  and my knowledge t h a t  c e r t a i n  o f  my m enta l 
s t a t e s  a re  s t a t e s  o f  b e l i e v i n g ,  i s  i n c o r r i g i b l e  and f i r s t  
p e rso n  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  b e l i e f s ,  b o th  o f  a  m en ta l s t a t e ’ s 
b e in g  one o f  b e l i e f  and o f  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  b e l i e f  ( o r  
p r o p o s i t i o n  b e l i e v e d )  w i l l  a lw ays o v e r r id e  t h i r d  p e rso n  
a s s e r t i o n s  o f  b e l i e f .  B u t ,  i t  i s  s a i d ,  i f  t h i s  i s  th e  c a s e , '  
how can we even t a l k  o f  someone’ s b e in g  j u s t i f i e d  i n  a p p ly in g  
th e  concep t " b e l i e f " ?  I f  th e r e  were no p u b l ic  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  c o n c e p t ,  p eo p le  would j u s t  be
_ r - ' .
a b le  to  c a l l  any m ental s t a t e  they  l i k e d  " b e l i e f "  and th e
I' word would have no %ixed m eaning a t  a l l .  -
T h is  c r i t i c i s m  i v e s  r i s e  to  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s
S’.
which ancho rs  th e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  b e l i e f  I n  th e  p u b l ic ly
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o b se rv a b le  w o rld . T h is  a n a l y s i s  s a y s  t h a t  to  have a 
b e l i e f  i s  t o  be d isp o se d  to  a c t  in  c e r t a i n  ways, and i t  
i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  someone a c t s  in  th e s e  ways which j u s t i f i e s  
u s  i n  s a y in g  t h a t  he h o ld s  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f ,  o r  b e l i e v e s  a 
c e r t a i n  p r o p o s i t i o n .  T h is  a n a l y s i s  does n o t  deny t h a t  
b e l i e f  i s  a s t a t e  o f  mind, b u t  say s  t h a t  b e in g  i n  t h i s  
s t a t e  o f  mind ( o r  i n  any s t a t e  o f  mind) means t h a t  c e r t a i n  
th in g s  can be t r u l y  s a id  o f  the  p e rso n  who i s  in  t h a t  s t a t e  
o f  m ind, and i t  does deny t h a t  t h i s  p e rso n  can  have any 
d i r e c t  o r  i n c o r r i g i b l e  knowledge o f  h i s  own s t a t e  o f  mind.
I f  he  behaves  i n  a c e r t a i n  way th en  he can t r u l y  be  s a id  
to  b e l i e v e  x ,  and i f  he does n o t ,  o r  behaves  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  
way, th e n  he c an n o t  be s a i d  to  b e l i e v e  x and n o th in g  he says  
abou t h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind w i l l  a l t e r  o u r  o p in io n .
On th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  "A b e l i e v e s  p” i s  
e q u iv a le n t  t o  "A i s  d is p o s e d  to  a c t  a s  i f  p were t r u e "  
which i s  in  tu rn  e q u iv a le n t  to  a c o n ju n c t io n  o f  c o n d i t i o n a l  
o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s t a te m e n ts :  " i f  A was a c t i n g  in  c i rc u m s ta n c e s
to  which p v/as r e l e v a n t  he would a c t  a s  i f  p were t r u e " .
The a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  h as  th e  consequences 
t h a t  a l l  s t a te m e n ts  o f  th e  form "A b e l i e v e s  p" a r e  in d u c t iv e  
and t h a t  "A a c t s  a s  i f  p were t r u e "  (o r  "A would a c t  a s  i f  
p were t r u e  i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s " )  i s  b o th  a 
n e c e s s a ry  and a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  the  t r u t h  o f  "A 
b e l i e v e s  p " .
The d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  h a s  v a r io u s  
a d v a n ta g e s ,  a s  w e ll  a s  r a t h e r  more d i s a d v a n ta g e s .  I t  
ta k e s  accoun t o f  th e  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n  betw een many b e l i e f s  
and a c t i o n ,  i n  f a c t  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f .  I t  a l s o  ta k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  and a l lo w s  
f o r ,  th e  n o n -o c c u r re n t  sen se  o f  b e l i e f  i n  w hich , i n  th e
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absence  o f  any m enta l e v e n t ,  o r  I n t e r n a l  o r  e x t e r n a l  
a s s e r t i o n  o f  b e l i e f ,  what a man does w i l l  b e  j u s t  what I s  
meant when we say  t h a t  he h as  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f .  But a t  
th e  same tim e t h i s  would e a r  t h a t  i f  a t  any p o in t  a  man 
d e n ie d  t h a t  he h e ld  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  we had a t t r i b u t e d  to  
him on th e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  b e h a v io u r ,  and d e n ied  t h a t  he had 
e v e r  h e ld  i t ,  we would have to  ig n o re  h i s  d e n ia l  and 
c o n t in u e  to  say  t h a t  he h e ld  th e  b e l i e f  f o r  as  lo n g  a s  he 
behaved in  th e  same way*
The d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  u n l ik e  th e  o c c u rre n c e  
a n a l y s i s ,  does a l lo w  f o r  u n c o n sc io u s  b e l i e f s ,  s im ply  b ecau se  
i n  th e  case  o f  such b e l i e f s  th e r e  i s  no p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a man 
a s s e r t i n g  o r  deny ing  t h a t  he h as  such a b e l i e f ,  e i t h e r  to  
h im s e l f  o r  to  anyone e l s e .  T h is  a n a l y s i s  has  a n o th e r  
s t re n g th ^ w h ic h  i s  t h a t  a s  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  we som etim es do 
tak e  a man’ s a c t i o n s  a s  ev id e n ce  t h a t ,  f o r  exam ple, he does 
no t b e l i e v e  what he  sa y s  he  b e l i e v e s .
But a l th o u g h  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  a l lo w s  f o r  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u n c o n sc io u s  b e l i e f s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  danger t h a t  
by a n a ly s in g  b e l i e f  i n  t h i s  way, we m ight a t t r i b u t e  f a r  too  
many u n co n sc io u s  b e l i e f s  to  someone, and t h i s  i s  b e ca u se  n o t  
ev e ry  ca se  o f  a p e r s o n ’ s a c t i n g  as  i f  p were t r u e  im p l ie s  
t h a t  he b e l i e v e s  p. There a re  many s i t u a t i o n s  in  which a 
pe rson  may a c t  a s  i f  p were t r u e ,  when i t  would n o t  be  r i g h t  
to  say t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  p , and th e r e  a r e  c a s e s  in  which a 
man m ight a c t  a s  i f  p were n o t  t r u e ,  a l th o u g h  he does i n  
f a c t  b e l i e v e  p. F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a man m ight b e l i e v e  p , emd 
be unaware t h a t  i t  was p r a c t i c a l l y  r e l e v a n t  to  h i s  a c t i o n ,  
and so a c t  as  i f  he d id  n o t  b e l i e v e  p ,  o r  b e l i e v e d  n o t  p.
To g iv e  a n o th e r  example o f  th e  way in  which a  man’ s b e h a v io u r  
may n o t  i n d i c a t e  what h i s  b e l i e f s  a re s  a man may a c t  a s  
though p were f a l s e ,  b u t  we canno t n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f e r  from
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t h i s  t h a t  he does n o t  b e l i e v e  p , b e ca u se  h i s  purpose  o r  
i n t e n t i o n s  may have been o th e r  than  we supposed  them to  be*
A man may even , i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  f o r g e t  t h a t  he  
h o ld s  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f ,  and so a c t  a s  though he does n o t  
h o ld  i t .
B ut a more im p o r ta n t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  i t  does n o t  ta k e  any acco un t o f  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l  concealm ent o f  b e l i e f ,  o r  
i n s i n c e r e  a s s e r t i o n  o f  b e l i e f ,  which i s  c e r t a i n l y  a genuine  
p o s s i b i l i t y .  We can c o n c e a l  ou r  b e l i e f s  o r  make p eo p le  
th in k  we b e l i e v e  th in g s  which we don’ t  b e l i e v e ,  and v ic e  
v e r s a ,  n o t  on ly  by o u r  a s s e r t i o n s ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  ou r  b e h a v io u r .  
Even i f  b e l i e f  i s  c o n s t ru e d  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  a s s e r t ,  t h i s  
does n o t  s o lv e  th e  problem  s in c e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
concealm ent by no a s s e r t i o n ,  o r  i n s i n c e r e  a s s e r t i o n ,  must 
be  a llow ed  f o r ,  and t h i s  would d i v e s t  the  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  i t s  a d v a n ta g e s ,  w h i le  r e t a i n i n g  i t s  d i s a d v a n ta g e s .
A nother d is a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  
t h a t  i t  does n o t - t a k e  acco u n t o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  b e l i e f s  which 
a re  n o t ,  and i n  most c a s e s  c o u ld  n o t ,  be  co n n ec te d  w ith  
a c t i o n ,  such a s  b e l i e f s  abou t th e  rem ote  p a s t  o r  f u t u r e .
A more im p o r ta n t  c r i t i c i s m  which can be l e v e l l e d  a t  the  
d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t ,  however i t  i s  fo rm u la te d ,  
i t  can n o t a v o id  c i r c u l a r i t y  s in c e  th e  fo r m u la t io n  a lw ays 
makes some i m p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  to  b e l i e f s  o r  to  some non- 
o b e e r v a t io n a l  f a c t o r s  such as  m otives  o r  i n t e n t i o n s .  T h is  
i s  t r u e  even i f  th e  c o n d i t i o n a l  a s s e r t i o n  i s  fo rm u la te d  
in  th e  s im p le s t  way p o s s ib l e ;  *A b e l i e v e s  p i f  he a c t s  as  
i f  p  were t r u e  in  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to  which p i s  r e l e v a n t * .
But what would j u s t i f y  u s  i n  making th e  in f e r e n c e  from * A 
a c t s  as  i f  p were t rue*  to  * A b e l i e v e s  p* ( i f  we c o u ld  b e
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j u s t i f i e d  i n  making t h i s  in f e r e n c e  a t  a l l )  i s  n o t  t h a t  A 
i s  a c t i n g  i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to  which p i s  r e l e v a n t ,  h u t  
t h a t  he b e l i e v e s  p i s  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i n  
which he i s  a c t i n g .  I f  he d id  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h i s ,  o r  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  p was n o t  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  i n  
which he was a c t i n g  we would n o t  be  j u s t i f i e d  i n  making th e  
i n f e r e n c e  from h i s  a c t i n g  as  i f  p were t r u e  to  h i s  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  p b e cau se  he m ight have been  a c t i n g  as  i f  p were t r u e  
by a c c id e n t  i n  which c a s e  h i s  a c t io n  would on ly  have a 
f o r t u i t o u s  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  i n  which he 
a c te d .
T here  i s  a l s o  a c i r c u l a r i t y  in v o lv e d  in  th e  n o t io n  o f  
" a c t in g  as  i f "  which i s  shown in  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a man’s 
a c t i n g  as i f  p were t r u e  by m is ta k e  o r  u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y .
What wbuld j u s t i f y  u s  i n  making an in f e r e n c e  from a man’ s 
a c t i o n s  to  h i s  b e l i e f s  i s  n o t  t h a t  he i n  f a c t  a c te d  a s  i f  p 
were t r u e ,  b u t  t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  he did* and a l th o u g h  
we can o f t e n  i n f e r  what a man b e l i e v e s  he i s  d o in g  i f  we 
know h i s  m o tives  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  t h i s  does n o t  f u l f i l  th e  
re q u ire m e n t  o f  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  b e l i e f  sh o u ld  
be  a n a ly se d  in  term s o f  a c t i o n  a lo n e .
Not on ly  i s  th e  n o t io n  o f  ’ a c t i n g  as  i f ’ dependen t on 
i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s ,  b u t  a man who b e l i e v e s  p may n o t  a c t  a s
i f  p were t r u e  even  i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to  which he b e l i e v e s   ^
p i s  r e l e v a n t  b e c a u se  h i s  m o tiv es  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  i n  a c t i n g  
may be such t h a t  i t  i s  to  h i s  ad van tage  to  a c t  as  i f  he d id  
n o t  b e l i e v e  p and so we would n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  i n f e r r i n g  
from h i s  a c t i n g  as  i f  n o t  p to  h i s  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  n o t  p i n  
t h i s  case  e i t h e r .  ^
We might a t te m p t  to  overcome th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a p p e a l in g  
to  a man’ s m o tives  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  i n  o rd e r  to  i d e n t i f y  h i s  
b e l i e f  by p o s t u l a t i n g  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  s in c e r e  b e l i e f  such
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t h a t  we can p r e d i c t  what a man w i l l  do n o tm a t te r  what h i s  
m o tiv es  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  a r e .  But t h i s  would have th e  
u n r e a l i s t i c  consequence t h a t  a man c o u ld  on ly  be s a id  
s i n c e r e l y  t o  b e l i e v e  n e c e s s a ry  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  C ircu m stances  
can a lw ays be im agined  i n  which however s i n c e r e ly  a man 
b e l i e v e d  som eth ing  i t  would be  to  h i s  advan tage  to  a c t  as 
though he d id n ’ t ,  o r  to  say t h a t  he d id n ’ t  i f  i t  was a 
c o n t in g e n t  p r o p o s i t io n .  The m a jo r i ty  o f  men, i f . f a c e d  w ith  
th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  d e a th  o r  c o n c e a l in g  b e l i e f ,  would choose 
th e  l a t t e r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  th e  b e l i e f  was o f  a f a i r l y  t r i v i a l  
n a tu r e  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th ey  d id  choose th e  l a t t e r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  (even i f  t h e  consequences  o f  n o t  ch o o s in g  i t  
were n o t  as  d i r e  a s  d e a th )  would h a rd ly  j u s t i f y  u s  in  sa y in g  
t h a t  th ey  d id  n o t  s i n c e r e l y  h o ld  t h a t  b e l i e f .
Even i f  such an acco u n t o f  b e l i e f  d id  n o t  have t h i s  
ab su rd  consequence  i t  would s t i l l  be  g u i l t y  o f  th e  
c i r c u l a r i t y  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  n o t io n  o f  ’ a c t i n g  a s  i f ’ 
m entioned  above. The o p e r a t iv e  f a c t o r  i s  t h a t  a man shou ld  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  he i s  a c t i n g  as  i f  p were t r u e  and i f  we canno t 
appea l  to  h i s  m o tives  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  to  h e lp  us d e c id e  w hether 
he b e l i e v e s  he i s  a c t i n g  i n  a  c e r t a i n  way th e n  u l t i m a t e l y  
we have to  f a l l  back on h i s  own te s t im o n y  and so  admit 
t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  a  m en ta l s t a t e  to  which he  h a s  p r i v i l e g e d  
a c c e s s .
T h is  accoun t i s  a l s o  g u i l t y  o f  th e  c i r c u l a r i t y  in v o lv e d  
in  th e  n o t io n  o f  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  i n  which a  man a c t s .
I t  o b v io u s ly  c an n o t  be made a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  s i n c e r e  
b e l i e f  t h a t  a man w i l l  a c t  i n  a c e r t a i n  way no m a t t e r  what 
h i s  m o tives  o r  i n t e n t i o n s  and no m a t t e r  what th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s .  
I f  t h i s  was 80, he would have to  spend  h i s  whole l i f e  a c t i n g  
in  t h i s  way in  o rd e r  to  q u a l i f y  a s  s i n c e r e l y  b e l i e v i n g  i t .
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But i f  th e  r i d e r  i s  added, as i t  must h e ,  t h a t  a man 
s i n c e r e l y  b e l i e v e s  p i f  he a c t s  as i f  p were t r u e  i n  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to  which p i s  r e l e v a n t ,  we a g a in  have to  
f a l l  b a ck  on th e  n o t io n  o f  b e l i e f :  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t o r  i s
t h a t  t h e  man must h e l i e v e  t h a t  p i s  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which he  i s  a c t in g .
A ccord ing  to  R yle  m o tiv es  as w e l l  a s  b e l i e f s  must^'^'^ 
a n a ly s e d  a s  d i s p o s i t i o n s  to  a c t  b u t  t h i s  m ere ly  worsens th e  
c i r c u l a r i t y  in v o lv e d  in  th e  a t tœ n p t  to  do away w ith  m enta l 
s t a t e s .  We cann o t i n f e r  a man’ s m o tives  from h i s  a c t io n
t
u n le s s  we know what he  b e l i e v e d  he was d o in g ,  and we canno t 
i n f e r  what he b e l i e v e d  he was d o in g  from h i s  a c t io n  u n le s s  
we know what h i s  m o tiv es  w e re ,  (b ecause  we cann o t i d e n t i f y  
th e  a c t i o n  a s  a c a se  o f  d o in g  such and such u n le s s  we know 
a t  l e a s t  one o f  th e s e  f a c t o r s ) .  We i n e v i t a b l y  have to  
r e f e r  to  a man’ s knowledge o f  a t  l e a s t  some o f  h i s  m en ta l 
s t a t e s *
Not on ly  do we i n e v i t a b l y  have to  r e f e r  to  a man’ s 
knowledge o f  a t  l e a s t  some o f  h i s  m en ta l s t a t e s ,  b u t  we 
a l s o  a t  some p o in t  have t c  r e f e r  to  a man’ s knowledge o f  
h i s  b e l i e f s .  Our knowledge o f  a man’ s a c t i o n  and h i s  
m o tives  a r e  n o t  a lw ays s u f f i c i e n t  to  i d e n t i f y  h i s  b e l i e f s .  
P a r t  o f  th e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  I s  t h a t ,  as  I  have a l r e a d y  
s a i d ,  t h e r e  a re  some b e l i e f s  which c o u ld  n o t have a n y th in g  
to  do w ith  a c t io n s  (p u re ly  t h e o r e t i c a l  b e l i e f s  and b e l i e f s  
about th e  rem ote p a s t  o r  f u t u r e  f o r  exam ple). The o t h e r  
p a r t  o f  th e  rea so n  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  m o tiv es  and i n t e n t i o n s  
a re  n o t  a lw ays, and c o u ld  n o t  a lw ays b e ,  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b e l i e f s  which a re  r e l a t e d  to  a c t i o n  
( f o r  exam ple, a man’ s b e l i e f  abou t th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in
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which he i s  a c t i n g ) .  A lthough knowledge o f  a  man’ s 
m o tives  may e n a b le  us  to  i n f e r  what he b e l i e v e s  he i s  
do in g  j i t  c ann o t alw ays en ab le  u s  to  i n f e r  what he b e l i e v e s  
th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  to be  in  which he i s  do ing  i t  b ecause  an 
a c t io n  o f  a c e r t a i n  k ind  i s  n o t  a lw ays perform ed in  only  
one s e t  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  I t  may be th e  c a se  t h a t  a man 
would n o t  have perfo rm ed  a c e r t a i n  a c t io n  i f  he had n o t  
h e ld  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f  abou t th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which he 
a c te d  b u t  u n l e s s  we know t h i s  to  be the  case  from the  man’ s 
own te s t im o n y  we can no t i n f e r  h i s  b e l i e f s  abou t th e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i n  which he i s  a c t i n g  from o u r  knowledge o f  
h i s  b e l i e f  abou t th e  n a tu r e  o f  h i s  a c t io n .  -
So even i f  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  d id  n o t  aim to  
do away w ith  r e f e r e n c e  to  a l l  ’ o c c u l t ’ m en ta l s t a t e s ,  and 
a llow ed  b e l i e f  to  be a n a ly se d  i n  term s o f  o th e r  m ental 
f a c t o r s  (m o tiv es  and i n t e n t i o n s )  a s  w e l l  a s  a c t i o n ,  i t  
h a s  been  shown t h a t  t h i s  canno t be  done. We i n e v i t a b l y  
})8ve to  r e f e r  to  a man’ s knowledge, n o t  on ly  o f  some o f  h i s  
m en ta l s t a t e s ,  b u t  a l s o  o f  h i s  b e l i e f s .
These a r e  two p u rp o se s  which t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  
a d i s p o s i t i o n  m ight h av e , and what i t  i s  s a i d  to  be a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o ,  and th e  meaning o f  ’ d i s p o s i t i o n ’ i t s e l f ,  
a l t e r s  a c c o rd in g  to  which o f  th e s e  p u rp o ses  th e  a n a l y s i s  
h a s .  As we have s e e n ,  R y le ’ s purpose  i n  a n a ly s in g  a 
b e l i e f  a s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  to  do away w ith  o c c u l t  m ental 
s t a t e s  o r  e v e n ts ;  to  e x p la in  how we come to  have th e  m en ta l 
c o n c e p ts  we h av e , how they  can be u se d  i n  a p u b l ic  lan g u ag e . 
He aims to  g iv e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
a m en ta l  co n cep t i n  o b s e r v a t io n a l  te rm s . For R y le ’ s 
p u rp o se ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e l i e f  must be a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  do 
som eth ing  which can be  o b se rv ed ,  and which can be i d e n t i f i e d  
w ith o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  o c c u l t  m en ta l s t a t e s .  I t  must
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t h e r e f o r e  be a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  a c t ,  (a  d i s p o s i t i o n  to  a s s e r t  
would add problem s and s o lv e  none)* S ince  he i s  a l s o  
a im ing to  g iv e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  a 
m ental co n cep t  in  o b s e r v a t io n a l  term s ( i . e .  th o se  c o n d i t io n s  
which a l lo w  i t  t o  become a concep t in  th e  p u b l ic  language  
and th u s  th e  c o n d i t io n s  which j u s t i f y  u s  i n  a p p ly in g  i t )  a 
’ d i s p o s i t i o n *  i t s e l f  must be  a n a ly se d  as  a c o n ju n c t io n  o f  
i f  . . .  th en  . . .  s t a te m e n ts  i n  o b s e r v a t io n a l  te rm s . In  
o th e r  words a ’ d i s p o s i t i o n ’ h e re  seems to  l e a v e  no room 
f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  one may have a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  do 
som eth ing  i n  n c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  and n o t  do i t  when 
th o s e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  a r i s e .  F o r R y le ’ s p u rp o ses  a d i s p o s i t i o n  
must have a s t a t u s  o f  a p r e d i c t i v e  law , o th e rw is e  he would 
have to  r e c o u r s e  to  m en ta l c o n c e p ts .  I f  sa y in g  t h a t  someone 
b e l i e v e d  som eth ing  meant t h a t  he was d isp o se d  to  a c t  i n  a 
c e r t a i n  way i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  a llow ed  f o r  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h i s  b e l i e v i n g  i t  b u t  no t  a c t i n g  in  t h a t  way 
in  th o se  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  R y le  would be  back where he s t a r t e d  
and would have to  a sk  th e  p e rso n  w hether he b e l i e v e d  th e  
p r o p o s i t io n .
I  do n o t  want to  embark on an a n a l y s i s  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n s  
b u t  j u s t  want to  p o in t  ou t t h a t  t h e r è  seem to  be two d i s t i n c t  
se n se s  which the  word ’ d i s p o s i t i o n ’ can have. I t  can have 
th e  s t a t u s  o f  a p r e d i c t i v e  law , w here, in  th e  c o r r e c t  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  t h e r e  i s  no room f o r  th e  non-perfo rm ance  o f  
th e  a c t io n  a p p r o p r i a t e  to  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n .  T h is  se n se  
seems to  acc o rd  w i th  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  u s e o f  th e  word: s a y in g
t h a t  som eth ing  i s  s o lu b l e  does n o t  seem to  mean t h a t  i t  i s  
j u s t  q u i t e  l i k e l y  o r  ve ry  l i k e l y  t h a t  i t  w i l l  d i s s o lv e  i n  
c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  w i l l  d i s s o l v e  i n  th o se
63
c ircu m stan ces*
There  i s ,  how ever, a n o th e r  se n se  o f  th e  word which seems 
to  a c c o rd  more w ith  ,our o rd in a r y  u se  o f  i t ,  which a l lo w s  f o r  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  so m e th in g ’ s n o t  d o ing  t h a t  which i t  has  
a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  d o , even in  th e  c o r r e c t  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .
I f  I  am d is p o s e d  to  go f o r  w alks on f i n e  d ay s , t h i s  on ly  
means t h a t  more o f t e n  th an  n o t  I  w i l l  go f o r  w alks on f i n e  
days . The d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  me on a l e s s  th an  
l a w - l i k e  b a s i s .  Someone who a t t r i b u t e s  t h id  d i s p o s i t i o n  to  
me w i l l  on ly  be s l i g h t l y  s u r p r i s e d  i f  I  do n o t  go f o r  a 
walk on a p a r t i c u l a r  f i n e  day. T h is  sense  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n  
i s  in  some ways l i k e  symptoms o f  d i s e a s e s .  By th e m se lv e s ,  
they  do n o t  i d e n t i f y  th e  d i s e a s e ,  s in c e  we may have th e  
d i s e a s e  w i th o u t  th e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  symptoms, and we may have 
th e  symptoms w i th o u t  h a v in g  th e  d i s e a s e ,  though h a v in g  th e s e  
symptoms may w e l l  c o n t r i b u t e  tow ards th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
a d i s e a s e ,  a s  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s e a s e .  The concep t o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  d i s e a s e  i s  a ve ry  vague one and n e c e s s a ry  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  can h a rd ly  e v e r  b e  g iven  f o r  th e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i s e a s e  as a p a r t i c u l a r  d i s e a s e .  Ryle 
w ants to  i d e n t i f y  b e l i e f s ,  n o t  j u s t  by th in g s  which may o r  
may n o t  o ccu r  when we have a b e l i e f ,  b u t  by th in g s  which 
must o c c u r  i n  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  o rd e r  to  
j u s t i f y  u s  i n  a t t r i b u t i n g  a b e l i e f  to  someone. These a r e  
more than  mere symptoms which may o r  may n o t  c o n t r i b u t e
I
tow ards ou r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  som eth ing  as  a case  o f  b e l i e f .
P e rh a p s ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  d i s p o s i t i o n s  in  the  
second se n se  o f  th e  word c o u ld ,  i f  we had th e  n e c e s s a ry  
knowledge, alw ays have th e  s t a t u s  o f  p r e d i c t i v e  law s.
P e rhaps  i f  I  have a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  go f o r  a walk on t  f i?  e
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f i n e  days t h i s  c o u ld  he a n a ly se d  as  " i f  i t  i s  f i n e ,  and I  
have n o th in g  e l s e  to  do, and I  am n o t  f e e l i n g  i l l ,  and I 
am i n  th e  co u n try  etc* e t c * ,  I  w i l l  go f o r  a w a lk ."  I t  
m ight j u s t  th e n  he t i i a t  ’ d i s p o s i t io n *  appeared  to  have 
t h i s  second  vaguer se n se  to  p eo p le  who were n o t  in  p o s s e s s io n  
o f  a l l  th e  r e l e v a n t  in fo rm a t io n  which makes i t  i n to  a 
p r e d i c t i v e  law . I t  m ight j u s t  he a u s e f u l  way o f  sa y in g  
t h a t  we f e e l  t h e r e  must he c o n d i t io n s  which would make i t  
i n t o  a l a w - l ik e  s ta te m e n t  i f  on ly  we knew what th ey  w ere.
Thus, someone who d id  know e v e r y th in g  which was im p l ie d  
by a t t r i b u t i n g  a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  me to  go f o r  w alks on f i n e  
days would n o t  be  a t  a l l  s u r p r i s e d  to  f i n d  t h a t  I  d id  n o t  
go f o r  a walk when I  was f e e l i n g  i l l .
T h is  does n o t  mean t h a t  ’ d i s p o s i t io n *  does n o t  have 
th e  second sen se  which I  have a t t r i b u t e d  to  i t ,  b u t  on ly  
t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  f i r s t  s e n se .
I t  i s  o f t e n  very  u s e f u l  to  a t t r i b u t e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  to  th in g s  
when t h i s  a t t r i b u t i o n  does n o t  have th e  s t a t u s  o f  a l a w - l ik e  
s ta te m e n t  sim ply because  we a re  n o t  i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  a l l  th e  
r e l e v a n t  in f o r m a t io n .  T h is  s o r t  o f  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  does p e r f o r c e  have the  sen se  t h a t  som ething  
which h a s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  do som eth ing  in  c e r t a i n  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  which we in  ou r ig n o ran c e  c o n s id e r  to  be 
th e  on ly  r e l e v a n t  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  may n o t  do t h a t  th in g  i n
th o se  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ./
In  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  in  th e  f i r s t  
se n se  >j’b e l i e f ’ i s  e q u a ted  w ith  th e  ways in  which we can t e l l  ^
t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a c a se  o f  b e l i e f .  In  t h i s  case  th e  ways 
in  which we can t e l l  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a case  o f  b e l i e f
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c o n s t i t u t e  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  th e  c o n cep t.  In  th e  a n a ly s i s  
o f  b e l i e f  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  in  th e  second se n se  o f  ’ d i s p o s i t io n *  
’b e l i e f *  i s  n o t  e q u a te d  w ith  th e  ways in  which we can t e l l  
t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a case  o f  b e l i e f .  The ways i n  which we 
can t e l l  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a c a se  o f  b e l i e f  a re  s ig n s  o r  
symptoms o f  i t  and so th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  
in  t h i s  sen se  im p l ie s  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  som eth ing  e l s e  ( e .g .  an 
i n n e r  s t a t e )  and th e  ways i n  which we can  t e l l  t h a t  som ething 
i s  a case  o f  b e l i e f  do n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  th e  
c o n ce p t.
H.H. P r i c e ,  in  h i s  book " B e l i e f " ,  w h i le  co nced ing  t h a t  
’b e l i e f *  canno t be a n a ly se d  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  i n  R y le ’ s s e n s e ,  
t h in k s  t h a t  i t  can be  a n a ly se d  as  what he c a l l s  a ’m ultiform * 
d i s p o s i t i o n .  Not h a v in g  R y le ’ s problem  o f  how a m ental 
con cep t can p la y  any p a r t  i n  o u r  p u b l ic  language  i f  i t  i s  
n o t  a n a ly se d  as a s e r i e s  o f  p u b l i c ly  o b s e r v a t io n a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
he say s  t h a t  i t  i s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  n o t  on ly  to  e x t e r n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  b u t  a l s o  to  i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s  and e v e n t s .  Some 
o f  th e  m a n i f e s t a t io n s  o f  b e l i e f  a r e  inw ard ar;d p r i v a t e .
For i n s t a n c e ,  b e l i e f  can b e  m a n i fe s te d  in  i n a c t i o n  a s  w e l l  
a s  in  a c t i o n  and in  such th in g s  as  hope , f e a r ,  s u r p r i s e ,  
d o u b t ,  a f e e l i n g  o f  c o n f id e n c e  and a tendency  to  draw 
in f e r e n c e s  from th o se  p r o p o s i t io n s  which we b e l i e v e .
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  a l l  t h e s e  s o r t s  o f  o c c u r re n c e s  o r  s t a t e s  
o r  f e e l i n g s  o f t e n  back  up th e  c la im  t h a t  someone b e l i e v e s  
som eth ing  and i f  one o r  some o f  them a re  m is s in g  in  c e r t a i n  
c irc u m s ta n c e s  we m ight be r e l u c t a n t  to say  t h a t  someone 
b e l i e v e s  som eth ing . For i n s t a n c e ,  i f  a p e rs o n  i s  s u r p r i s e d  
when 8 p r o p o s i t io n  i s  f a l s i f i e d ,  t h i s  i s  very  good ev id en ce  
t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  and i f  he i s  n o t  s u r p r i s e d
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t h i s  i s  good ev id en ce  t h a t  he d id  n o t  b e l i e v e  th e  p r o p o s i t io n .
A n a ly s in g  b e l i e f  a s  a d l s p o s l t i o n ^ i n  any s e n s e ^ s  / / ) )
g iv in g  ways i r  which we can t e l l  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a c a se  
o f  b e l i e f .  R y le  w ants t h e s e  ways to  b e  g iv en  s o l e ly  in  
te rm s o f  t h in g s  which we can obse rve  a id  he a l s o  wants them 
to  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  n e c e s sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  c o n ce p t  ( s in c e  th ey  a re  th e  n e c e ssa ry  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  our h a v in g  t h i s  concep t a t  a l l ) .
P r i c e  does n o t  th in k  t h a t  th e  ways in  which we can t e l l  t h a t  
som eth ing  i s  a c a se  o f  b e l i e f  can be g iven  in  p u re ly  
o b s e r v a t io n a l  te rm s . But t h e r e  i s  som ething  ve ry  odd abou t 
a d m i t t in g  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  an i n t r o s p e c t i b l e  s t a t e  which 
canno t be  a n a ly se d  p u re ly  i n  term s o f  o b s e r v a t io n a l  
s ta te m e n ts  and a t  th e  same tim e g iv in g  some c o n d i t io n s  f o r  
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  co n cep t  (which a r e  i n c i d e n t a l l y  n o t
n e c e s s a ry  o r  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  as b e l i e f  i s  an i n t r o -  
s p e c t i b l e  s t a t e  and i t  f o l lo w s  from t h i s  t h a t  a man * s own 
a s s e r t i o n  o f  b e l i e f  must o v e r r id e  any symptoms o r  s ig n s  o f  
n o t  b e l i e v i n g  which he may show) i n  teasms o f  i n t r o s p e c t i b l e  
and inw ard  o c c u r re n c e s  o r  s t a t e s ,  s in c e  t h i s  im p l ie s  t h a t  a 
man who h im s e l f  h o ld s  a b e l i e f ,  can t e l l  t h a t  h e ,  in  f a c t ,  
does so from such  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as h i s  f e e l i n g  s u r p r i s e  
when th e  p r o p o s i t io n  i s  f a l s i f i e d .  But i f  a man knows 
when he b e l i e v e s ,  and t h i s  knowledge i s  n o t  i n d u c t iv e ,  t h e r e  
i s  no p o in t  in  g iv in g  him ways in  which to  t e l l  t h a t  he 
b e l i e v e s ,  such a s  lo o k in g  o u t  f o r  a f e e l i n g  o f  c o n f id e n c e ,  
o r  a l a c k  o f  s u r p r i s e .  The n o t io n  o f  "ways i n  which we can 
t e l l "  t h i s  som ething i s ,  f o r  exam ple, a case  o f  b e l i e f  on ly  
has  a p p l i c a t i o n  ( i f  i t  i s  a d m it te d  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  p r im a r i ly  
a s t a t e  o f  mind known d i r e c t l y  by th e  person  whose s t a t e  o f  
mind i t  i s )  when we, th e  o b s e r v e r s ,  a r e  t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h
7^
w hether someone e l s e  h e l i e v e s  som ething  a n d  so t h e r e  i s  no 
p o in t  i n  g iv in g  us t h in g s  t o  lo o k  ou t f o r ,  l i k e  someone 
e l s e * 8 f e e l i n g  o f  c o n f id e n c e  o r  l e e k  o f  s u r p r i s e ,  which a re  
t h in g s  we c o u ld  n o t  l o g i c a l l y  look  ou t f o r .
P^rice i s  u s in g  'd i s p o s i t i o n *  in  th e  second sense  
o u t l i n e d  above i n  which c e r t a i n  m a n i f e s t a t io n s  o f  b e l i e f  
a re  to  b e l i e f  a s  symptoms a re  to  d i s e a s e s .  They a r e  ways 
o f  t e l l i n g  w h e th er  som eth ing  i s  a c a se  o f  b e l i e f ,  and as  
I  have j u s t  s a i d ,  th e  on ly  th in g s  which ean s e n s ib ly  be  g iven  
a s  ways o f  t e l l i n g ,  a re  e x t e r n a l l y  o b se rv a b le  t h in g s .
Because he i s  u s in g  'd i s p o s i t i o n *  in  t h i s  sense  he i s  n o t  
g iv in g  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  b e l i e f ,  he i s  n o t  g iv in g  th e  e s s e n t i a l  
f e a t u r e s  o f  b e l i e f ,  s in c e  som eth ing  may be a case  o f  b e l i e f  
w i th o u t  m a n i f e s t in g  i t s e l f  in  any e x t e r n a l l y  o b se rv a b le  ways 
a t  a l l .  As som eth ing  may be a case  o f  ' f l u  w i th o u t  
m a n i f e s t in g  any o f  th e  u s u a l  e x t e r n a l l y  o b se rv a b le  symptoms 
o f . ' f l u .  (There  i s  n o t  a  com plete  p a r a l l e l  h e re  s in c e  the  
c o n t r a s t  betw een i n t e r n a l  and e x te r n a l  i s  n o t  th e  same in  
th e  ca se  o f  d i s e a s e s  a s  i t  i s  in  th e  ca se  o f  m en ta l s t a t e s  
and th e  p e rs o n  who has  ' f l u  h im s e l f  u s u a l ly  needs  ways o f  
t e l l i n g  t h a t  he do es . But th e  p a r a l l e l  i s  c lo s e  enough to  
i l l u s t r a t e  th e  p o i n t . )
On th e  o t h e r  hand , th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  a s  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  on ly  p o s s ib l e  on th e  second sen se  o f  th e  word 
'd i s p o s i t i o n *  a s  we have seen t h a t  b e l i e f  cann o t be 
a n a ly se d  as  a c o n ju n c t io n  o f  i f  . . .  th en  . . .  s t a te m e n ts  
which a re  made up o f  e i t h e r  o b s e r v a t io n a l  o r  n o n - o b s e rv a t io n a l  
te rm s. I f  they  were made up o f  o b s e r v a t io n a l  term s they  
would n o t  g ive  an a c c u r a te  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f ;  they  would 
n o t  g ive  th e  n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  b e l i e f .
I f  they  were made up o f  n o n - o b s e rv a t io n a l  term s what p o in t
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would th e r e  he  i n  c a l l i n g  them d i s p o s i t i o n s  i f  th ey  were 
n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  b e l i e f .  I f  
b e l i e f  j u s t  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a f e e l i n g  o f  c o n f id e n c e  o r  
a  la c k  o f  s u r p r i s e ,  th en  what p o in t  o r  se n se  c o u ld  th e r e  be 
in  sa y in g  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  have th e s e  f e e l i n g s ,  
u n l e s s  we wanted to  imply t h a t  b e l i e f  was som eth ing  e l s e  and 
t h a t  th e s e  f e e l i n g s  were s ig n s  o r  symptoms o f  i t  which 
u s u a l ly  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  o c c u r .  B e l i e f  a s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  
i n  R y l e ' s  se n se  r e t a i n s  n e i t h e r  o f  th e s e  f e a t u r e s .  That i s ,  
n e i t h e r  th e  im p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  som eth ing  e l s e ,  
som ething o t h e r  th a n  th e  a c t i o n s  which i t  i s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  
to  p e rfo rm , n o r  th e  o t h e r ,  which i s  t h a t  th e s e  a c t io n s  
which b e l i e f  i s  a d i s p o s i t i o n  to  perfo rm  a re  a c t io n s  which 
u s u a l l y ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  a r e  perfo rm ed .
S in c e  b e l i e f  can on ly  be a n a ly se d  as a d i s p o s i t i o n  i n
an
th e  second se n se  o f  'd i s p o s i t i o n  , / a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  as  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  can no t g iv e  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  b e l i e f .
The main d e f e c t  o f  b o th  the  o c c u r re n c e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
b e l i e f  and th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  they  
g ive  no accoun t o f  th e  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  
aims a t  t r u t h ,  t h a t  i f  p u r p o r t s  to  r e p r e s e n t  r e a l i t y  and t h a t  
when a man b e l i e v e s  a  p r o p o s i t i o n  he b e l i e v e s  i t  to  be  t r u e .  
Nor do they  ta k e  any acco u n t  o f  th e  r e l a t e d  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
s o r t  o f  r e a s o n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f s  d i c t a t e  to  
some e x te n t  w h e ther  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind i s  a c t u a l l y  one o f  
b e l i e f  o r  n o t .
I t  m ight be o b je c te d  t h a t  Ryle ta k e s  acco un t o f  the  
r ô l e  o f  t r u t h  i n  b e l i e f s  when he say s  t h a t  b e l i e v i n g  p i s  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  to  a c t  as i f  p were t r u e  in  th e  a p p r o p r i a te  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  But he  i s  n o t  t a k in g  accoun t o f  t r u t h  i n  
th e  r i g h t  way, a s  e s s e n t i a l  to  th e  con cep t Of b e l i e f  r a t h e r
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than  any o th e r  s t a t e  o f  mind, s in c e  a l l  s t a t e s  o f  mind may 
he an a ly sed  as d i s p o s i t i o n s  in  the  same way. For i n s t a n c e ,  
a man might he s a id  to  he f r ig h te n e d  o f  l i o n s  i f  he a c t s  as  
though i t  were t r u e  t h a t  l i o n s  a re  f i e r c e  an im als . Ryle 
does no t g ive  th e  n o t io n  o f  t r u t h  any s p e c ia l  r ô l e  in  th e  
concept o f  b e l i e f .
What makes b e l i e f  such a p ro b lem atic  concept i s  t h a t ,  
i n  a way, 'b e l i e f *  i s  th e  name o f  a s t a t e  o f  mind, l i k e  
' f e a r*  p e rh a p s ,  o f  which one can have d i r e c t  and i n c o r r i g i b l e  
knowledge, b u t  which i s  d i s t in g u i s h e d  from o th e r  s t a t e s  o f  
mind by th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  p u rp o r t s  to  r e p r e s e n t  r e a l i t y .
No o th e r  s t a t e  o f  mind has t h i s  fu n c t io n  o f  a im ing to  say 
som ething t r u e  about th e  w orld , excep t in  so f a r  as i t  
s u b j e c t iv e ly  a f f e c t s  th e  peop le  who a r e ,  a s  a r e s u l t ,  i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e  o f  mind. T his fu n c t io n  imposes a l o g i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t  on b e l i e f  from w ith o u t ,  a s  i t  were. This i s  n o t  
the  same s o r t  o f  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  which B e h a v io u r is ts  
impose on m ental s t a t e s  from w ith o u t;  th e se  a re  j u s t  ways 
o f  t e l l i n g  t h a t  someone i s  in  a c e r t a i n  m ental s t a t e  which, 
s in c e  they  a re  th e  only ways o f  t e l l i n g ,  a re  c r i t e r i a ! .
The l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  which i s  imposed on b e l i e f  has n o th in g  
to  do w ith  a way o f  t e l l i n g  th a t  a s t a t e  i s  one o f  b e l i e f ,  
excep t i r  so f a r  a s  i t  i s  a n e ce ssa ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  i t ,  b u t  
i t  i s  c r i t e r i a ! :  a b e l i e f  i s  no t a b e l i e f  u n le s s  i t  aims
a t  th e  t r u th  and i f  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  were a l lo w ab le  as rea so n s  
f o r  i t  ( d e s i r e s )  then i t  would no lo n g e r  f u l f i l  th e  
n e ce ssa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  aim ing a t  the  t r u t h .
The problem i s  to  f i n d  a way o f  fo rm u la t in g  'a im in g  a t  
the  t ru th *  which g iv es  a more a c c u ra te  s ta te m e n t  o f  the  
c r i t e r i a  o f  b e l i e f .  One l o g i c a l l y  n e ce ssa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  
f u l f i l l i n g  the  fu n c t io n  o f  aiming a t  the  t r u th  has  been 
found i n  the  sphere  o f  th e  reasons  t h a t  can l e g i t im a t e ly  be 
given by a man fo r  h i s  b e l i e f .  But no fo rm u la t io n  o f  th e
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l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on the  rea so n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f  has  been  found which does n o t  i t s e l f  in c lu d e  
r e f e r e n c e  to  b e l i e f .  (A man can be s a id  to  b e l i e v e  p i f  
he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  re a so n s  he g iv e s  f o r  p a re  re a so n s  
p o in t in g  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p ) .
The f a u l t  o f  b o th  th e  o c cu rren c e  a n a ly s i s  and th e  
d i s p o s i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t  they  a n a ly se  b e l i e f  a s  a 
s t a t e  o f  mind upon which no n e c e s s a ry  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  p la c e d  
by th in g s  as  th e y  a r e .  Hume and Locke g e t  n e a r e r  to  th e  
t r u t h :  Hume by s a y in g  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  in v o lu n ta ry  and i s
imposed on us by th e  w orld  as i t  i s  (b u t  he does n o t  say 
t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l u n t a r y ) ,  and Locke by n o t in g  th e  
im p o r ta n t  p la c e  o f  e v id en ce  in  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  our b e l i e f s .
But he too  l e a v e s  open th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e r e  need be 
no l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  imposed by th e  w orld  on o u r  b e l i e f s :  
th e  d eg ree  o f  our a s s e n t  ougiit to  be  a p p o r t io n e d  to  th e  
s t r e n g th  o f  th e  e v id e n c e ,  b u t  we would on ly  be i r r e s p o n s i b l e  
i f  i t  had n o th in g  to  dc w ith  e v id e n c e .
At th e  end o f  th e  t h i r d  c h a p te r  I  s a id  t h a t  when one 
i s  g iv in g  re a so n s  f o r  o n e 's  b e l i e f  one i s  do ing  two t i l in g s  
w ith  one s e t  o f  re a so n s :  one i s  g iv in g  re a so n s  f o r  o n e 's
s t a t e  o f  mind’ s b e in g  one o f  b e l i e f ,  and one i s  g iv in g  
r e a so n s  which one supposes o r  b e l i e v e s  a re  re a s o n s  p o in t i n g  
to  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  one t e l i v e s ,  and the  
f u l f i l m e n t  o f  th e  f i r s t  f u n c t io n  i s  dependen t on th e  f u l f i l m e n t  
o f  th e  second f u n c t io n .  The r e l a t i o n  between th e s e  two 
f u n c t io n s  i s  c a u s a l .  I t  i s  because  t h e  re a so n s  f u l f i l  th e  
second f u n c t io n ,  and in  v i r t u e  o f  t h i s ,  t h a t  they  f u l f i l  ' 
th e  f i r s t  f u n c t i o n ,  i . e .  g iv e  re a so n s  f o r  my b e l i e f  (my
s t a t e  o f  m ind). I  am g iv in g  re a so n s  f o r  my s t a t e  o f  mind
b ecause  I  b e l i e v e  I  am g iv in g  re a so n s  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e
p r o p o s i t io n  which I  b e l i e v e .  But t h i s  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n
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must be  fo r rau la te d  w ith o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  b e l i e v i n g  i f  i t  i s  
to  avo id  c i r c u l a r i t y .
L eav in g  a s id e  t h i s  q u e s t io n  f o r  the  moment, p e rh aps  a 
more s a t i s f a c t o r y  fo rm u la t io n  car, be found f o r  th e  n e c e s s a ry  
f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  th an  'a im in g  a t  th e  t r u t h * .  I f  b e l i e f  
aims a t  th e  t r u t h ,  th en  i t  t r i e s  t c y ^ o w le d g e ,  which 1
n e c e s s a r i l y  a c h ie v e s  t r u t h  and p e rh a p s  some c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  n o t io n  o f  a im ing  a t  th e  t r u t h  w i l l  be ga in ed  by 
com paring b e l i e f  w ith  knowledge and s e e in g  i n  what r e s p e c t s  
i t  f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  knowledge. Knowledge can be d e f in e d  as  
b e l i e f  upon which c e r t a i n  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t io n s  a r e  im posed, 
among them th e  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  t h a t  what i s  b e l i e v e d  i s  
t r u e .  But knowledge can n o t be d e f in e d  as  j u s t i f i e d  t r u e  
b e l i e f .  A b e l i e f  may be j u s t i f i e d  and i t  may a l s o  be t r u e ,  
b u t  i t  does n o t ,  i n  v i r t u e  o f  th e s e  two f a c t s  a lo n e ,  
c o n s t i t u t e  knowledge, s in c e  what j u s t i f i e s  someone i n  
b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  t r u e  may n o t  i n  f a c t  be what 
a c c o u n ts  f o r  i t s  t r u t h .
T h is  problem  can p e rh a p s  be so lv e d  by l o c a t i n g  th e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  b e l i e f  which c o n s t i t u t e s  knowledge in  th e  
r e l a t i o n  o f  th e  re a so n s  f o r  a s t a t e  o f  mind, to  th e  re a s o n s  
f o r  the  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t i o n .  A may b e l i e v e  p becau se  
he b e l i e v e s  q, where q may be very  good ev id en ce  f o r  th e  
t r u t h  o f  p , and p may be t r u e ,  b u t  A cann o t be s a id  to  know 
p , because  q was n o t  what accoun ted  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p .
I n  o rd e r  f o r  A 's  b e l i e f  t h a t  p to  coun t a s  knowledge, what 
j u s t i f i e s  him in  b e l i e v i n g  p must be one and th e  same th in g  
which a c c o u n ts  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p. T h is  e n t a i l s  t h a t  i f  A 
I s  to  coun t as  knowing t h a t  p we must be  a b le  to  a rg u e  from 
t h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  p to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p and what w i l l  e n ab le  us 
to  a rg u e  i n  t h i s  way i s  t h a t  th e  way in  which A comes to
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“b e l i e v e  t h a t  p ,  i s  a l s o  the  way in  which p «ornes to  be  t r u e ,  
i . e .  b o th  th e  s ta te m e n ts  'A b e l i e v e s  p '  and *p i s  true*  a re  
t r u e  i n  v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  n e c e s s a ry  r e l a t i o n  w ith  q. In  the 
case  o f  th e  s ta te m e n t  *A b e l i e v e s  t h a t  p* t h i s  n e c e s sa ry  
r e l a t i o n  must be  a c a u s a l  one. I t  i s  only  i f  A b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  p because  he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  q t h a t  we can ( i f  p b ecau se  q) 
a rgu e  from A’ s b e l i e f  t h a t  p to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p. And we can
a rgue  from A*s b e l i e f  t h a t  p to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p ( i n  an in d u c t iv e
and i n d i r e c t l y  c a u s a l  way) b ecause  A i s  caused  to  b e l i e v e  
p by h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  q, and q i s  what a cc o u n ts  f o r  th e  t r u t h  
o f  p. So f o r  b e l i e f  to  coun t as  knowledge i t  must be an
e f f e c t  and i t  must be an e f f e c t  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
In  the  c a s e  o f  b e l i e f  which c o n s t i t u t e s  knowledge i t  canno t 
h e lp  b e in g  an e f f e c t  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  s in c e  i t  i s  
in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  I g  an e f f e c t  o f  r a t i o n a l  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  t h a t  we can argue  from a b e l i e f  which i s  an 
e f f e c t  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t io n .  
I t  i s  becau se  b o th  *p b e ca u se  q* and *A b e l i e v e s  p b e ca u se  he 
b e l i e v e s  q* a r e  t r u e  t h a t  we can a rgue  from A*s b e l i e f  t h a t  
p to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p.
But in  th e  case  o f  b e l i e f s  t h a t  do n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  
knowledge, though they  must always be e f f e c t s ,  they  a r e  n o t  
alw ays e f f e c t s  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and when th ey  a r e  
e f f e c t s  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  they  do n o t  always 
c o n s t i t u t e  knowledge (a s  in  th e  c a se  o f  th e  man who b e l i e v e s  
p b ecau se  he b e l i e v e s  q where q i s  good ev id en ce  f o r  p ,  b u t  
no t  what acco u n ts  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p ) .  But t h i s  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c cu ld  be c r i t e r i a l  i n  b e l i e f  
w i th o u t  a s s i m i l a t i n g  b e l i e f  to  knowledge.
B efo re  a t t e m p t in g  to  fo rm u la te  c r i t e r i a  f o r  b e l i e f ,  
th e  ways in  which b e l i e f s  ca r  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  knowledge sho u ld
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be n o te d .  As we have s e e n ,  j u s t i f i e d  t r u e  b e l i e f  can f a l l  
s h o r t  o f  knowledge: a man may be j u s t i f i e d  in  b e l i e v i n g  p ,
by th e  f a c t  t h a t  he b e l i e v e s  p b e ca u se  he b e l i e v e s  q and q 
i s  v e ry  good e v id e n c e  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p , b u t  he canno t be  
s a i d  to  know t h a t  p b ecau se  q does n o t  accoun t f o r  th e  t r u t h  
o f  p. A man can a l s o  have a j u s t i f i e d  b u t  f a l s e  b e l i e f .
In  such a ca se  a man m ight b e l i e v e  p becau se  he b e l i e v e s  q 
and q m ight be ve ry  good e v id e n c e  f o r - p ,  b u t  p i s  n o t  t r u e .
He may a l s o  have b o th  a f a l s e  and u n j u s t i f i e d  b e l i e f ,  when 
he b e l i e v e s  p becau se  he b e l i e v e s  q b u t  q i s  n o t  good ev id en ce  
f o r  p and p i s  f a l s e .  In  such a case  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  q may 
b o th  cause  h i s  b e l i e f  and be  th e  re a s o n  he g iv e s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f j  o r  i t  may j u s t  cau se  h i s  b e l i e f .  He may g iv e  o th e r  
re a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  o r  he may g iv e  no r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  
b u t  i f  he g iv e s  a a s  th e  re a s o n  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  he must b e l i e v e  
t h a t  q i s  good e v id en ce  f o r  p and t h i s  must be t r u e  o f  any 
re a s o n s  he g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  p. A man may a lso  
have an u n j u s t i f i e d  b u t  t r u e  b e l i e f :  he may b e l i e v e  t h a t
p i s  t r u e  b e c a u se  he  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  q , where q i s  n o t  good 
ev id en ce  f o r  p b u t  p i s  t r u e .  In  t h i s  case  to o ,  i f  he g iv e s  
as  a rea so n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  p ,  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  q he must b e l i e v e  
t h a t  q i s  good ev idence  f o r  p.
The common f a c t o r  in  a l l  t h e s e  c a s e s  o f  b e l i e f ,  and , i t
a p p e a rs ,  th e  f a c t o r  which i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  them a s  c a se s  o f
b e l i e f ,  i s  t h a t  i f  a man has r e a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  th e s e  
re a so n s  a r e  c a u s a l ly  o p e r a t iv e  on him, and p roduce  t h a t  
b e l i e f ,  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he  r e g a rd s  them as  good 
ev idence  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  the  p r o p o s i t io n  he b e l i e v e s .
There a r e  two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  k in d s  o f  c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n  in  
b e l i e f s ,  one o f  which i s  dependent on th e  o th e r :  when I have
a b e l i e f  f o r  which I can g iv e  re a so n s  in  term s o f  o th e r  b e l i e f s
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my s t a t e  o f  mind (o r  a t t i t u d e  tow ards a p r o p o s i t io n )  i s  
caused  by th o se  o th e r  b e l i e f s .  I  b e l i e v e  p because  I 
b e l i e v e  q and i f  I  cea sed  to  b e l i e v e  q I  would no lo n g e r  
b e l i e v e  p. The c o n n e c t io n  between p and q may be r a t i o n a l  
o r  i r r a t i o n a l ,  b u t  th e  c a u s a l  e f f i c a c y  o f  my b e l i e f  t h a t  q 
on my b e l i e f  t h a t  p ( i f  I  g iv e  q a s  my re a so n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  p)
i s  dependen t on a f u r t h e r  c a u s a l  c o n n ec tio n  which i s  t h a t
T am cau sed  to  have a c e r t a i n  a t t i t u d e  tow ards p ( b e l i e f )  
by my b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  re a so n s  I g ive  (ray b e l i e f  t h a t  q)
p o in t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  p. The dependence o f  th e  f i r s t  k in d
o f  c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n  on th e  second k in d  o f  c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n  
i s  what i t  means to  say  t h a t  th e  re a so n s  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f  a re  c a u s a l ly  o p e r a t iv e  on him in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  he r e g a r d s  them as  good ev idence  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p .
But i t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  a man can g iv e  r e a s o n s  f o r  
h i s  b e l i e f  which a r e  n o t  c a u s a l ly  o p e r a t iv e  on him and do n o t  
produce t h a t  b e l i e f :  th e  b e l i e f  i s  produced by som eth ing
o th e r  than  th e  re a so n s  he g iv e s .  T h is  would be  so in  th e  
c a se  where a man, in  g iv in g  re a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f ,  i s  
m erely  r a t i o n a l i z i n g  h i s  own p re ju d ic e #  But th e re  i s  a l s o  
a c o n s t r a i n t  on th e  a t t i t u d e  a man may have tow ards h i s  r e a so n s  
f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i f  they  a re  to  coun t as re a so n s  
f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  ( i f  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t  was n o t  s a t i s f i e d  we 
would n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  d is c o u n t  him a s  b e l i e v i n g  what he says  
he b e l i e v e s ,  b u t  on ly  a s  b e in g  a b le  to  g iv e  re a s o n s  f o r  h i s  
b e l i e f ) .  The c o n s t r a i n t  which must o b ta in  in  h i s  a t t i t u d e  
tow ards h i s  r e a s o n s ,  i f  they  a r e  to  count as  h i s  r e a s o n s ,  i s  
t h a t  he must r e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  re a so n s  he  g iv e s  a r e  c a u s a l ly  
o p e ra t iv e  and produce  h ie  b e l i e f ,  and th ey  can o n ly  be 
re g a rd e d  by him to  be c a u s a l l y  o p e r a t iv e  i f  they  a re  a l s o  
re g a rd e d  by him to  be good grounds f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  




We a re  l e f t  w ith  t h r e e  ways in  which a b e l i e f  which i s  
b a sed  on ev id en ce  can f u l f i l  th e  n e c e ssa ry  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
b e in g  a b e l i e f :  some b e l i e f s  a re  caused  by r a t i o n a l
c o n s id e r a t io n s  ( th e s e  need n o t c o n s t i t u t e  knowledge s in c e
I
they  need n o t  always be  t r u e ,  and we have seen  t h a t  even i f  
they  a re  t r u e ,  u n l e s s  they  a re  b ased  on th e  r i g h t  r a t i o n a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  they  w i l l  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  knowledge) some 
b e l i e f s  a re  caused  by what a re  c o n s id e re d  by th e  b e l i e v e r  
to  be r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and some b e l i e f s  a r e  m erely 
c o n s id e re d  by th e  b e l i e v e r  to  be caused  by r a t i o n a l
i
c o n s id e r a t i o n s :  th e  n o t io n  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  appea rs
to  be c r i t e r i a l  to  th e  co n cep t  o f  b e l i e f .  The n e c e s sa ry  
c o n n e c t io n  betw een a man*s b e l i e f  and what he c o n s id e r s  to  
be good ev id en ce  f o r  i t  can be fo rm u la te d  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  
to  ’what he c o n s id e rs*  o r  *what he b e l ie v e s *  to  be  good 
e v id e n c e ,  th u s  a v o id in g  c i r c u l a r i t y  i n  th e  f o l lo w in g  manner; 
when A g iv e s  as  a rea so n  f o r  h i s  be  i e f  t h a t  p ,  h i e  b e l i e f  
t h a t  q, he must a l s o  be  a b le  to  say *p becau se  q*. T h is  
h o ld s  even f o r  c a s e s  o f  be i e f  where th e  rea so n  g iven  f o r  
a b e l i e f  i s  n o t  a l s o  th e  cause  o f  t h a t  b e l i e f .  The man 
who says  he b e l i e v e s  p b e cau se  he b e l i e v e s  q, w ha teve r  the  
r e a l  cause  o f  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  p , must a l s o  be  a b le  to  say *p 
becau se  q*.
T h is  fo r m u la t io n ,  i t  may be o b je c te d ,  a s s i m i l a t e s  b e l i e f  
to  knowledge and a l lo w s  no room f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f a l s e  
o r  i r r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f s :  i f  a men b e l i e v e s  p b e ca u se  he
b e l i e v e s  3 and p b e cau se  q, then  th e  man knows I f  t h i s
was th e  c o r r e c t  fo rm u la t io n  then  i t  would ind eed  a s s i m i l a t e  
b e l i e f  to  knowledge, b u t  th e  c o r r e c t  f o rm u la t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  
man who b e l i e v e s  p b ecau se  he  be i e v e s  q must be  a b le  to  sa.v
\
*p b e ca u se  q* and th e r e  i s  a world o f  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een
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’p b e ca u se  q* and sa.vlng *p b ecau se  q* s in c e  one may say p 
b ecause  q W ithout b e in g  j u s t i f i e d  in  o n e 's  a s s e r t i o n  and when 
in  f a c t  ' p b ecau se  q* does n o t  h o ld .I
But w i th o u t  a s s i m i l a t i n g  b e l i e f  to  knowledge t h i s
o f
fo rm u la t io n  does g iv e  th e  c o n c e p t / b e l i e f  th e  amount o f  
anchorage  in  o b j e c t i v i t y  which i t  r e q u i r e s  in  o rd e r  to  f u l f i l  
the  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  'a im in g  a t  th e  t r u t h '  s i n c e ,  
a l th o u g h  th e r e  i s  room f o r  a man to  be  wrong when he says 
*p b e ca u se  q ' t h e r e  i s  a l i m i t  on t h e s o r t  o f  v a lu e s  he can 
a t t a c h  to  p and q. T h is  i s  a n o th e r  way o f  sa y in g  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  an o b j e c t i v e  n o t io n  o f  good ev idence :  n o t  j u s t
a n y th in g  car  coun t as  good ev id e n ce  f o r  a n y th in g  e l s e ,  and 
what a man b e l i e v e s  to  be  good ev id en ce  must be  c irc u m s c r ib e d  
by th e  s o r t s  o f  t h in g s  which l o g i c a l l y  can be good ev idence  
f o r  o th e r  s o r t s  o f  th in g s .  A man cann o t g ive  h i s  d e s i r e s  
as  re a so n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f s  becau se  he canno t l o g i c a l l y  say 
'my w an tin g  p i s  good ev iden ce  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  p*. I t  i s  
becau se  b e l i e f s  a re  a t t a b h e d  in  t h i s  way to  the  o b j e c t i v e  
n o t io n  o f  good ev id en ce  t h a t  we a re  j u s t i f i e d  in  b a s in g  our 
a c t io n s  on many o f  them. I f  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  to  what a man 
can c o n s id e r  to  b e  good e v id e n c e .  Imposed by th e  s t a t e  o f  
a f f a i r s  in  th e  w o rld ,  then  n o t  a l l  ou r  b e l i e f s  can be wrong 
and a g r e a t  mahy o f  them (from  among th o se  which a re  b a sed  on 
r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s )  w i l l  b e  r i g ^ t .
I t  may be o b je c te d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  th e  c r i t e r i a  I  
have g iven  f o r  be i e f ,  by a l lo w in g  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
some b e l i e f s  b e in g  f a l s e ,  ^do a llow  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a l l  
our b e l i e f s  b e in g  f a l s e :  even i f  t h e r e  a re  l i m i t s  to  what a
man car: l o g i c a l l y  c o n s id e r  to  be good ev id en ce  he may s ta y  
w i th in  th e s e  l i m i t s  w i th o u t  e v e r  a r r i v i n g  a t  a t r u e  b e l i e f .
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But a lth o u g h  i t  i s  r o t  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  so m e th in g 's  
b e in g  a b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  be b a s e d  on r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  some b e l i e f s  which a re  b a se d  on 
r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i s  a n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  t h e r e  
b e in g  b e l i e f s  a t  a l l ,  b e cau se  i t  i s  in  v i r t u e  o f  the  f a c t  
t h a t  a l l  b e l i e f s  a re  to  some e x te n t  r a t i o n a l  t h a t  thiey a re  
b e l i e f s .  I  have a l r e a d y  s a i d  to  what e x te n t  b e l i e f s  must 
be r a t i o n a l  i f  they  a r e  to  count as b e l i e f s .  That t h e r e  
a re  b e l i e f s  which a re  cau sed  by o th e r  b e l i e f s  where th e r e  
i s  a r a t i o n a l  c o n n ec tio n #  betw een th e  p r o p o s i t io n  o f  th e  
f i r s t  b e l i e f  and th e  p r o p o s i t io n  o f  th e  second b e l i e f  i s  a 
n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  b e l i e f s  a t  a l l ,  and n o t  
a l l  b e l i e f s  which a re  r a t i o n a l l y  co n n ec ted  w ith  o th e r  b e l i e f s  
can be  wrong o r  we would have no o b j e c t i v e  n o t i o n 'o f  good 
e v id e n ce .
T h is  answ ers a n o th e r  o b j e c t i o n  which m ight be  r a i s e d  
which i s  t h a t  I  have n o t  shown t h a t  b e l i e f s  must be e f f e c t s .
There a re  two a re a s  o f  be i e f  in  which I t 'm u s t  be conceded 
t h a t  b e l i e f s  a re  e f f e c t s .  Our p e rc e p tu a l  b e l i e f s  must be  
e f f e c t s ;  and when we h o ld  one b e l i e f  b e c a u se  we h o ld  
a n o th e r  b e l i e f  where t h e r e  i s  no r a t i o n a l  c o n n ec tio n  between 
th e  c o n te n t  o f  the  f i r s t  b e l i e f  and t h a t  o f  th e  second, 
b u t  i t  i s  j u s t  a p s y c h o lo g ic a l  f a c t  t h a t  we h o ld  th e  second 
b e l i e f  becau se  we h o ld  th e  f i r s t  one , th e  f i r s t  b e l i e f  i s  
the  cause  o f  th e  second b e l i e f .  What o th e r  accoun t c u ld  
be g iven  o f  th e  "b ec a u se ” i n  'He b e l ie v e s p b e c a u e e  he b e l i e v e s  
q* when th e re  i s  no r a t i o n a l  c o n n e c t io n  between p and q?
I f  i t  i s  conceded t h a t  th e s e  s o r t s  o f  b e l i e f s  must b e  e f f e c t s ,  
i t  would seem a t  l& a s t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  to  deny t h a t  b e l i e f s  
which v.ere th e  r e s u l t  o f  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  were th e
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e f f e c t s  o f  th o se  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  (o r  th e  b e l i e f s  in  
which th e  r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  were m a n i f e s te d ) .
I t  sh o u ld  n o t  be f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  b e l i e f  i s  p r im a r i ly  
a s t a t e  o f  mind o f  wi^ich, i t  seems, a man wlio b e l i e v e s  has 
i n c o r r i g i b l e  knowledge. T h is  i s  shown by th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  
i s  p o s s ib l e  to  c o n ce a l  o n e 's  b e l i e f s ,  o r  to  a s s e r t  them 
i n s i n c e r e l y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i t  d i f f e r s  from knowledge 
whose c r i t e r i a  a re  grounded in  th e  o b je c t iv e  w orld . A man 
can t h in k  he knows som eth ing  and be  m is tak en . In  some ways 
b e l i e f  seems to  b e  e x a c t ly  l i k e  o th e r  s t a t e s  o f  mind ( l i k e ,  
f o r  exam ple, f e a r i n g  and w a n t in g ) :  i t  seems a s  odd t h a t
someone m ight s i n c e r e ly  say he b e l i e v e s  som ething  and be m is taken
as i t  does t h a t  someone m ight s i n c e r e ly  say he wants som ething
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and be m is ta k en . But a s  we have seen  th e re  i s  a l o g i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t  ( l o c a te d  in  th e  re a s o n s  he g iv e s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f )  
on what a man may be s a i d  to  b e l i e v e  o r  w hether he may b e  
s a id  to  b e l i e v e .  There i s  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  imposed by 
th e  w o rld  ( th e  n o t io n  o f  good e v id e n c e )  on th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  word 'b e l i e f *  a s  th e  name o f  a s t a t e  o f  mind, b o th  to  
o th e r s  and to  o u r s e lv e s ,  which th e r e  i s  n o t  on th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  the  names o f  o th e r  s t a t e s  o f  minds l i k e  w an tin g  and 
f e a r i n g  to  o th e r s  and o u r s e lv e s .  (A lthough th e r e  i s  a l i m i t  
in  g e n e r a l  on th e  s o r t  o f  t h in g s  a man car s e n s ib ly  be  s a i d  
to  want o r  f e a r  t h i s  l i m i t  i s  n ev er  l o g i c a l .  I t  can n e v e r  
be c o n t r a d i c t o r y  to  want a n y th in g  however g e n e r a l ly  u n d e s i r a b l e ,  
o r  to  f e a r  som ething  however u n fea rso m e) .
So a lth o u g h  as  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  a man may never  be  
m is taken  in  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  word 'b e l i e f *  to  h im s e l f  
t h i s  i s  b ecause  he can l o g i c a l l y  on ly  apply  th e  word when 
c e r t a i n  o b j e c t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  o b ta in .  I f  he a p p l i e s  i t  when 
th e s e  c o n d i t io n s  do n o t  o b ta in  he d i v e s t s  i t  o f  i t s  meaning.
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CHAPTER V
The I m p l ic a t io n s  o i  th e  Asymmetry betw een PeailNia m# Reasons 
f o r  B e l i e f s  and D e s i r e s  as r e a s o n s  f o r  A c t io n s  f o r :
1. R e s p o n s i b f l l t y  f o r  b e l i e f a
I t  has been seen  in  th e  fo re g o in g  c h a p te r s  t h a t  th e  
re a so n  a man g iv e s  f o r  h i e  b e l i e f s  must be what he b e l i e v e s  
i s  good ev id en ce  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  because  
o f  th e  n e c e s s a ry  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  aims a t  th e  t r u t h ,  
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  a man can n o t  g iv e  h i s  d e s i r e s  as  r e a s o n s  
f o r  h i s  b e l i e f .  From t h i s  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  b e l i e v i n g  i s  n o t  
v o lu n ta ry  in  the  sense  t h a t  i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t i o n  i s  v o lu n ta r y ,  
t h a t  a  c o n sc io u s  p r o j e c t  o f  d e c id in g  to  b e l i e v e  i s  no t  
com p a tib le  w ith  b e l i e f  s i n c e  th e  degree  o f  s e l f - d e c e p t i o n  
n e c e s s a ry  f o r  a d e c i s io n  to  b e l i e v e  i s  n o t  c o m p a tib le  w ith
r^.
t h a t  d e c i s i o n ' s  b e in g  a c o n sc io u s  one. I t  would seem to  
fo l lo w  from t h i s  t h a t ,  s in c e  b e l i e f s  a r e  always e f f e c t s ,  we 
can n e v e r  be  h e ld  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  them. The n o t io n  o f  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  a t t a c h e d  to  t h a t  o f  v o l u n t a r i n e s s ,  and 
s in c e  ou r b e l i e f s  a re  n o t  v o lu n ta r y  ( a t  l e a s t  n o t  i n  the  
same se n se  a s  o u r  i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t io n s  a re  v o lu n ta ry )  we canno t 
be r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  them. ( I t  shou ld  be n o te d  t h a t  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  b e l i e f s  a r e  e f f e c t s  does n o t  by i t s e l f  accoun t f o r  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  th ey  a re  in v o lu n ta r y .  As was a rg ued  in  th e  
second c h a p t e r ,  a c t io n s  a r e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  p rim ary  
re a so n s  f o r  them, b u t  t h i s  does n o t  maRe them in v o lu n ta r y .
What makes b e l i e f  in v o lu n ta r y  i s  t h a t  we canno t choose o r  
de c id e  what our b e l i e f s  s h a l l  be caused  b y ,  o r  s h a l l  b e  th e  
e f f e c t s  o f ) .
B ut a l th o u g h  we a re  n o t  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  o u r  b e l i e f s  i n  the  
sen se  t h a t  we canno t d e c id e  o r  choose what to  b e l i e v e  as we
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can d e c id e  o r  choose what to  do i t  seems t h a t  on o c ca s io n  
we m ight want to  a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  someone f o r  
h a v in g  h e ld  a f a l s e  b e l i e f  i f ,  f o r  example t h i s  b e l i e f  was 
n o t  j u s t i f i e d  by th e  e v id en ce  on which i t  was b a se d ,  and 
th e  man who h e ld  th e  b e l i e f  c o u ld  re a so n a b ly  be e x p e c te d ,  
i n  h i s  c a p a c i ty  a s  a sane  and r a t i o n a l  man, to  know t h a t  
th e  ev idence  was i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  j u s t i f y  th e  b e l i e f .
T h is  does n o t  rrean t h a t  th e  man does i n  f a c t  know t h i s ,
( i f  he does th e n  t h i s  wnuld weaken h i s  c la im  to  b e l i e v e )  
b u t  o n ly  t h a t  he can be e x p e c te d  a s  a r a t i o n a l  man to  know 
i t .  A pply ing  t h i s  to  th e  example g iven  i n  th e  f i r s t  
c h a p te r  o f  th e  man who s a i d  t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t r e a t i n g  
th e  madman l i k e  a sane man (which in v o lv e d  g iv in g  him a 
k n i f e )  would encourage  him to  behave l i k e  a sane man, we 
might want to  say b o th  t h a t  he was n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  t h i s  b e l i e f  
and t h a t  he sh o u ld  have known t h a t  he was n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  i t .
The f a c t  t h a t  we m ight want to  do t h i s  seems to  imply 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an e lem ent o f  th e  v o lu n ta r y  in  th e  way in  which 
we a c q u i r e  b e l i e f s  and a lth o u g li  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  to  th e  way 
in  which b e l i e f s  car  be  a c q u i r e d  which a re  e s s e n t i a l  t o  th e  
concep t o f  b e l i e f  and which a re  b a se d  on th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
a re  o b j e c t i v e  l i m i t s  to  what a man can r e g a r d  as  good 
e v id e n c e ,  w i th in  th e s e  l i m i t s  a man car: t h in k  som ething  i s  
good ev id en ce  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t i o n  which i s  n o t ,  
o r  i s  n o t  good enough e v id e n ce  f o r  i t .  T h is  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  i f  b e l i e f  i s  to  r e t a i n  i t s  d i s t i n c t i o n  from 
knowledge.
But does t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  imply t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a r e a  
o f  th e  g e n u in e ly  v o lu n ta ry  (c i r c u m s c r ib e d  by th e  o b j e c t i v e  
n o t io n  o f  good ev id e n ce )  i n  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  our b e l i e f s ?
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In  th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  b e l i e f  we have s e v e r a l  t im es come a c ro s s  
th e  word 'o u g h t ' .  For example: 'What we b e l i e v e  
ought to  be true*  a l th o u g h  i t  cou ld  n o t  be the  case  t h a t  
e v e ry th in g  t h a t  i s  t r u e  ought to  be som ething  we b e l i e v e .
The f u n c t io n  o f  th e  word 'ought*  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  i s  to  draw 
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  aims a t  t r u t h  and 
to  p o in t  o u t  what i s  o b v io u s ,  t h a t  a b e l i e f  can be f a l s e .
But t h e r e  i s  a n o th e r  p o in t  to  th e  u se  o f  th e  word 'ought*  in  
*V/hat we b e l i e v e  ought to  be  t r u e ' , i r  which i t  r e f e r s  to  the  
ev id en ce  we have f o r  the  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  we b e l i e v e .  
Here th e  word 'o u g h t '  seems to  imply t h a t  we have a du ty  to  
c o n s id e r  the  ev id en ce  a rd  to  b e l i e v e  what th e  ev id en ce  p o in t s  
t o .  T h is  does n o t  mean t h a t  we can b e l i e v e  what th e  
e v id ence  p o in t s  t o ,  o r  what i t  does n o t  p o in t  to  a s  we p le a s e ,  
b u t  i t  does seem to  imply t h a t  w i th in  th e  rea lm  o f  what we 
dan l o g i c a l l y  c o n s id e r  to  be  good e v id e n c e ,  th e r e  i s  room f o r  
so m e th in g 's  b e in g  b e t t e r  ev idence  than  som ething e l s e ,  so 
t h a t  when we g ive  re a so n s  f o r  a b e l i e f  which we must b e l i e v e  
p o in t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  b e l i e v e d ,  we can be 
g iv in g  l e s s  good ev id ence  than  we m ight have been g iv in g  o r  
b e t t e r  ev idence  than  we m ight have been g iv in g .  And 
sometimes when a ^ b e l i e f  I s  n o t  j u s t i f i e d ,  we m ight have had 
i t  i n  our power to  se e  t h a t  i t  was n o t  j u s t i f i e d ,  and so n o t  
to  have h e ld  i t .  The on ly  s o r t  o f  freedom th e r e  i s  i n  
b e l i e f  i s  th e  freedom to  a llow  o n e s e l f  to  be  caused  to  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  som ething  i s  good ev id en ce  by what i s  in  f a c t  good 
e v id e n ce ,  and to  suspend b e l i e f  from p r o p o s i t io n s  f o r  which 
one has n o t  g o t  ad equa te  e v id e n ce .  But t h i s  i s  a very  
l im i t e d  se n se  o f  'f r e e d o m ' h a rd ly  p a r a l l e l  to  th e  s o r t  o f  
freedom  we app ea r  to  have in  a c t io n  i n  which th e  n o t io n  o f  
w an ting  p la y s  a c e n t r a l  p a r t .  T h is l a t t e r  freedom  does no t 
e x i s t  i n  th e  rea lm  o f  b e l i e f ;  we must be caused  to  b e l i e v e  
by what we b e l i e v e  a r e  r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  we do
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have th e  power to  examine th e s e  l a s t  b e l i e f s  and to  d e c id e  
( i n  a very  l i m i t e d  s e n se )  w he ther  what we b e l i e v e  to be 
r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  r e a l l y  a re  r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  
and we have as  a s ta n d a r d  w ith  which to  compare th e s e  
b e l i e f s  th e  o b j e c t i v e  n o t io n  o f  what r a t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  
a re  o r  o f  what good e v id en ce  i s .  I f  we f a i l  to  tak e  
advantage  o f  t i l l s  power o f  exam ina tion  i f  we c o u ld  re a so n a b ly  
be e x p ec te d  to  have had th e  power i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  c a se ,  th e n ,  
i f  we end up w ith  an u n j u s t i f i e d  b e l i e f ,  we can in  t h i s  
l i m i t e d  s e n s e ,  be  h e ld  r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  i t .  So i f  an a c t i o n  
i s  engendered  by an u n j u s t i f i e d  b e l i e f  which c o u ld  have been 
known to  be u n j u s t i f i e d ,  th en  a man can be h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le  
f o r  i t ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he h e ld  th e  b e l i e f  s i n c e r e ly .  
I f  we c o u ld  n ev e r  be  h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le  in  any way f o r  any o f  
our s i n c e r e ly  h e ld  b e l i e f s ,  t h e r e  would be many v o lu n ta ry  
a c t io n s  f o r  which we c o u ld  n o t  be  h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le .  We 
co u ld  n o t  h o ld  th e  sane  man who g iv e s  a k n i f e  to  a mad man 
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  murder committed by th e  rmà man u n le s s  
i t  c o u ld  be shown t h a t  th e  sane man’ s i n t e n t i o n s  were n o t  
what he p r o f e s s e d  them to  b e .  That i s ,  he would have to rhou 
be shown n o t  to  want th e  b e s t  f o r  th e  mad man, o r  to  want 
the  o c cu rren c e  o f  a m urder. But i f  h i s  m otive i s  r e a l l y  
t h a t  he does want th e  b e s t  f o r  th e  mad man, then  we c o u ld  n o t  
h o ld  him r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  th e  m urder, u n l e s s  we co u ld  h o ld  
him r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f .  Whether in  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
case  we would h o ld  him r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  i s  an open 
q u e s t io n  and would depend on such th in g s  a s  th e  s o r t  o f  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  he cou ld  g iv e  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  and h i s  p re v io u s  
e x p e r ie n c e  in  such m a t t e r s .  We m ight d e c id e  t h a t  g iven  
h i s  p re v io u s  e x p e r ie n c e  he could  n o t  have s i n c e r e ly  b e l i e v e d  
what he s a i d  he b e l i e v e d ,  in  which ca se  we would be fo r c e d  to 
co nc lude  t h a t  h i s  m otives were o th e r  than  he p ro fe s s e d  them
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to  b e .  But we c o u ld  d e c id e  t h a t  he should  n o t have 
h e ld  t h a t  b e l i e f .
T h is  s o r t  o f  freedom e n t a i l s  t h a t  we do have a l im i t e d  
amount o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  what we be ie v e .  We have a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  to  w ith h o ld  b e l i e f  u n t i l  we 
a re  as su re  as  we can  be  abou t th e  ev idence . But t h i s  i s  
an odd sense  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  s in c e  i t  i s  to  a llow  one’ s 
b e l i e f s  to  be caused  by what r e a l l y  i s  th e  e v id e n ce ,  and n o t  
to  a llow  one’ s b e l i e f s  to  be caused  by what i s  n o t  ev id en ce  
o r  what i s  n o t  s t r o n g  enough e v id e n c e .  There a re  v a r io u s  
ways in  which we can a s s i s t  o u r s e lv e s  to  do t h i s  which a re  
r e l a t e d  to  th e  v a r io u s  ways in  which i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  to  
a c q u i r e  a  f a l s e  b e l i e f .  We cantxam ine the  ev idence  f o r  what 
we a l re a d y  b e l i e v e  and on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  exam ina tion  come 
to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  we a r e  o r  a re  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
b e l i e v in g .  I t  i s  t h i s  s o r t  o f  freedom  which B e sc a r te d  
was e x e r c i s in g  when he r e s o lv e d  to  doubt e v e ry th in g  which 
he d id  n o t  c l e a r l y  and d i s t i n c t l y  p e rc e iv e  to  be  t r u e .
And L ock’ s u se  o f  ’ o u g h t’ , when he say s  t h a t  th e  deg ree  o f  
our a s s e n t  to  a p r o p o s i t io n  ought to  be a p p o r t io n e d  to  the  
s t r e n g th  o f  the  ev id en ce  f o r  i t ,  im p l ie s  t h i s  freedom  (a l th o u g h  
i t  a l s o  im p l ie s  a n o th e r ,  u n j u s t i f i e d ,  freedom  -  th e  freedom 
n o t  to  c o n s id e r  th e  e v id e n c e . )
In  th e  th i r d  c h a p te r  I  s a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  were methods 
by which one co u ld  t r y  to  b e l i e v e  som eth ing  one wanted to  
b e l i e v e .  I f  we can a c q u i r e  b e l i e f s  i n  th e se  ways (a l th o u g h  
we cannot know t h a t  we a re  a c q u i r in g  them l i k e  t h i s )  then  we 
have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  make su re  t h a t  we a re  n o t  a c q u i r in g  
them l i k e  t h i s ,  s in c e  i f  we a r e ,  we a re  n o t  p u t t i n g  o u r s e lv e s  
in  a p o s i t i o n  where we may be c a u s a l ly  in f lu e n c e d  by what 
r e a l l y  i s  e v id e n c e .  By s e l f - a n a l y s i s  we c an , up to  a p o i n t .
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make su re  t h a t  we a re  n o t  a c q u i r in g  b e l i e f s  in  th e se  
ways and th e  deg ree  o f  ou r su c c e ss  w i l l  depend  on th e  
e x te n t  o f  our a b i l i t y  to  be  h o n e s t  w ith  o u r s e lv e s .
I  have p o in te d  out t h a t  th e  p r o j e c t  o f  f o r g e t t i n g  
what i s  t r u e  i s  e a s i e r  and l e s s  in c o h e re n t  than  th e  p r o j e c t  
o f  b e l i e v i n g  what i s  f a l s e  and t h i s  draws a t t e n t i o n  to  
an o th e r  way i r  which we have a freedom , which we ought to  
e x e r c i s e ,  to  g e t  i n t o  a p o s i t i o n  to  a llo w  th e  r i g h t  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  to  cause  our b e l i e f s :  f o r g e t t i n g  what i s  t r u e
can l e a d  to  b e l i e v i n g  what i s  f a l s e  a rd  we, t h e r e f o r e ,  have 
a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  t r y  n o t  to  f o r g e t  what i s  t r u e .
As I  have s t r e s s e d ,  th e  s o r t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  which 
a p p l i e s  to  b e l i e f s  i s  a v e ry  l i m i t e d  k ind  because  the  s o r t  
o f  freedom  we have in  b e l i e f s  i s  and l o g i c a l l y  must be  so 
l im i t e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  a l o g i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  k in d  o f  freedom from 
th e  freedom t h a t  o b ta in s  i n  a c t io n .  I t  i s  the  freedom  to  
a llow  o n e s e l f  to  be caused  to  b e l i e v e  by th e  s o r t  o f  th in g s  
by which one o u ^ t  to  be caused  to  b e l i e v e  and th e  s o r t  o f  
th in g s  by which one ought to  be caused  to  b e l i e v e  stem  from 
th e  concep t o f  b e l i e f  i t s e l f  and a re  anchored  i n  th e  o b j e c t i v e  
w orld  i n  th e  n o t io n  o f  good e v id e n ce .  A r e n a rk  o f  Tom N a g e l 's  
i n  'The P o s s i b i l i t y  o f  Altruism' seems to  sum up th e  s i t u a t i o n  
w ith  r e g a rd  to  b e l i e f s  ve ry  w e l l .  " I t  i s  as though b i l l i a r d  
b a l l s  d e c id e d  whete to  r o l l ,  and a t  what v e l o c i t y ,  a f t e r  
c a r e f u l l y  n o t in g  th e  f o r c e s  and f r i c t i o n s  o p e r a t in g  upon them, 
and i n f e r r i n g  th e  a p p r o p r i a te  d i r e c t i o n  from th e  laws o f  
m echanics . (They would a l s o  have to  be c ap a b le  o f  c o r r e c t i n g  
th em se lv e s ,  o r  acknow ledging  th e  a ccu racy  o f  a c o r r e c t i o n ,  
i f  th ey  made a m is ta k e ) .
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2. R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  D e s i re s
The rea so n  which m o t iv a te s  an a c t i o n ,  th e  prim ary  re a so n ,  
i s  composed o f  a b e l i e f  and a d e s i r e .  We have seen  t h a t  
th e  on ly  freedom  a man h a s  in  b e l i e f  (and he does n o t  a lw ays 
have t h i s  freedom ) i s  th e  freedom t o  a llow  h im s e l f  to  be 
caused  to  b e l i e v e  by the  s o r t  o f  th in g s  by which he ought 
to  b e  caused  to  b e l i e v e .  Does a man have any more freedom , 
o r  a d i f f e r e n t  k in d  o f  freedom  in  th e  rea lm  o f  h i s  d e s i r e s ?
I  have th ro u g h o u t  assumed t h a t  he d o es ,  and i f  t h e r e  i s  an 
asymmetry betw een b e l i e f  and a c t io n  i t  must r e s t  on t h i s  
assum ption . I n  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r  I  drew a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  
s o r t  o f  C o n s t r a in t  which i s  imposed on th e  re a so n s  a man 
g iv es  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  and t h a t  which i s  imposed on the  
rea so n s  f o r  a c t i o n ,  and s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t  stemmed 
from th e  concep t o f  b e l i e f  and a c t io n  them se lves ;  th e  
c o n d i t io n s  which impose l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  rea so n s  a man 
can g iv e  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  stem u l t i m a t e l y  from th e  w orld  
which i t s e l f  g iv e s  u s  ou r n o t io n  o f  good ev idence  whereas 
th e  c o n d i t io n s  which impose l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  re a so n s  f o r  
a c t io n  them se lv es  stem  from th e  pe rson  who perform s th e  
a c t io n  ( h i s  d e s i r e s ) .  I  a l s o  s a id  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
n e c e s sa ry  c o n n e c t io n  between th e  n o t io n  o f  v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  
and th e  f a c t  t h a t  re a so n s  f o r  v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  must s ta n d  i n  
some r e l a t i o n  to  d e s i r e s ;  t h a t  they  do i s  what makes an 
a c t io n  v o lu n ta ry .  In  c h a p te r  I I  I  e n la rg e d  on t h i s  and 
s a id  t h a t  th e  prim ary  re a so n  f o r  an a c t io n  becomes a rea so n  
as w e l l  as  a cause (and so c o n fe r s  v o l u n t a r in e s s  on t h a t  
a c t io n )  i n  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a d e s i r e  o f  th e  ag en t 
forms p a r t  o f  i t .  In  th e  t h i r d  c h a p te r  I  h e ld  t h a t  a l th o u g h ,  
in  a very  l im i t e d  s e n s e ,  one might be s a i d  to  be  a b le  to, 
d e c id e  to  b e l i e v e  som eth ing , t h i s  i s  h a rd ly  th e  w ider sense
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o f  'd ec id e*  in  which the  word i s  u sed  o f  v o lu n ta ry  a c t i o n ,  and 
l a t e r  in  th e  same c h a p te r  I  s a id  t h a t  d e c id in g  i n  t h i s  sense  
( th e  se n se  i n  which i t  i s  u s u a l ly  u sed  o f  d e c id in g  to  a c t )  
means e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  one can d e c id e  to  do som ething b ecause  
one w ants to  (n o t  t h a t  one can always g iv e  'B ecau se  I want t o '  
as a rea so n  f o r  o n e 's  a c t i o n s ,  b u t  o n e 's  re a so n s  f o r  a c t io n  
a re  always u l t i m a t e l y  r e d u c ib le  to  s o n e th in g  o f  t h i s  f o r m .)
In  i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t io n  d e s i r e s  canno t be escaped , b u t  the  
a ssum ption  t h a t  i t  i s  t h i s  f a c t  about a c t io n s  which c o n fe r s  
v o lu n ta r in e s s  on them (which a p p ea rs  to  in v o lv e  th e  assum ption  
t h a t  we a re  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  ou r  d e s i r e s )  and hence j u s t i f i e s  
US i n  a s c r i b i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  p eo p le  f o r  t h e i r  v o lu n ta ry  
a c t io n s  must now be examined.
A man has no v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  o v e r  h i s  b e l i e f s  ( o r  only 
to  a very  l im i t e d  e x te n t )  because  he has no v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  
over th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f s  and so ,  i f  he i s  to  be to  
any d eg ree  autonomous, he must be a b le  to  e x e r c i s e  some 
v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  o ve r h i s  d e s i r e s  ( p a r t  o f  th e  prim ary  
re a so n  o r  cau se  o f  h i s  a c t i o n ) .  He must be a b le  to  d e c id e  
upon h i s  a c t io n s  to  some e x te n t  by d e c id in g  on what h i s  
m o tiv e s ,  o r  d e s i r e s  which c o n s t i t u t e  th e  re a s o n s  f o r  h i s
f '
a c t i o n s ,  s h a l l  be . Not ev ery  d e s i r e  a man h a s ,  even i f  
i t  i s  a d e s i r e  d i r e c t l y  to  do som eth ing , m o t iv a te s  an a c t io n .
A man can have c o n f l i c t i n g  d e s i r e s  only  one o f  which can 
r e s u l t  i n  a c t io n  and some d e s i r e s  a r e  s t r o n g e r  than  o t h e r s .
I f  d e s i r e s  were j u s t  som eth ing  which w e lled  up in  a man as  i t  
w ere, upon which he had to  a c t ,  we would, I  t h in k ,  be 
r e l u c t a n t  to  a t t r i b u t e  any d eg ree  o f  autonomy to  him, even 
i f  h i s  d e s i r e s  were n o t  caused  by a n y th in g  o th e r  than  h im s e l f .  
We would, a t  l e a s t ,  h a rd ly  c a l l  him a r a t i o n a l  man. I f  a 
man must be a b le  to  e x e r c i s e  some v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  over 
which o f  h i s  d e s i r e s  r e s u l t  i n  a c t io n  t h i s  in  tu rn  means
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t h a t  he  must have re a so n s  f o r  some o f  h i s  d e s i r e s  (we do not 
have re a so n s  f o r  a l l  o f  ou r  d e s i r e s ;  we j u s t  have some o f  
them* In d ee d , a  d e s i r e  i s  t y p i c a l l y  som ething we j u s t  h a v e) .  
But i f  a man can e x e r c i s e  v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  o ve r  which o f  
h i s  d e s i r e s  r e s u l t s  i n  a c t i o n ,  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  
he has re a so n s  f o r  th e s e  d e s i r e s  th e n ,  i t  seems he must a l s o  
he a b le  to  e x e rc i s e  some v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  over th e  r e a s o n s  
f o r  h i s  d e s i r e s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  t h a t  th e  re a so n s  f o r  h i s  d e s i r e s  
rmist n o t  be imposed on him by som eth ing  o th e r  th a n  h im s e l f .
I f  th e  a so n6 f o r  d e s i r e s  were c o n s t r a in e d  as  th e  re a so n s  
f o r  b e l i e f  a re  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  then  a man c o u ld  no t be s a id  to  
have any more v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  over h i s  d e s i r e s  than  he has 
over h i s  b e l i e f s ,  and i f  t h i s  were so ,  a c t io n  would be no 
more v o lu n ta ry  th an  b e l i e f .
T h is  i s  n o t  to  imply t h a t  th e  c o n t r a s t  between th e  
c o n s t r a i n t  which th e r e  l o g i c a l l y  must be on th e  rea so n s  f o r  
b e l i e f  and th e  u n c o n s t r a i n t  which th e r e  must be on th e  re a so n s  
f o r  d e s i r e s  ( i f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a d e s i r e  i s  a rea so n  f o r  an 
a c t io n  i s  what c o n fe r s  v o l u n t a r in e s s  on t h a t  a c t io n )  i s  
com ple te . Not j u s t  a n y th in g  can be a re a so n  f o r  o n e 's  
d e s i r e s .  There i s  a l s o  a c o n s t r a i n t  on th e  s o r t  o f  th in g s  
which can l o g i c a l l y  count a s  rea so n s  f o r  o n e 's  d e s i r e s  
imposed by th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  which e x p re s s e s  th e  
d e s i r e .  One co u ld  n o t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  g iv e  o n e 's  b e l i e f  
t h a t  London i s  th e  c a p i t a l  o f  England as a re a s o n  fo r  o n e 's  
d e s i r e  to  go to  th e  moon.
Nor, o b v io u s ly ,  a re  d e s i r e s  u n c o n s t r a in e d  in  th e  sen se  
t h a t  we can l i t e r a l l y  choose what d e s i r e s  to  have . A g r e a t  
many o f  ou r  d e s i r e s ^ j u s t  o ccu r  in  u s ,  and th o se  which do n o t ,  
which a re  c u l t i v a t e d ,  a r e  c u l t i v a t e d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  o t h e r  
d e s i r e s  which we j u s t  do have. The n o t io n  o f  c h o ic e  ( o r ,  
more e s p e c i a l l y ,  d e c is io n ) ;  i t s e l f  p resu p p o se s  th e  e x is te n c e
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o f  d e s i r e s  in  r e l a t i o n  to  which we make our c h o ic e s  o r  
d e c i s io n s .  Some d e s i r e s  j u s t  o c cu r  i n  u s ,  such a s  th e  
sudden d e s i r e  to  e a t  a c a k e ,  and f o r  th e s e  no re a so n s  can 
he g iv e n ,  h u t  t h e r e  a r e  o th e r  d e s i r e s  which, i t  seems, i t  
would he m ean in g le ss  to  have u n le s s  we d id  have re a so n s  f o r  
th e n ,  such a s ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  d e s i r e  to  shop f o r  g r o c e r i e s .
Given th e  f a c t  t h a t  d e s i r e s  ten d  to  o ccu r  in  u s ,  i t  
a p p ea rs  t h a t  th e  v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r o l  we have over  them , which 
i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  ou r  autonomy ( in  v i r t u e  o f  which th e  cau se  o f  
our a c t io n  becomes a r e a so n  as  w e ll  as a cau se )  must be 
e x e r c i s e d  n o t  p r im a r i ly  o v e r  th e  d e s i r e s  which we have,
(becuase  i t  i s  i n  g e n e ra l  n o t  p o s s ib l e  to  e x e r c i s e  v o lu n ta ry  
c o n t r o l  in  t h i s  f i e l d ) ,  b u t  i n  th e  rea lm  o f  a l lo w in g  c e r t a i n  
d e s i r e s  to  r e s u l t  i n  a c t io n  and p r e v e n t in g  c e r t a i n  o th e r s  
from d o in g  so . I t  i s  h e re  t h a t  th e  asymmetry between b e l i e f  
end d e s i r e  m ust, i t  seems, be lo c a te d ;  i f  we have a b e l i e f  
which i s  r e l e v a n t  to  some a c t io n  we co n tem p la te  pe rfo rm ing  
i t  cann o t b u t  be  p a r t  o f  th e  p rim ary  rea so n  f o r  the  a c t io n  
( I f  we a c t u a l l y  pe rfo rm  i t ) .  We canno t choose to  d i s r e g a r d  
i t  b e c a u se ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  we do n o t  approve  o f  i t .  I f  we 
have th e  b e l i e f ,  t h i s  i s  j u s t  n o t  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s ib le  (we 
can a c t  as  though we do n o t  b e l i e v e  i t  f o r  some o th e r  
p u rp o se ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  same a s  d e c id in g  to  d i s r e g a r d  i t ) .  
But i f  we have a d e s i r e  which i s  r e l e v a n t  to  some a c t io n  
we c o n te m p la te ,  i t  must be open to  u s ,  i f  we a re  to  be  
v o lu n ta ry  a g e n ts ,  e i t h e r  to  a llow  o r  to  d i s a l lo w  t h a t  d e s i r e  
to  r e s u l t  i n  a c t io n ,  to  be p a r t  o f  th e  p rim ary  rea so n  f o r  
an a c t io n .  We m ust, i n  o th e r  words, be a b le  to  d e c id e  
w hether we want to  want what we want. We would, as I have 
a l re a d y  s a i d ,  be  r e l u c t a n t  to  a s c r i b e  v o lu n ta r in e s s  to  a 
man who d id  n o t  have t h i s  power, whose a c t io n s  were a t  th e  
mercy o f  h i s  immediate d e s i r e s .  T h is  does n o t  mean t h a t  a
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m an's  a c t io n s  must a lw ays be m o tiv a te d  by what he wants them 
to  be m o tiv a te d  by (hence  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n c o n t in e n t  
a c t i o n s ) .
We do, a s  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  seem to  have t h i s  power o f  
d e c id in g  w hether we w art  to  want what we want, and when we 
have c o n f l i c t i n g  d e s i r e s  we ap p ea r  to  have some c o n t r o l
' r \
o ver which o f  th e s e  d e s i r e s  r e s u l t s  in  a c t io n .  T h is  c o n t r o l  
i s  made p o s s ib le  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  we have re a so n s  f o r  some 
o f  o u r d e s i r e s ,  and  even when we do n o t  have a rea so n  f o r  a 
s p e c i f i c  d e s i r e ,  we may have a rea so n  f o r  n o t  l e t t i n g  t h a t  
d e s i r e  r e s u l t  i n  a c t i o n  and we have th e  a b i l i t y  to  c o n s id e r  
and weigh up th e s e  r e a s o n s .  h a v in g  d e c id ed  t h a t  we do n o t  
want a p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i r e  to  r e s u l t  in  a c t i o n ,  we do no t 
n e c e s s a r i l y  c e a se  to  have th e  d e s i r e ,  b u t  c o n t r o l  ove r  what 
d e s i r e s  we have (which i s  im p o s s ib le )  i s  n o t  tlie s o r t  o f  
c o n t r o l  which i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  v o l u n t a r i n e s s ,  and we do a p p e a r ,  
in  some c a s e s ,  t o  be a b le  to  p rev en t  i t  from in f lu e n c in g  
our a c t i o n s .
The d e c i s io n  to  a llow  a c e r t a i n  d e s i r e  to  be m o t iv a t io n a l ly  
e f f i c a c i o u s  o r  n o t  must be made i n  r e l a t i o n  to  o th e r  more 
b a s i c  d e s i r e s  we have such a s  the  s o r t  o f  p e rso n  we want to  
be and so on. T h is  i s  what makes d e c i s io n  i n  a c t i o n  a 
l o g i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  k in d  o f  th in g  f r o ^  d e c i s io n  i n  b e l i e f  and , 
i t  a p p e a rs ,  what makes a m an 's  a c t i o n s  v o lu n ta r y .  A lthough 
our d e c i s io n s  to  a llo w  c e r t a i n  d e s i r e s  to  m o tiv a te  our 
a c t io n s  a re  c o n s t r a in e d ,  th e  f a c t o r s  which impose th e  
c o n s t r a i n t  stem from the  man who makes th e  d e c i s io n  and 
n o t  from th e  w orld  i t s e l f ,  a s  i s  th e  case  i n  b e l i e f .
On t h i s  view a m an 's autonomy/ i s  m a n ife s te d  in  h i s  a b i l i t y  
to  have second o r d e r  d e s i r e s ,  to  be  a b le  to  d e c id e ,  on th e  
b a s i s  o f  h i s  more g e n e ra l  d e s i r e s ,  which o f  h i s  f i r s t  o r d e r  
d e s i r e s  he w ishes to  be  m o t iv a t io n a l ly  e f f i c a c i o u s .  H is
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f i r s t  o rd e r  d e s i r e s ,  b e in g  p a r t  o f  th e  prim ary re a so n s  f o r  
h i s  a c t i o n s ,  a r e  p a r t  o f  th e  c au se s  o f  h i s  a c t i o n s .  Viie 
m igh t,  t h e r e f o r e ,  say t h a t  a m an 's  autonomy was m a n ife s te d  
i n  h i s  a b i l i t y  to  a llo w  h im s e l f  to  be caused  to  a c t ,  o r  to  
g ive  h i s  a s s e r t  to  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  a s  cau ses  o f  h i s  a c t io n s  
by th e  s o r t  o f  th in g s  which he wants to  be th e  cau ses  o f  h i s  
a c t i o n s ,  and t h a t  he does n o t  have t h i s  autonomy i n  th e  
rea lm  o f  b e l i e f  b e cau se  in  b e l i e f  he must a llow  h im s e l f  to  
b e  caused  to  b e l i e v e  by th e  s o r t  o f  o b j e c t iv e  f a c t o r s  by 
which he ought to  be  caused  to  b e l i e v e .
B ut th e re  i s  som eth ing  odd abou t l o c a t i n g  a m an's 
autonomy in  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  g iv e  h i s  a s s e n t  to  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  
as cau se s  o f  h i s  a c t i o n s ,  th e re b y  c o n f e r r in g  on them th e
s t a t u s  o f  r e a s o n s  a s  w e l l  as c a u se s ,  i f  t h i s  im p l ie s  t h a t  a
m an 's  autonomy i s  n o t  r e l a t e d  to  w he ther  he cou ld  have done 
o th e r  than  he d id ,  o r  w h e ther  he need  n o t  have been  caused  
to  a c t  by h i s  f i r s t  o rd e r  d e s i r e .
H arry  G. F r a n k f u r t ,  i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  'Freedom o f  th e  w i l l  
and th e  concep t o f  a ie r s o n *  (6) a rg u e s  t h a t  th e  assum ption  
t h a t  a man co u ld  have done o th e r  than  he d id  i s  n o t  n e c e ssa ry  
to  ou r a t t r i b u t i o n  to  him o f  autonomy and , c o n se q u e n t ly ,  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  A ccord ing  to  F r a n k f u r t ,  even i f  a man 
cou ld  n o t  have done o th e r  than  he d id  (co u ld  n o t  b u t  have
been caused to  a c t  by a f i r s t  o rd e r  d e s i r e  o f  h i s )  he a c te d
o f  h i s  own f r e e  w i l l  i f  he gave h i s  a s s e n t  to  t h i s  f i r s t  
o rd e r  d e s ire '^an d  a llow ed  i t  to  be m o t iv a t io n a l ly  e f f i c a c i o u s ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w hether he had any genuine  a b i l i t y  to  a l lo w  i t  
o r  n o t .  We a b so lv e  a man o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n  
i f  he a c t s  on ly  because  he co u ld  n o t  have done o therw ise*  
b u t  n o t  i f  he cou ld  n o t  have done o th e rw ise  and a l s o  wanted 
to  Rant to  do what he d id .  But t h i s  accou n t o f  a m an 's 
autonomy has th e  e f f e c t  o f  making our a t t r i b u t i o n s  o f
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  dependen t on mere c o n t in g e n c ie s .  I f  a man 
canno t b u t  be cau se d  to  a c t  by a c e r t a i n  f i r s t  o rd e r  d e s i r e  
o f  h i s ,  th e n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he a s s e n t s  to  i t  i s  a c o n t in g e n t  
one; he might j u s t  a s  w e l l  have w i th h e ld  h i s  a s s e n t  and t h i s  
co u ld  have had no in f lu e n c e  on what he d id  b e ca u se  i t  c o u ld  
have no i n f lu e n c e  on th e  d e s i r e  which caused  him to  do i t .  
P e rh ap s  we c o u ld  make th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between v o lu n ta ry  and 
in v o lu n ta ry  a c t i o n  dependen t on w h e th er  a man had second o rd e r  
d e s i r e s  o r  n o t  and make t h i s  th e  b a s i s  o f  our a t t r i b u t i o n s  o f  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  E u t i t  would be  a s  though we a t t r i b u t e d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  a man f o r  h i s  a c t io n  i f  he s e e s  t h a t  i t  i s  
i n e v i t a b l e  and d e c id e s  to  go th ro ugh  w ith  i t  w ith  a good 
g ra c e ,  to  g r i n  and b e a r  i t  a s  i t  w ere , where we would n o t  
a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  him i f  he a c te d  s u l k i l y  o r  
a n g r i l y ,  a s  though he d id  n o t  y /art to  do what he  d id .  
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a t t r i b u t e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  such c o n t in g e n c ie s  
would seem to  b e  a very  a t t e n u a t e d  form o f  r e s : o n ta b i l i t y .  
A lso , i f  a man c o n fe r r e d  th e  s t a t u s  o f  re a s o n s  on th e  c a u se s  
o f  h i s  a c t i o n  by g iv in g  h i s  a s s e n t  to  them, th e re b y  
e n a b l in g  u s  to  c a l l  th e  a c t i o n  v o lu n ta r y ,  t h i s  would seem to  
be  a ve ry  a t t e n u a t e d  form o f  r e a s o n ,  and c o u ld  h a rd ly  be 
the  e lem ent in  v i r t u e  o f  which we c a l l  an a c t i o n  v o lu n ta ry .
The freedom  to  g iv e  o n e 's  a s s e n t  o r  n o t  to  whet i s  i n e v i t a b l e  
i s  a vacuous s o r t  o f  freedom , and i t  seems t h a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  
b e in g  a b le  to  do o th e r  than: one does canno t be escaped  i n  
t h i s  way.
The assum ption  t h a t  a m an 's second  o rd e r  d e s i r e s  r e a l l y  
can in f lu e n c e  which o f  h i s  f i r s t  o r d e r  d e s i r e s  r e s u l t  i n  
a c t i o n ,  o r  w hether any o f  them do, i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  the  
a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  any s i g n i f i c a n t  se n se .  But 
i f  t h i s  i s  80, to  say t h a t  a man’ s autonomy i s  m a n i fe s te d  in  
h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  g iv e  h i s  a s s e n t  to  c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  as  c au se s
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o f  h i s  a c t i o n ,  and t h a t  by do ing  t h i s  t h e  c au ses  become h i s  
r e a so n s  and he a c t s  o f  h i s  own f r e e  w i l l  i s ,  i t  seems, 
n o th in g  more than  an over  co m p lica te d  way o f  sa y in g  t h a t  a 
man’ s autonomy i s  m a n ife s te d  in  h i s  a b i l i t y  to  do what he 
r e a l l y  w ants to  do: i n  one sen se  I have an immediate d e s i r e
to  e a t  a cake , b u t  I  do n o t  r e a l l y  want to  and so my 
autonomy shows i t s e l f  in  my a b i l i t y  to  r e f r a i n  from e a t i n g  
i t .  But even when we a c t  v o l u n t a r i l y  o r  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  we 
do n o t  always do what we r e a l l y  want to  do. We o f te n  a c t  
i n c o n t i n e n t l y ,  so i t  must n o t  be  made a n e c e ssa ry  c o n d i t io n  
o f  v o l u n ta r in e s s  t h a t  a man always a c t s  in  accordance  w ith  
h i s  second o r d e r  d e s i r e s .  I t  i s  e n o u ^  t h a t  a man sho u ld  
know what he r e a l l y  w ants to  do, s in c e  he i s  then  in  p o s s e s s io n  
o f  th e  r e a so n s  f o r  and a g a i n s t  th e  a c t i o n  he c o n te m p la te s  and 
t h i s  i s  th e  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  v o l u n t a r in e s s  and 
co n seq u e n tly  o f  th e  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I f  he 
a c t s  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a g a i n s t  h i s  own b e t t e r  judgement he co u ld  
have done o th e rw is e .
I t  ml gilt be o b je c te d ,  r i ^ t l y , t h a t  th e  a b i l i t y  to  
have second o rd e r  d e s l r e s 'w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  th e  d e s i r e s  which 
m o tiv a te  a man’ s a c t io n s  does n o t ,  even i f  th e s e  second o rd e r  
d e s i r e s  r e a l l y  can in f lu e n c e  our a c t io n s  v i a  ou r  f i r s t  o rd e r  
d e s i r e s ,  show t h a t  a man i s  a c t i n g  o f  h i s  own f r e e  w i l l .  A 
man’s second o rd e r  d e s i r e s  may be c a u s a l ly  detex*mlned in  
which c a se  he co u ld  no t have wanted to  want o th e r  th an  he d id  
want a rd  so cann o t he h e ld  r e s p o n s ib l e  e i t h e r  f o r  th e  d e s i r e s  
which m o tiv a te d  h i s  a c t io n  o r ,  i n  consequence , f o r  th e  a c t io n  
i t s e l f .
The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a man’ s second o rd e r  d e s i r e s  b e in g  
c a u s a l ly  de te rm in ed  by som ething o t h e r  than  h im s e l f  does 
c r e a t e  problems and th e  assum ption  t h a t  they  a re  n o t  i s  
v i t a l  to  th e  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and to  our n o t io n
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o f  v o lu n ta r ln e s B .  A man can have re a so n s  f o r  a g r e a t  many 
o f  h i s  d e s i r e s ,  h u t  i t  i s  i n  v i r t u e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n  in  which 
they  s ta n d  to  h i s  more g e n e ra l  o r  b a s i c  d e s i r e s  t h a t  th e s e  
re a so n s  a re  re a so n s  a s  w e l l  as c a u s e s ,  and t h a t  a man can 
be c a l l e d  a v o lu n ta ry  a g e n t .  But u l t i m a t e l y ,  i n  th e  c h a in  o f
second o rd e r  d e s i r e s ,  we a r r i v e  a t  d e s i r e s  f o r  which no 
rea so n s  can be  g iv e n ;  one j u s t  has  o n e ’ s b a s i c  d e s i r e s ,  
and i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  our concep t o f  v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  and a 
g r e a t  many r e l a t e d  c o n ce p ts  t h a t  t h e r e  shou ld  be no c au se s  o f 
th e s e  b a s i c  d e s i r e s .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  c a u s e s ,  th e s e  sh o u ld  stem 
from th e  man h im s e l f  and u l t i m a t e l y ,  i f  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  i s  
to  be av o id ed , we must come to  some c au se s  which a re  them se lves  
uncaused .
The e s s e n t i a l  n o t io n  o f  a man’ s d e s i r e s  ’ stemming from 
h i m s e l f ’ and no t b e in g  caused  by ’ som eth ing  o th e r  than  
h im s e l f ’ r a i s e s  p ro b le m a t ic  q u e s t io n s  abou t th e  image o f  th e  
s e l f  we have. I t  seems t h a t  t h i s  image can on ly  be d e f in e d  
n e g a t iv e ly  i f  a t  a l l .  I f  we c o u ld  i d e n t i f y  a n y th in g  a s  th e  
cause  o f  a man’ s most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  we cou ld  no lo n g e r  
d e s c r ib e  them as stemming from h im s e l f .  I f ,  f o r  exam ple, ,
a man’ s p e rs o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  gave r i s e  to  some o f  h i s  '^k
most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  ( i n  many c a se s  b a s i c  d e s i r e s  and p e rs o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  can be e q u a ted  w ith  one a n o th e r )  and th e  
cause  o f  h i s  p e rs o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  co u ld  be t r a c e d  to  some
p h y s io lo g ic a l ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  f e a t u r e  such a s  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of
/
h i s  g en es , we co u ld  no lo n g e r  say t h a t  h i s  d e s i r e s  stemmed 
from h im s e l f .  The very  e lu s iv e n e s s  o f  th e  id e a  o f  th e  s e l f  
which we have i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  i t .  I f  i t  c ea sed  to  e lu d e  us 
and c o u ld  be  t i e d  down, i t ,  and many o f  our most b a s ic  co n cep ts  
which depend on i t ,  would v a n is h .  T here  a re  some t h in g s  we 
might say about th e  s e l f ,  f o r i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  an i n s t i g a t o r  
o f  c a u se s .  But more than  t h i s  we cann o t say and s t i l l  r e t a i n
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th e  n o t io n  o f  th e  s e l f#
I f  t h e r e  a r e  no c au se s  o f  our most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  t h e r e  
can e q u a l ly  be no re a so n s  f o r  them, b u t  i f  t h e r e  can be no 
re a so n s  f o r  them, th en  we can no t be r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  them.
The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c h o ic e  o r  d e c i s io n  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  th e  
n o t io n s  o f  v o l u n ta r in e s s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  b u t  we canno t 
d e c id e  on t h in g s  f o r  which we have no r e a s o n s ,  end we have 
no re a s o n s  f o r  our most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  b ecau se  we j u s t  have 
t h m .  The n o t io n  o f  th e  s e l f  depends on our hav ing  no 
re a so n s  f o r  our b a s i c  d e s i r e s .  But a l th o u g h  t h i s  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  we canno t s e r is ib ly  be h e ld  r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  them, 
p a r a d o x ic a l ly ,  we cannot be  exempted from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
them s in c e  t h i s  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  were cau ses  o f  them 
which would in  tu r n  mean t h a t  we c o u ld  n o t  have th e  image o f  
th e  s e l f  which we do have and which I s  e s s e n t i a l  to  the  
n o t io n  o f  v o l u n t a r in e s s .
T h is  whole a re a  i s  f r a u g h t  w ith  paradoxes s in c e  i t  i s  in  
v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  we canno t be h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  our 
most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  (becau se  t h a t  we canno t have re a so n s  f o r  
them i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  our image o f  th e  s e l f )  t h a t  we can  be  
h e ld  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  our l e s s  b a s i c  d e s i r e s  (and c o n seq u e n tly  
f o r  our a c t i o n s )  and t h a t  we can say t h a t  th e  cau se s  f o r  o u r 
l e s s  b a s i c  d e s i r e s  stem  from o u r s e lv e s  and so c o n s t i t u t e  
r e a so n s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a genuine  d e c i s io n  b a sed  on 
second o rd e r  d e s i r e s  a s  to  w hether a f i r s t  o r d e r  d e s i r e  sho u ld  
m o tiv a te  an a c t io n  i s ,  p a r a d o x i c a l l y ,  dependent on th e  
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a genuine  d e c i s io n  in  th e  a re a  o f  our most 
b a s i c  d e s i r e s .
irerhaps t h i s  image o f  th e  s e l f  i s  a nebu lous  m etap h y s ica l  
a ssu m ptio n , and pe rh ap s  i t  i s  m y th o lo g ic a l ,  b u t  w i th o u t  t h i s  
a ssum ption  we would be d iv e s te d  o f  many o f  o u r  most fundam ental
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c o n c e p ts .  We c o u ld  n o t have th e  co n cep t o f  d e s i r e  as 
som eth ing  which e s s e n t i a l l y  stems from a man h im s e l f  a id ,  i f  
yje d id  n o t  have t h i s  co n cep t  o f  d e s i r e ,  t h e r e  cou ld  he no 
n e c e ssa ry  c o n n e c t io n  betw een d e s i r e s  and m otives  o f  a c t io n .
I t  would be  as im p o s s ib le  to  e x p la in  how a d e s i r e  b ro u g h t  
about an a c t io n  as  i t  would be  to  e x p la in  how th e  f a c t  t h a t  
a man had b lu e  e y e s ,  o r  h e ld  a c e r t a i n  b e l i e f ,  by i t s e l f  
b ro u g h t  abou t an a c t io n  o f  h i s .  T here  co u ld  be  no re a so n s  
f o r  a c t i o n ,  on ly  c a u se s  o f  a c t i o n ,  b e cau se  som ething  i s  a 
re a so n  f o r  a c t io n  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  s ta n d s  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to  th e  a g e n t ’ s d e s i r e s .  And i f  th e re  c o u ld  be no 
re a so n s  f o r  a c t i o n ,  t h e r e  c o u ld  b e  no v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  
a rd  so no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  T h is  i s  p e rh ap s  th e  l e a s t  s e r io u s
o f  th e  consequences . We c o u ld  c o n ce iv a b ly  do w ith o u t  th e
n o t io n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  b u t  n o t  w ith o u t  d e s i r e s .  On th e  
o th e r  hand , i t  h a s ,  I  t h in k ,  been  shown t h a t  i f  we have th e  
concep t o f  d e s i r e  as som eth ing  which e s s e n t i a l l y  stem s from 
a man h im s e l f  and a s  som eth ing  which m o tiv a te s  an a c t io n ,  we 
a u to m a t i c a l ly  have th e  n o t io n  o f  v o lu n ta ry  a c t io n  and, 
c o n se q u e n t ly ,  t h a t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The assum ption , 
which I  s a i d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  must be  
examined, t h a t  i t  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a d e s i r e  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  
rea so n  f o r  an a c t io n  which c o n fe r s  v o l u n ta r in e s s  on t h a t  
a c t i o n ,  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  a ssum ption . The n o t io n s  o f  d e s i r e s  
a s  r e a s o n s  and v o l u n ta r in e s s  a re  i n e x t r i c a b l y  en tw ined  and 
m u tu a l ly  dependen t.
B u t ,  i t  m ight be o b je c te d ,  t i^ is  may be s o ,  b u t  i t  does
n o t  show t h a t  we car; ho ld  a man r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  h i s  d e s i r e s  o r ,
c o n se q u e n t ly ,  f o r  th e  a c t io n s  they  m o tiv a te .  S u re ly  th e  
a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  any s i g n i f i c a n t  sen se  must 
depend on the  n o t io n  o f  h a v in g  been a b le  to  do o th e rw is e  and, 
where a man’ s most b a s i c  d e s i r e s  a re  c o r .c e r re d ,  ( a rd  even where
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hlB l e s s  b a s i c  d e s i r e s  a re  con cerned) i t  makes no se n se  to  
say he c o u ld  have w anted o therw ise*  The answer to  t h i s  i s  
t h a t  a l th o u g h  a man can n o t u s u a l ly  be h e ld  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
th e  d e s i r e s  which he has  ( though  he m ight be  r e s p o n s ib l e  
f o r  h a v in g  a d e s i r e  i f  he had c u l t i v a t e d  i t )  he i s  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  
i n  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s e n s e ,  f o r  a l lo w in g  o r  n o t  a l lo w in g  h i s  f i r s t  
o r d e r  d e s i r e s  to  be m o t i v a t i o n a l l y  e f f i c a c i o u s  b ecau se  i n  t h i s  
a r e a  he r e a l l y  can d e c id e  which o f  h i s  d e s i r e s  he w ishes  to  
r e s u l t  i n  a c t io n  b e ca u se  he r e a l l y  does have re a s o n s  on th e  
b a s i s  o f  which to  make th e s e  d e c i s i o n s ,  ( t h i s  does n o t  mean 
t h a t  he w i l l  a lw ays do what he d e c id e s  he war t s  to  d o ) .  A 
man, to  be a v o lu n ta r y  a g e n t ,  must have t h i s  s o r t  o f  
autonomy; he must n o t  be a t  th e  mercy o f  h i s  f i r s t  o rd e r  d e s i r e s .
I t  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n ,  however, o f  t h i s  s o r t  o f  
' autonomy t h a t  a mai: shou ld  n o t  be r e s p o n s i b l e  in  th e  same 
se n se  ( t h e  sense  in  which he can have re a s o n s  and so make a 
d e c i s io n )  f o r  h i s  most b a s i c  d e s i r e s ,  a s  has  a l r e a d y  been 
shown. We m i ^ t  a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  him f o r  h i s  
b a s i c  d e s i r e s  i n  a r a t h e r  s p e c i a l  se n se  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  
th e  s e n s e ,  p e rh a p s ,  in  which they  can b e  a s c r ib e d  to  him.
But t h i s  does n o t ,  and c a i in o t ,  c a r r y  any i m p l i c a t i o n s  abou t 
b e in g  a b le  to  want o th e rw is e .  U l t im a te ly ,  i f  we a re  to  have 
th e  co n cep t o f  v o l u n t a r i n e s s  a t  a l l ,  we have to  g e t  beyond 
th e  n o t io n  o f  h a v in g  been a b le  to  do o r  want o th e rw is e .
The image o f  th e  s e l f ,  abou t which a l l  we can say i s  t h a t  
i t  i s ,  o r  i s  th e  so u rc e  o f ,  a man’ s most b a s i c  d e s i r e s ,  i s  
n e c e ssa ry  t o  o u r  con cep t o f  v o lu n ta ry  a c t i o n  b e ca u se  some o f  
th e  f a c t o r s  which impose c o n s t r a i n t  on a man’ s re a so n  f o r  
a c t io n  m ust, i f  th e  a c t io n  i s  to  be v o lu n ta r y ,  s tem  from 
h im s e l f  and i t  i s  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e s e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  tiie  a c t io n  
i s  v o lu n ta r y .  I t  i s  n o t ,  however, n e c e s s a ry  to  o u r  co n cep t  
o f  b e l i e f  b e ca u se  i t  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  b e l i e f  t h a t
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